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Countries around the world set ambitious targets to substantially reduce their greenhouse 
gasses emissions, including those which come from electricity sector. This requires a 
transition to a low carbon electricity generation and supply system, which in part, can be met 
by increasing distributed generation (DG) connection and implementing demand side 
response (DSR) programme on distribution network. Therefore, the role of distribution 
network operators (DNOs) in facilitating the connection of new DG and the implementation 
of DSR programme is vital. In order to encourage DNOs to be more active in the low carbon 
transition, the energy regulator needs to set up financial incentives for DNOs.  
Current DG incentive mechanism, which is applied in the UK, aims to incentivise DNOs 
based on the amount of DG capacity connected to the network. Consequently, in a 
generation-dominated area, the incentives might not be sufficient to cover the reinforcement 
required for connecting DGs, which in turn, the output energy from DGs will be excessively 
curtailed. Therefore, this research proposes a new approach, called energy-based DG 
incentive mechanism. This mechanism will incentivise DNOs based on the utilization of 
available DG energy on the network and its relation with the requirement of network 
reinforcement.  
In terms of DSR incentives, different mechanisms have been applied in some countries, 
including Australia and USA. Some of the mechanisms incentivise DNOs based on the 
investment cost or forgone revenue related to DSR initiatives, as implemented in demand 
management incentive and rate of return mechanisms. Other mechanisms aim to incentivise 
DNOs based on the energy savings or avoided costs of supply associated with DSR 
participation, as implemented in shared savings and avoided cost mechanisms. Those 
mechanisms operate independently without any correlation between them. Therefore, this 
research   develops a new approach to assess the relation between DSR investment cost and 
DSR participation, called energy-based DSR incentive mechanism. This mechanism will 
incentivise DNOs based on the utilization of available DSR energy on the network and its 
relation with the required investment.  
Comparing with current incentive mechanisms, both energy-based DG incentive and energy-
based DSR incentive can reflect the effectiveness of DNOs to deal with the required 
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1.1.1 Use of Renewable Energy Sources to Tackle Climate Change 
Nowadays climate change has become one of the most concerned problems around the world. 
This phenomenon can cause sea level rises, temperature rises and extreme weather events, 
such as heat waves, storms, flood and drought, that threaten not only peoples’ health and way 
of life but also the existence of plants and animals. The main cause of climate change is the 
emission of greenhouse gasses, like carbon dioxide and methane. One of the sources of 
carbon dioxide comes from energy production which uses fossil fuels to generate energy. In 
order to tackle the effects of climate change and to minimise further dangerous risk, one of 
the most appropriate ways is by decarbonising energy production.  
Renewable energy sources are important and beneficial, not only to replace fossil fuels in 
terms of the reduction of carbon emission in energy generation, but also to cope with the need 
for sustainable sources to fulfil the growth of demand for energy over the next few decades, 
which is combined with the depletion of fossil fuels in the near future. Some countries have a 
specific target to reduce their dependence on fossil-fuelled power plants and turn to 
renewable energy power plants.  
UK has targeted that 15% of energy will be taken from renewable sources by 2020. It is 
projected that 30% of the 2020 target for electricity generation could be met by utilizing 
onshore and offshore wind, but important contributions from hydro, sustainable bio-energy, 
marine sources and small-scale technologies, must be considered as well [1].  
USA has targeted that 20% of total power consumed will be taken from Renewable Power by 
2020 [2]. This target is expected to be achieved gradually, i.e.  not less than 10 percent in 
2015, not less than 15 percent in 2016 and 2017, not less than 17.5 percent in 2018 and 2019 
and finally, not less than 20 percent by 2020 [3]. 
Through the Renewable Energy Target (RET) scheme, Australia also targeted to reach 20% 
of its electricity production derived from renewable sources by 2020. The RET is designed to 
transform Australia’s energy generation mix to be cleaner and to have more various sources 




1.1.2 Deployment of Distributed Generation (DG) 
In terms of electricity generation and supply, there are two methods which have significant 
impact on achieving the target in reducing greenhouse gasses emissions and increasing the 
penetration of renewable energy sources in electricity production, i.e. increasing the 
connection of distributed generation (DG) and implementing demand side response (DSR). 
The first method to achieve the targets is by increasing the connection of distributed 
generation (DG). Since most of DGs come from renewable resources they can contribute in 
reducing carbon emissions from the electricity sector and increasing the use of renewable 
sources to replace fossil fuels. 
Distributed generations (DGs) are directly connected to the distribution network rather than 
transmission network and the electricity generated is being used locally rather than 
distributed to a wider area, so that, the loading level of branches and substation transformers 
at which they are connected might decrease. This can substantially reduce energy losses 
during energy transmission [5][6][7] and improve supply reliability [8]. It might also cause 
the deferment of distribution and transmission networks investment.  
The presence of DGs on electricity distribution network has also changed the nature of the 
network. In a conventional network, the power flows in one-directional way, from the 
transmission or distribution networks to the demands or loads. On the network with 
connected DGs, the power flows in bi-directional way, from the transmission or distribution 
networks to the demands or loads, and vice versa [9]. This requires more sophisticated 
network configuration and technology application, such as smart grid and smart meters. A 
mechanism called active network management (ANM) can also be deployed to deal with this 
issue. This mechanism allows distribution network operators (DNOs) to automatically control 
and coordinate devices (demand) and resources (DGs) to manage the network constraints 
[20]. 
Currently, according to some reports, the penetration of DGs on distribution network is quite 
low in some countries, such as Australia, United States of America and the United Kingdom. 
DGs contribute around 1.36% of the total electricity generation in Australia [10], 18.98% of 
the total electricity generation in US [11] and approximately 7.5% of the total electricity 





1.1.3 Implementation of Demand Side Response (DSR) Programme  
The second method to achieve the target is by implementing demand side response (DSR). 
The implementation of DSR, through demand reduction and demand shifting mechanisms, 
has the potential to reduce carbon emissions. These mechanisms will impact on the more 
efficient use of electricity generation as well as minimising the use of less efficient generation 
plants, which mostly come from fossil fuelled power plants [13][14].  
Demand Side Response (DSR) is described as a mechanism to reduce peak demand, as well 
as to respond the requirement to balance the system, due to electricity demand is greater than 
total available electricity, either by reducing electricity demand, shifting the times of 
electricity consumption at peak times to other off-peak times in a day, or by running on-site 
generation [15][16][17]. 
Besides contributing in carbon emissions reduction, the implementation of DSR on electricity 
distribution network can provides other benefits, not only for the DNO but also for all 
associated parties who participate in distributing electricity, including suppliers, retailers, 
aggregators and consumers. 
DSR, in the forms of peak demand reduction, either by demand reduction or demand shifting, 
can reduce the requirement of new network investment as well as reduce the required 
capacity from additional electricity generation [18]. Peak demand reduction also impacts on 
reducing the price of electricity paid by consumers, since they can avoid the use of expensive 
electricity prices at peak times [18]. DSR can also reduce the scarcity of electricity by 
running on-site generation, at times when electricity supply from transmission network is 
disturbed [19]. This mechanism will maintain the reliability of supply to the customers as 
well as reduce the emissions due to network losses and mitigate negative environmental 
impacts from fossil-fuelled power plants [17][19]. 
Some countries, such as Australia, US and the UK have run some DSR trials on their 
electricity distribution network. The trials show that the implementation of DSR can reduce 







1.1.4 Current Incentive Mechanisms for DNOs 
A. DG Incentive Mechanism 
The presence of DGs and the implementation of DSR programme is important to move 
towards the low carbon transition because they can contribute in reducing the carbon 
emissions from electricity sector. Since DG Connection and DSR programme are 
implemented on distribution networks, the role of DNOs is vital, considering they are 
responsible for network operation, maintenance and development. 
Currently, DNOs do not have huge experience in connecting large amount of DGs and 
implementing DSR programmes. Therefore, the government or the energy regulators need to 
provide supporting incentive mechanisms which can encourage DNOs to be more active in 
the development of DGs and DSR programmes. 
DG incentive mechanism, which is currently applied in the UK [24], aims to give incentives 
for distribution network operators based on the DG capacity that DNOs have connected to the 
network. This incentive mechanism is uniform, means that the value of the incentives given 
to the DNOs for them to connect per unit DG capacity is the same across the country. 
This research analysis shows that different DG technologies have different value of DG 
parameters, including capacity factor, electricity generation cost and operational time. These 
parameters will determine the amount of energy that can be generated by a particular DG. 
This means that the same DG capacity from different technology will generate different 
amount of energy. The analysis also shows that DG connection at different locations on a 
network, i.e. at a generation-dominated area and at a demand-dominated area, will have 
different effects. DG connection at a generation-dominated area will cause the power flow to 
increase. As the amount of power flow increases, the power losses will increase as well. 
Meanwhile, the opposite effects are resulted from the connection of DG at a demand-
dominated area. This connection will decrease the power flow on related lines. As a result, 
the power losses of those lines will decrease as well. Considering these results, current DG 
incentive mechanism which is mainly based on the DG capacity, might not give equal 
treatment for DG connection with different DG technologies and at different location on the 
network.  
Capacity-based mechanism also can lead to an undesirable consequence, where the incentives 
might not sufficient to cover the reinforcement required to connect DGs in the generation-
dominated area, which in turn, DNOs will have to excessively curtail DG generation.  There 
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will therefore be the case to design DG incentives according to the actual energy conveyed by 
DNOs, instead of DG capacity connection, as significant energy may have to be curtailed. 
Through energy based DG incentives, DNOs can provide better economic message to 
renewable investors of the likely usable energy from their generation plant, encouraging a 
more balanced generation/network development. 
B. DSR Incentive Mechanism 
For the purpose of incentivising DNOs associated with DSR implementation on their 
distribution network, some countries including Australia and USA have applied different 
incentive mechanisms, including demand management incentive, rate of return, shared 
savings and avoided cost mechanisms. 
Demand management incentive mechanism, which is currently applied in Australia, aims to 
incentivise DNOs based on the investment costs and forgone revenues associated with DSR 
initiatives [25]. Shared savings mechanism allows DNOs to receive a percentage share of the 
energy saving as a result of Demand Response (DR) or Energy Efficiency (EE) program. 
Rate of return mechanism allows DNOs to earn profit on DR and EE investment, based on 
their rate base. Avoided cost mechanism allows DNOs to receive a percentage of their 
avoided supply costs as their DR and EE savings compensation. The last three mechanisms 
are currently applied in USA [26]. 
Currently, the existing DSR incentive mechanisms operate independently without any 
correlation between them. Therefore, this research develops a new approach to assess the 
relation between the required investment to implement DSR programme and the actual DSR 
energy participation. Through energy based DSR incentives, DNOs can be encouraged to be 
more effective in implementing DSR programme on their network. 
1.1.5 Effective Incentive Mechanisms for DNOs 
This research proposes two new approaches to set incentives for DNOs associated with DG 
connection and DSR implementation on distribution networks, i.e. energy-based DG 
incentive and energy-based DSR incentive mechanisms. 
Energy-based DG incentive mechanism is a mechanism to incentivise DNOs in connecting 
DG on their network, based on the utilization of available DG energy on the network and its 
relation with the requirement of network reinforcement. The higher the energy from the 
connected DG can be conveyed, the higher the incentive for DNOs. The maximum incentive 
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will be given to DNOs if the available DG energy can be fully utilized. Meanwhile, the 
minimum incentive will be given if the connected DG can only convey energy at its 
minimum requirement. If the connected DG cannot meet the minimum requirement, DNOs 
will not be incentivised.  
In a generation-dominated area, a new DG connection might cause the network capacity is 
not sufficient to accommodate the total DG capacity. This will result in two options, either by 
curtailing the energy from the connected DG to suit the network capacity, or by reinforcing 
the network to accommodate all available DG capacity. In financial point of view, the less 
cost the better. If the network reinforcement is chosen, the value of a new investment must be 
higher, or more worthy, than the value of energy curtailment. At the point where the value of 
DG curtailment is equal to the value of network reinforcement, the minimum requirement for 
energy to be conveyed is obtained.  
Hence, energy-based DG incentive mechanism can encourage DNOs to be more effective in 
in facilitating DG connection on their network by considering the utilization of available DG 
energy on their network.  
This research also proposes an energy-based DSR incentive mechanism, i.e. a mechanism to 
incentivise DNOs in association with the implementation of DSR programme on their 
network. This mechanism considers two factors in implementing DSR programme, including 
the investment cost and the utilization of available DSR energy on the network. 
The investment cost includes all costs that fall under DNOs responsibility, such as 
communication system upgrade cost, software cost, consumer education cost and programme 
administration and management cost. The higher the investment cost the higher the incentive 
for the DNOs.  
Besides the investment cost, the energy-based DSR incentive for DNOs also considers the 
utilization of available DSR energy on the network. The available DSR energy is based on 
the agreement between customers and DNOs or suppliers on how much energy can be 
participated in DSR programme. The higher the DSR energy utilization, the higher the 
incentive for the DNOs. The maximum DSR incentive will be given to DNOs if the available 
DSR energy can be fully utilized. 
Through energy-based DSR incentives, DNOs can be encouraged to be more effective in 




The objectives of this thesis are: 
1) To assess the impact of DG connections to an existing distribution network, especially in 
a generator-dominated area and in a demand-dominated area, in terms of voltage level, 
power losses and network capacity utilization. 
2) To develop a method to form an effective energy-based DG Incentive for DNOs based on 
the utilization of the available DG energy on the network. 
3) To assess the impact of DSR on network performance, i.e. voltage level, power losses and 
network capacity utilization, through demand reduction, demand shifting and running on-
site generation. 
4) To develop a method to form an effective energy-based DSR Incentive for DNOs based 
on the utilization of the available DSR energy on the network. 
5) To develop a method to form a mixed energy-based DG and DSR Incentives for DNOs 
related to the connection of a DG and the implementation of DSR programme on the 
same distribution network. 
1.3 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
1) This research develops a new approach to assess the impact of DG connection on the 
performance of a distribution network. The assessment is carried out by analysing the 
effects of DG connection at a generation-dominated area and at a demand-dominated 
area, in terms of voltage level, power losses and network capacity utilization. The results 
of this assessment have been published in two different papers. 
2) This research develops a new approach in incentivising DNOs to promote DG 
connection on their distribution network. DG incentive is given based on the utilization 
of available DG energy on the network and its relation with the requirement of network 
reinforcement. Since the value of DG incentive based on the actual energy, a DNO who 
can convey all available DG energy on their network will receive incentives at its 
maximum value. However, DNOs must ensure that the connected DGs can convey the 
minimum required energy through the network. Otherwise, DNOs will not be 
incentivised. Hence, this mechanism could encourage DNOs to be more effective in their 
investment to accommodate DG connection on their network by considering the 
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utilization of available DG energy. This new approach has been written in a paper which 
is currently waiting for publication. 
3) This research develops a new approach to set a DSR incentive mechanism, based on the 
utilization of available DSR energy on the distribution network and its relation with the 
required investment. The higher the energy from DSR participation, the higher the 
incentive for the DNOs. DNOs will receive the maximum value of DSR incentive when 
they can utilize the available DSR energy as required. This means that the value of DSR 
incentive received by DNOs could encourage DNOs to be more effective in their 
investment to implement DSR programme on their network by considering the utilization 
of available DSR energy.   
4) This research also develops a new approach to set a mixed DG and DSR incentives 
mechanism, based on the utilization of available DG and DSR energy on the distribution 
network and their relation with the required investment. The higher the energy utilization 
from DG and DSR participation, the higher the incentive for the DNOs. DNOs will 
receive the maximum value of incentive when they can utilize the available DG and DSR 
energy in their system. This means that the value of incentives received by DNOs could 
reflect the effectiveness of DNOs in providing DG connection and implementing DSR 
programme on the same distribution network, simultaneously.    
1.4 OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 1 describes the background, main contribution, objectives, and outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 consists of a comprehensive literature review of Distributed Generation and 
Demand Side Response, including the reasons to move forwards the low carbon transition, 
definition and characterization of DG, current installed DG capacity, barriers and the 
mitigation measures for DG and DSR. This chapter also describes the requirement of 
incentives for DNOs to facilitate DG connection and DSR implementation. Furthermore, the 
current DG incentive and DSR incentive mechanisms which are applied in different 
countries, including Australia, USA and the UK are explained. 
Chapter 3 describes the assessment of DG connection and DSR implementation on 
distribution network performances, in terms of voltage level, power losses and network 
capacity utilization. This chapter provides a simulation network to observe the impact of 
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connecting new DGs to the existing busbar, both at generation-dominated area and at 
demand-dominated area. The simulation network is also used to observe the impact of DSR 
on distribution network, through demand reduction, demand shifting and running on-site 
generation. 
Chapter 4 provides a new scheme to form Energy-based DG Incentives for Distribution 
Network Operators. This chapter explains the principles, the structure and the methodology 
used to develop energy-based DG incentives mechanism. The proposed mechanism which 
considers the type of DG technology, the location of DG connection and the network 
configuration is examined in case studies. 
Chapter 5 provides a new scheme to form Energy-based DSR Incentives for Distribution 
Network Operators. This chapter explains the principles, the structure and the methodology 
used to develop energy-based DSR incentives mechanism. Case studies are provided to 
examine the proposed mechanism.   
Chapter 6 describes the analysis of mixed DG and DSR implementation on a particular 
network configuration. This chapter also develops and explains the principles, the structure 
and the methodology used to form energy-based incentive mechanism for this mixed 
implementation. The explanation is complemented with case study. 




2 DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND 
DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE 
2.1 MOVING TOWARDS THE LOW CARBON TRANSITION 
In order to tackle the impact of climate change, the government or the energy regulators need 
to provide supporting regulations to move towards the low carbon transition. Some countries 
have set a target to substantially reduce their carbon emissions, which come from many 
sources including electricity sector. In electricity generation and supply process, the reduction 
of carbon emission can be gained by increasing the number of distributed generation (DG) 
and implementing demand side response (DSR) on distribution network.  
The presence of distributed generation (DGs) to generate electricity can reduce carbon 
emissions as well as increase the penetration of renewable resources because, mostly, they 
use renewable energy sources to produce electricity. However, the presence of renewable 
DGs might require more reserve generations to anticipate the supply scarcity due to those 
DGs are out of service. The reserve generations consist of generations with quick start-up, of 
which, they are usually fossil fuelled generations. If this is the case, the presence of 
renewable DGs could increase carbon emissions emitted from the reserve generations. 
While the implementation of DSR through demand reduction and demand shifting 
mechanisms, can also contribute in reducing carbon emissions. These mechanisms are 
allowing more efficient use of existing electricity generation and minimising the use of less 
efficient generations which come from fossil fuelled power plants[13][14]. 
Since DGs connection and DSR implementation are applied on electricity distribution 
network, the role of distribution network operators in both mechanisms is vital. DNOs are 
responsible in operating, maintaining and developing the distribution networks in order to 
deal with the growth of electricity demand within their working area. The development of 
DGs and DSR on electricity distribution network and the role of distribution network 







2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION  
2.2.1 Definition and Characterization of Distributed Generation  
A. Definition of Distributed Generation (DG) 
Distributed Generation (DG) or Embedded Generation is defined as any kind of electricity 
generation which is directly connected to the distribution network rather than transmission 
network, and the electricity generated, is being used locally rather than distributed to a wider 
area. Technically, this definition also includes some large power stations, such as Combined 
Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) technologies of any 
scales, and can be installed by individuals, businesses, communities and schools [27].  
Current technologies of distributed generation which are used worldwide include wind, tidal, 
wave, hydro, solar PV, geothermal, biomass and combined heat and power (CHP) 
technologies [12]. These technologies convert the energy sources, which are mostly 
renewable, directly into electricity. The only technology which might not use renewable 
sources is CHP, which uses fossil fuels to generate electricity. However, it can be set to be 
more efficient by capturing and using the heat, as a by-product of electricity generation. 
Other types of DG technologies are called micro-generations, defined as generations at a 
micro-scale which are located decentralized in power system in community’s scale [28]. In 
terms of electricity, the capacity of micro electricity generation technologies is up to 50kW, 
including solar PV, micro-wind turbines, micro-hydro and micro-CHP [28]. 
Solar photovoltaic (PV), generates electricity from daylight (not just direct sunlight), and 
usually installed on Panels, often roof-mounted. Micro-wind (<100kW), uses small wind 
turbines to generate electricity, can now be roof-mounted as well as attached to. Micro-hydro 
captures the power of flowing water and converts it to electricity. Micro/domestic CHP and 
CHP up to 1MWe, produces electricity and captures the waste heat produced as a by-product. 
CHP used on this scale tends to be for heat and power for a single house or on a community 
or commercial scale (i.e. a housing estate, or an office block). 
B. Characterization of Distributed Generation (DG) 
The types of DG technology can be characterized based on three parameters, including 
capacity factor, levelised cost of energy generation and operational time [29]. These 
parameters will impact on the calculation of energy output from a particular DG. 
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1). DG Capacity Factor 
DG Capacity Factor is the comparison between actual DG energy output for a period of time 
and its full rated energy for the same period [30].  This factor directly indicates the ability of 
DG to deliver energy at its rate and indirectly indicates the supply reliability. Table 2.1 shows 
various value of DG Capacity Factor from different DG technologies.  
Type of Generation Capacity Factor 
Onshore wind 0.350 
Offshore wind 0.430 
Hydro (run of river) 0.400 
Hydro (reservoir) 0.400 
Solar PV 0.097 
Geothermal 0.800 
Biomass 0.900 
CHP  0.675 
Table 2.1 Generation Capacity Factor [30][31] 
2). Levelised cost of energy generation (LCOEG) 
The Levelised cost of energy generation (LCOEG) is described as the ratio of all associated 
costs to generate energy from a power plant over the lifetime of that particular power plant 
[33]. The unit of LCOEG, which is expressed in £/MWh, is presented in table 2.2 for each 







Onshore 75 10MW Gas CHP 82.6 – 191.8 
Offshore 149 Small GT based CHP 75.5 – 176.0 
Hydro 42 CCGT CHP 60.4 – 136.7 
Geothermal 132 Small Biomass CHP 122.4 – 172.9 
Solar PV 202 Large Biomass CHP 113.6 – 160.0 
Table 2.2 levelised cost of energy generation [33][34] 
3). DG Operational Time 
The operational time of a DG is determined by the contract between DG developers and 
DNO. Referring to the UK electricity market, there are four types of DG contracts can be 
chosen by DG developers [35], i.e. Base Load Contract, Daytime Contract, Night-time 
Contract and Load Shape 44 Contract. The division of DG contract types is based on the load 
shape in the day. 
Base Load Contracts generators are eligible for a must-take basis for 24 hours. Generators 
fall under Daytime Contracts might be operated for 12 hours, from 7am until 7pm. The 
Night-time Contract generators will also be operated for 12 hours, but during night-time 
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hours, i.e. between 7pm and 7am. While the Load Shape 44 Contract generators will be partly 
operated on the base load power and partly operated on the daytime.   
2.2.2 The Role of Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) 
Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) have a main role to operate, maintain and develop 
electricity distribution network within their working area. Therefore, DNOs are required to 
accommodate requests for DG connection on their distribution networks.  
Figure 2.1 depicts a distribution network with some DGs connected on it. The presence of 
DGs, which are represented by wind turbines and CHP generation, can change the nature of 
the power flow on the network. In conventional way, the power will flow in one direction 
from the distribution network to the demand. Since DGs are connected at demand side, the 
energy will be delivered from the demand side to the network, so that, the power will flow in 
bi-directional way, from distribution network to the demand, and vice versa. 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution Network with Distributed Generations [9] 
Consequently, there will be costs that must be borne by DNOs which are related to 
installation and connection, as well as routine operational and management fees to operate 
and maintain them. In order to encourage DNOs to be more active in the development of 
DGs, the energy regulators need to provide financial incentive mechanisms. Current DG 
incentive mechanisms are discussed further in section 2.4. 
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2.2.3 Benefits of Distributed Generation 
The development of DG can address the requirement for the energy supply companies to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions and to provide secure, clean and affordable energy [27]. The 
penetration of distributed generation (DG) will also give benefits the consumers or 
communities.  
Since DG is installed near to the demand and the electricity can be directly used by the 
customers, it will reduce transmission losses. The presence of DG, as an additional electricity 
supply, will enhance the security of supply for the customers. Another important benefit of 
DG is related to the environmental impact, i.e. it can contribute in tackling the climate change 
effects. The use of renewable sources to generate electricity, instead of fossil fuels, will 
reduce the greenhouse gasses emissions [27]. 
In terms of customers benefits [27], DG can reduce energy bills and contribute to inhibit 
energy price rises in the future. Moreover, the installation of DG can attract financial 
incentives, such as Feed-In Tariffs, for the customers who installed DG and distributed their 
excess electricity to the grid.  
2.2.4 Current Installed DG Capacity 
Based on the data taken from Australia, USA and the UK, the penetration of DG in electricity 
system is quite low. The total installed DG capacity for each country is describe as follows. 
Australia has 58.86 GW of installed electricity generation capacity. The generation mix 
consists of coal 75%, gas 15%, oil 1%, hydro 5%, wind 2%, biofuels & waste 2%, and solar 
0.1% [36]. DG contributes 798MW or equal to 1.36% of the total electricity generation. The 
types of DG technology which are developed in Australia are wind, hydro, biomass, and solar 
[10]. 
The total capacity of electricity generation in the United States is around 1,054.8 GW, 
consisting of natural gas 39%, coal 30%, nuclear 10%, other gases 0.3%, conventional hydro 
7%, renewables 6%, petroleum 5%, and pump storage 2% [37]. The types of DG 
technologies are vary, including fuel cells, turbines, micro turbines, reciprocating engines, 
wind turbines, photovoltaic, and solar thermal [38] with total capacity of 200 GW, equal to 
18.98% of total electricity generation [39]. 
The United Kingdom, in total, has 93.4 GW of installed electricity generation capacity, 
including natural gas 46%, coal 29%, nuclear 16%, biofuels & waste 4%, wind 3%, oil 1%, 
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and hydro 1% [40]. The contribution of DG is around 7.01 GW, equal to 7.5% of the total 
electricity generation capacity. More than 50% of installed DG capacity is dominated by 
conventional steam stations and CCGT stations, which contributed about 4.647 GW. Another 
50% consists of hydro-electric station (natural flow) which contributes 0.133 GW, wind 
power with 0.484 GW capacity and other renewable sources, include biomass/waste, CHP, 
solar PV and micro-hydro contribute 1.747 GW capacity [28]. 
2.2.5 Barriers on the Deployment of Distributed Generation  
There are four key elements as barriers for the implementation of DG including costs, lack of 
reliable information, planning permission and electricity industry issues. 
A. Costs Barriers 
Higher capital cost and the rewards for exporting electricity, which seems to be small and 
difficult to access, tend to be the disadvantages for the development of DG [27]. 
B. Lack of Reliable Information 
Lack of reliable information about the deployment of DG, [27] includes the diversity of DG 
technologies, the available incentives for DG investors that can be accessed and the 
accreditation scheme for suppliers and installers. 
C. Barriers in Getting Planning Permission 
Planning permission to install DGs in the community development and new housing is 
becoming difficult, especially coupled with the associated costs and delays [27]. 
D. Barriers in Electricity Industry Issues  
In terms of electricity industry issues [27], obtaining efficient technological and economical 
ways to connect DGs to the existing network and the obligation of suppliers to buy excess 
electricity from small generators tend to be substantial issues that must be addressed. 
2.2.6 Mitigation Measures  
To deal with the four key elements of barriers in deploying DGs on electricity distribution 
network, as stated in section 2.2.3, some mitigation measures are taken into account as 
follows. 
A. Mitigation Measures Associated with Costs Barriers 
In order to deal with the associated costs in generating and exporting electricity from DG, the 
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electricity regulator might introduce financial incentives, such as the Feed in Tariffs (FITs) 
mechanism or other financial rewards [27]. 
Feed in Tariffs (FITs) mechanism is a scheme which allows individuals, communities, 
organizations and businesses to invest, and in return, to get a guaranteed payment for the 
electricity they have generated and exported. This mechanism aims to make financial support 
to households and communities, as well as energy businesses and investors, who engage in 
small-scale low carbon electricity generation (less than 5MW) [1]. Some countries have 
applied this mechanism in their electricity markets, including Australia, USA and the UK 
[38][ 41][42][43]. 
Other financial rewards to encourage associated parties to take a part in the deployment of 
DGs, which are currently applied in some countries, are explained as follows. 
In Australia [41], the energy regulators issue an award for the public-recognized leadership in 
Distributed Energy development, called Public Recognition and Award. They also issue 
Default Network Support Payments as a standard or default network support payment to be 
paid by DNOs to DGs for exported electricity to the main grid but, in turn, ensuring that 
DNOs are not disadvantaged in providing such payments. 
In USA, the energy regulator implement Economic Incentives to reduce the economic 
threshold for some projects development, including wind, PV, biomass, hydro, & fuel cell 
[38][42]. 
Meanwhile, the UK’s energy regulator set some mechanisms to encourage DG operators 
increasing the use of renewable energy sources to generate electricity, through Renewable 
Obligation and Green Energy Certificates.  
The Renewable Obligation is a mechanism administered by OFGEM to put obligation on 
licensed suppliers, to take their sources of electricity and to annually increase the proportion 
of their sales from renewable sources. Since it was introduced in 2002, it has accelerated the 
growth of wind generation, especially onshore, with an increase from about 1.3TWh in 2002 
to about 5.8TWh in 2008 [43]. 
Generators, who use renewable energy sources to generate electricity, have the right to claim 
the Green Energy Certificates [44], including Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC), 
Levy Exemption Certificate (LEC) and Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGO).  
- The Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) is a certificate issued by the Government, 
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to demonstrate that a generator has supplied a proportion of its electricity from 
renewable energy sources. One Renewables Obligation Certificate is based on each 
megawatt hour (MWh) of renewable electricity generated [43].  In addition, generators 
can sell ROCs to the suppliers [44]. 
- The Levy Exemption Certificate (LEC) is a certificate for the Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) exemption, i.e. an environmental tax imposed on the supply of a certain taxable 
commodity, like electricity, to final business consumers [44]. Generators with renewable 
energy sources can claim one LEC for each 1MWh electricity generated and they can sell 
LECs to the utilities or other third parties. 
- The Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGO) is a certificate which demonstrates 
that generators have used renewable energy sources to generate electricity. One REGO is 
issued per kilowatt hour (kWh) of renewable electricity generated. Unlike the other two 
certificates, REGOs do not have monetary value [44]. 
B. Mitigation Measures Associated with Lack of Reliable Information  
Lack of reliable information can be handled by providing all aspects of DG including micro-
generations and energy efficiency measures, given by a trusted organisation [27]. 
C. Mitigation Measures Associated with the Planning Permission 
The regulator might introduce regulation to curtail the regulatory burden on existing suppliers 
and ease new suppliers to participate, such as giving licence-exempt certificate for small 
generation [27].  
D. Mitigation measures associated with electricity industries barriers 
Barriers associated with electricity industries can be addressed by establishing discussion and 
research groups amongst associated parties who collaborate in DG development and 
enhancing competition level in the new connections provision, both for demand and 
generation customers. Also, the energy regulator should encourage the distribution network 
operators (DNOs) to be more active in accommodating DG connection on their network by 
providing financial incentives for them [27]. 
Another solution to solve the problem associated with this issue is by deploying an active 
network management (ANM). ANM can be described as automatic control and coordination 
of devices and resources to manage the network constraints [20].  
The deployment of ANM is driven by some targets that must be achieved in electricity 
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system, including increasing the penetration of renewable and DGs, reducing capital 
expenditures, maximising the use of assets, and enabling low carbon technologies [20]. An 
example of ANM scheme is depicted in figure 2.2  
 
Figure 2.2 Active Network Management [20] 
As shown in figure 2.2, active network management can be utilized for dispatching power on 
the network, reconfiguring the network, dealing with dynamic constraints, fault level 
management, power flow management, demand side management and active voltage control. 
Some devices and resources that currently can be controlled by ANM include transformer’s 
tap changers, switching devices, generator’s output (active and reactive powers – P and Q) 
and industrial’s demand and system controls [20].  
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE 
2.3.1 Definition and Provision of Demand Side Response  
A. Definition of Demand Side Response 
There are some definitions to describe Demand side response (DSR). DSR in the electricity 
market is defined as the response acted by electricity consumers to high prices or network 
congestion [37]. DSR is also described as a deliberate act of end user, either as an individual 
or a group, to change their demand in response to energy market price or the signals of 
congested network [15]. Other definitions for Demand Side Response are given by [16], i.e. 
as an intentional modification of electricity consumption by end-use customers in response to 
imbalances or market prices; and given by [17], i.e. refers to the customer’s response to a 
signal, either congestion or price signal, by changing the amount of electricity they consume 
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at particular times. In which, one of the benefits from this action is it can provide flexibility 
in energy system to deal with intermittent generation from renewable sources. 
B. Provision of Demand Side Response 
The provision of demand side response requires participation from stakeholders, including 
network operators, suppliers, aggregators and end-users [23]. 
- Network operators might consist of transmission network operators (TNOs) and 
distribution network operators (DNOs).  
- Suppliers are parties who purchase electricity from generators and sell it to end-users. 
Sometimes suppliers also own generators, so that, they can sell their electricity directly 
to end-users. 
- Aggregators are responsible in coordinating and combine small DSR contribution from 
end-users. This aggregated DSR will be offered to suppliers. Then, the suppliers will 
offer this aggregated DSR contribution to DNOs or TNOs. 
- The last stake holder in DSR provision is end-users. End-users, include industries, 
commerce and households, are connected to the distribution network and consume 
electricity from suppliers.  
There are three mechanisms in DSR of which end-users can participate, include (i) changing 
their energy consumption pattern by reducing or increasing their electricity consumption; (ii) 
installing on-site generation; and (iii) shifting their demand at peak times to other hours of the 
day [15][16][17][25]. 
The implementation of DSR programme on distribution network can be controlled by two 
mechanisms [17][25], i.e. automated DSR or direct load control, and end-user controlled 
DSR. Through automated DSR or direct load control, a contactor or aggregator can remotely 
turn on and off end-user’s machines. While end-user controlled DSR allows end-users to 
change their electricity consumption pattern to get incentives, either manually or through pre-
programming machines. 
In order to support the deployment of DSR in the UK Electricity System, some technologies 
associated with DSR communication and control have been applied [17], such as the use of 
radio signals to operate tele switches on night time heaters, the use of timers to equip 
customer’s appliances using a pre-set programme, deploying smart appliances which can 
automatically respond the electricity grid congestion or price signals, the use of smart meters 
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to record information related to consumer’s energy usage and the use of mobile phone and 
land lines to transmit prices or commands to change demand, either automatically or by 
voice. In Australia [45], large industrial users can participate in demand management to 
reduce their usage of network capacity through engaging with DSR aggregator to participate 
in scheduled or on-call demand reduction and allowing Distribution Network Service 
Providers (DNSPs) to exercise direct load control. 
2.3.2 The Role of Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) 
The role of DNOs in the implementation of DSR programme on distribution network can be 
explained by referring to figure 2.2. This figure shows an example of DSR programme which 
is run by one of DNOs in the UK.  
 
Figure 2.3 Demand Side Response Provision: Honeywell I&C ADR Project [46] 
At times of peak demand, Scottish and Southern Energy Power distribution, as one of DNOs 
in the UK, can reduce the electricity consumption on their network by employing Automated 
Demand Response (ADR) programme [46]. The Demand Response Automation System 
(DRAS) will send an action signal to the ADR Gateway device which has been installed in 
each participated building. This signal will initiates Electricity Load Shedding Strategy, 
which is programmed in each building’s Building Management System (BMS), to turn down 
the pre-agreed electricity apparatus, including air handling units, lights and heat pumps. 
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In this case, the DNOs must provide more sophisticated network configuration and 
technology application, such as smart grid, smart meters and required automated software, to 
implement DSR programme. Consequently, there will be costs that must be borne by DNOs. 
In order to support and encourage DNOs to be more active in the development of DSR 
program, the energy regulator should provide financial incentive mechanisms. Further 
discussion about current DSR incentive mechanism is presented in section 2.4.   
2.3.3 Benefits of Demand Side Response 
The implementation of DSR on distribution network can give benefits to all parties which are 
involved in the programme, including the deferment of new network investment, the 
reduction of supply scarcity, the reduction of electricity prices and the reduction of 
environmental impact. 
1). Benefits associated with the deferment of new network investment 
DSR can be used to manage constraints of the network by keeping the amount of electricity 
demand within the limitation of the grid [17]. If the amount of electricity flowing through the 
grid is too high, that might cause damages or failures. DSR can temporarily reduce demand to 
prevent this high electricity flow occurs. In the presence of unexpected failure, DSR can also 
reduce demand to prevent further damage. If an extreme case of black out occurs, DSR can 
be used to restart the system through assisting a synchronised start-up of supply and demand. 
Regular demand reduction at peak times can also reduce the requirement of new investment 
in distribution network, without any required change in the electricity system management 
philosophy [17][47]. DSR can lower the risk of the interconnected power system security and 
improve the asset utilisation across the system due to flattening load profile [19]. 
The benefits of a large scale DSR to relieve the network constraint at a particular central 
business district is efficient only when the DSR is well enough aggregated by large users and 
DNSP has direct control over the load at times of peak demand. If the network constraint can 
be relieved, consequently the network augmentation can be avoided [18]. 
2). Benefits associated with preventing supply scarcity 
In case where there are some stand-by generators, i.e. generators installed by costumers to 
deal with emergency/unforeseen events, there might be overlap between operating additional 
inefficient generation from network operator and running on-site/stand-by generators in order 
to balance the network’s demand and supply [19]. Therefore, if demand reductions at peak 
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times can be reliably maintained, the required capacity from additional electricity generation 
can be essentially reduced. 
Customers can participate in DSR program by providing the ability to reduce demand quickly 
in an emergency at short notice.  These customers would effectively be on stand-by reserve 
relates to the need of system balance in emergencies/unforeseen events. Meanwhile, the 
growth of intermittent electricity generation such as wind will cause balancing mechanism in 
the system become more difficult. The system will require increased amount of reserves, 
which can be provided by combining synchronized and stand-by reserves. The synchronised 
conventional generation must be run part loaded to supply reserve, which leads to 
inefficiency losses.  In order to supply energy which is originally allocated to that part loaded 
generation, the system will require additional generation capacity. Furthermore, balancing 
mechanism also requires stand-by reserves which can be supplied by higher fuel cost power 
plants. In this case, DSR can substitute the role of stand by generation capacity [19].  
3). Benefits associated with the reduction of electricity prices 
Since demand increases during peak times, additional electricity is required to meet the 
demand. Sometimes, less efficient generators with high operation cost, perhaps with higher 
CO2 emissions, are needed. This high cost will be passed onto the customers. By shifting 
demand at peak times to outside peak hours, where more efficient generators are available, it 
will reduce or may avoid the needs to run inefficient generators [19]. Therefore, it can reduce 
the costs and the emissions of carbon dioxide per kWh electricity. 
In electricity market, DSR will make the market becomes more predictable, stable and 
efficient due to volatility and risks of electricity contract prices and terms can be reduced 
[17][19]. DSR also impacts on maximising social welfare [18], i.e. when all consumers at a 
particular area consume electricity to the extent that the value of their consumption exceeds 
the marginal cost to provide electricity (also called as electricity market Locational Marginal 
Price, LMP). At the same time, all electricity producers at that area produce electricity to the 
extent that their production cost is less than LMP. The proper LMPs will also encourage 
generators whose costs are lower than those LMPs – but higher than pre-existing LMPs to 
generate electricity. This will increase the amount of generation available. The increasing 
generation might change the amount of efficient DSR. 
DSR might also reduce the price paid for power by load since lower demand will cause lower 
price [18]. This becomes benefit for the load, at least in the short run. If proper calculation 
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causes the value of LMPs to increase, the price that consumer has to pay for their electricity 
consumption will be higher. This condition will encourage consumers to participate in DR 
because in return, they increase their savings by not consuming electricity. 
4). Benefits associated with the reduction of environmental impact 
The implementation of DSR has significant benefits on environment.  These include reducing 
emissions due to network losses reduction and more efficient use of base load generators and 
mitigating negative environmental impacts from fossil-fuelled power plants. In terms of 
electricity generations with finite resources, these also mean reductions in resources 
consumption which could impact on resources scarcity [17][19]. 
2.3.4 Current DSR Implementation 
A. DSR Implementation in Australia 
In Australia, potential DSR from industry is estimated represents about 10.5% of the total 
36GW peak load. This consists of 3.1GW identified DSR capacity and 0.6GW estimated 
DSR capacity registered for 2014-2015 [22]. The data taken from 34 participated companies 
including mining, manufacturing and others. From the total identified potential DSR capacity, 
over 95% could be available with 2-4 hours’ notice. This trial using capacity market 
mechanism, in which the DSR providers are paid based on the available capacity at peak 
time. In 2011, as much as 2,559MW out of 32,538MW total demand (in 2010-2011 period) is 
estimated to participate in DSR [22]. 
B. DSR Implementation in USA 
DSR trial in USA shows that 60% of the tests have produced reduction in peak demand of 
10% or greater [21]. DSR trial was implemented by using time of use rates and smart 
metering roll-out. This mechanism was deployed in Ontario to incentivise customers for 
curtailing their electricity consumption during the peak times which can reduce the overall 
usage of electricity. The roll-out of smart metering is an important step to make transition 
from fixed price to dynamic pricing [21]. 
The average number of DR resources registered during summer 2011 was about 6.46 million 
resources with combined capacity of 50,919MW and 3 hours and 6 minutes of average 
sustained response period. While during winter period 2011-2012, the average number of 
registered demand response resources was about 5.34 million resources with combined 
capacity of 48,686MW and 1 hour and 43 minutes of average sustained response period. 
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Overall, the potential DR resource contribution in U.S. RTO/ISO increased by 4.1 percent 
since 2009 [48]. 
C. DSR Implementation in the UK  
There are two potential areas of growth for DSR in the UK, i.e. turn-down DSR and running 
on-site generation [49]. Turn-down DSR is a mechanism to reduce electricity consumption by 
consumers during times of peak demand, through turning off their electricity appliances. 
Meanwhile, running on-site generation means operating generations at consumer’s side, 
which are installed and owned by consumers, at times of supply scarcity on the network.  
Currently, households contribute almost 50 % of UK’s 56 GW winter peak demand but they 
make relatively small contribution to DSR. Therefore, the smart meters roll out is expected to 
make this contribution increases. Furthermore, Time-of-use tariffs which are partly controlled 
by smart meters have encouraged household to participate in some DSR trials in the UK. This 
participation could make 10% peak demand reduction.  Furthermore, future electrification of 
heat and transportation such as heat pumps and electric vehicles could be potential household 
demand suitable for DSR. 
Regarding on-site generation, it is predicted that around 1 to 20 GW of on-site generation in 
industrial and commercial sectors is still unused [49]. This amount of capacity is very 
potential to be used for DSR. In households and some commercial sectors, the increase 
number of small-scale gas-fired Combined Heat and Power plants could provide additional 
capacity suitable for DSR. 
Meanwhile, non-domestic sector might have more technical potential to contribute in DSR 
programme. In 2011, a study [50] suggested that the implementation of DSR can reduce the 
winter peak demands by 1 to 4.5 GW out of 15GW total demand from non-domestic 
customers.   
2.3.5 Barriers on the Implementation of Demand Side Response 
This section describes some barriers in the implementation of DSR, in terms of the parties’ 
participant, the regulation and the use of advance technology. 
A. Obstacles Associated with Parties Participant 
Currently, DNOs do not have enough encouragement to invest in DSR programme or 
dynamic pricing projects instead of capital projects [22]. This reason is driven by the fact that 
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the initial cost of setting up DSR, include costs for analysing consumption patterns and costs 
for installing and operating communication technology, are expensive [26][49]. In contrast, 
savings from DSR do not provide sufficient financial return because the total shifted demand 
from individual end-user is too small [49].  
Another concern refers to the customer awareness which is quite low. In case of DSR 
implementation in USA, the number of retail customers on time-based rates is limited [48]. 
This might be cause by the fact that the interaction between suppliers and end-users 
(households and commercials) is limited to billing while direct interaction between customers 
and with DNOs is less. Some trials [49] show that customers who have signed up for end-
user controlled DSR do not give certainty about the amount and reliability of committed 
demand shifting capacity, some even lose interest.  
B. Obstacles Associated with Advance Technologies 
Advance technologies including smart meters and smart appliances have important roles in 
implementing DSR. Some identified barriers related to advance technologies are lack of 
consistency in the measurement and verification of demand reductions and lack of Demand 
Response Forecasting and Estimation Tools [48]. 
Data privacy and cyber security [49] become crucial issues to be addressed related to the 
deployment of smart meters because data from household and commercial customers become 
accessible from outside. Other concerns include misuse for commercial purpose, data theft 
and terrorist threat of cutting electricity to users. 
Moreover, most of industrial businesses are not ready to provide the required capabilities, 
skills and technology for DSR and DSR may be not the top priority for industrial businesses. 
C. Obstacles Associated with Regulation 
In USA, the traditional utility regulation hinders investment in demand response (DR) and 
energy efficiency (EE) [26]. Traditional utility regulation provides opportunities for utilities 
to earn a rate of return on infrastructure investments in generation, transmission and 
distribution. Hence, if there are two equivalent alternatives for the utilities of building a 
profitable power plant or investing in DR and EE for cost-recovery only, a utility generally 
will opt the first alternative, i.e. building a power plant. Furthermore, traditional utility 
regulation set the revenue of a utility based on kilowatt-hours sales of electricity. The more 
customers consume electricity, the more revenue the utility can earn. This regulation will 
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discourage utilities to implement DR and EE on their system since both mechanisms will 
reduce electricity consumption by customers, even in cases where utilities can recover the 
investment costs. There is also lack of coordination among policies at the federal and state 
levels [48]. 
Considering the implementation of DSR in the UK, inefficient use of DSR can be caused by 
infrequent utilisation of DSR providers. Moreover, due to contractual conditions, a DSR 
provider cannot be contracted by more than one stakeholder. However, since the usage 
patterns of different parties, such as National Grid and a DNO, are different and there is no 
significant interference amongst them, stakeholders suggested a possibility for a DSR 
provider to be contracted by multiple parties [49]. 
2.3.6 Mitigation Measures  
In order to mitigate the obstacles that might be occur in the implementation of DSR 
programme, some measures are taken into account as described as follows. 
1). Mitigation Measures Related to the Low Participation of Associated Parties 
In order to encourage DNOs to invest in DSR programme or dynamic pricing projects, the 
energy regulator should establish mechanisms to give financial incentives to the DNOs. 
Current DSR incentive mechanisms are explained section 2.4.  
Regarding the customer participation which is quite low, suppliers are required to deliver full 
price signals [23]. It is expected that the customers will change their electricity consumption 
pattern to reduce their bills, i.e. by not consuming electricity at peak times. The change of 
consumers’ behaviour in electricity use can reduce the electricity prices, as well as reduce the 
peak demand.  
Encouraging consumers to change their behaviour in electricity use, which also means to 
change of their lifestyle, requires an appropriate level of financial incentive. Offering 
reasonable tariffs to save consumer’s money and introducing automated devices to response 
the price signals tend to be an effective way to change consumers’ behaviour [14]. Incentives 
can be given through offering different tariffs to consumers, such as by distinguishing the 
electricity prices at peak and off-peak demand. The off-peak demand has lower prices, so the 
customers will be financially incentivised for reducing their electricity consumption at peak 
demand. However, for some customers, the difference in electricity prices will not tempt 
them to change their lifestyle. They prefer to spend more money to maintain their comfort. To 
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deal with this situation, customers’ willingness in changing their electricity consumption has 
an important role. 
Incentives for customers can also be given through DSR compensation mechanisms, such as 
Dynamic Pricing and Contracts, Locational Marginal Price, Fixed Price and Fixed Prices 
Consisting of Generation and Non-Generation Components [18]. 
Dynamic pricing [18] is a pricing system for the electricity which reflect the relevant real-
time a day-ahead LMP. The price is used to charge for the electricity consumption or to pay 
the electricity purchase. Customers who are participating in the spot market pay the LMP for 
the electricity they consumed. However, they may sign a contract for a fixed price of a given 
quantity of electricity.  
Through locational marginal price scheme [18], generators which are connected to 
distribution network (DGs) will receive payment based on their locations and the amount of 
electricity they generate each hour. Hence, they will receive an incentive if they can produce 
electricity at a lower cost than LMP. The consumers who do not consume at those hours will 
save the LMP. So, they have an incentive to consume whenever the value of electricity is 
higher than LMP. 
Fixed price scheme [18] can be explained using the following example.  A customer has a 
contract for a given quantity of electricity at its place for a fixed price C. Suppose that a given 
point in time, the LMP at customer’s location exceeds the marginal value that customer put 
on the electricity MV. In this case, it will be more efficient for the sell the electricity to the 
market rather than to consume it. When the LMP at customer’s location is less than MV, 
consuming electricity at that given point of time is more efficient for the customers. 
Fixed prices consisting of generation and non-generation components scheme means that the 
fixed price F consists of three parts, i.e. a generation component G, a transmission component 
T, and a distribution component D. If LMP is greater than the marginal value of electricity, 
the customer has an incentive for not consuming the electricity. Since F is greater than G, 
LMP-G is greater than LMP-F. If a payment of LMP-F can encourage customers not to 
consume electricity at inefficient time, a larger payment will be more sufficient to encourage 
the customer to behave in that manner. 
Since participation of a single customer has a very low contribution to the amount of demand 
reduction, and usually will be neglected, the regulator should determine cumulative 
benchmarks which match against signal responses [22]. It is also important to maintain 
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appropriate performance and compensation for DSR contributions through accurate 
measurement using established baselines [25]. 
In 2013, Energy Act introduced capacity market mechanism to guarantee sufficient reliable 
capacity in the UK electricity system. This mechanism offers payment for commitment to 
deliver electricity or temporarily reduce demand when required. Payments for committed 
capacity will be offered to companies via auctions. The payments for DSR participation will 
be available from 2015 while generation will be eligible for payment for generating 
electricity from 2018 [49]. The capacity market mechanism is also applied in Australia’s 
electricity market. Through this mechanism, the DSR providers are paid based on the 
available DSR capacity at peak time. This mechanism is applied by the Wholesale Electricity 
Market (WEM), which is operating in the South-West Interconnected System (SWIS) in 
Western Australia [22]. 
2). Mitigation Measures Related to Advance Technologies 
To deal with the needs of advance technologies in implementing DSR, some actions could be 
taken into account, such as installing common protocol for data communication amongst 
different meters and other technology [22], developing advance technologies to integrate new 
forms of DSR into normal system operations during peak and off-peak times [25], providing 
accurate and timely information about overall performance of electricity system and 
operations of specific DSR by deploying adequate equipment for metering and 
communication [25] and another idea is implementing remote devices via smart meters that 
will allow suppliers to automatically reduce demand as a response to price signals [22]. 
There should be accessible, accurate, understandable, and comparable information for 
consumers to take an active role in the development of DSR, especially in terms of electricity 
prices. The information should cover electricity prices comparison for all consumers, 
including vulnerable and low-income consumers, who may be most attracted to the cost 
savings [14]. 
Facilitating DSR in distribution networks requires advance technologies, to make the process 
run automatically. The technologies must have capabilities on detecting load curtailment 
requirement, delivering the requirement to participating users, curtailing or shedding the load 
automatically, and verifying the demand response compliance.  
The roll-out of smart meters, which will be conducted in the UK between 2015 and 2020 
[49], is one solution that can be applied to deal with the problem related to advance 
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technology. The aim of this policy is that smart meters can develop interactive 
communication between suppliers and customers. Hence, households are expected to be 
much easier to provide and participate on DSR.  
Another solution related to advance technologies is by deploying an active network 
management (ANM), as shown in figure 2.2. This scheme can be used to automatically 
control and coordinate the network’s devices and resources, as well as to automatically 
manage the network constraints. In demand side, this scheme can be applied to control 
electric vehicles (EVs), energy storages and other domestic appliances in response to 
congested network [20]. Another definition of ANM is given by [51] as a smart way to 
operate the electricity network without solely relying on network’s infrastructure investment. 
3). Mitigation Measures Related to Regulation 
According to [52], there are three parameters that must be taken into account to arrange the 
service incentive mechanism, i.e. the size of the service incentive, the differentiation of the 
incentive including regions and customer types, and the possibility to pass through the 
liability that DNSPs may suffer under a service incentive scheme to a DSR proponent. 
Given DSR solutions are less reliable that network solutions, the size of the service incentive 
will impact the DNSP decision on comparing DSR or DG project with network augmentation 
project. The basic principle of the service incentive is that the reward or penalty scheme 
might encourage DNSPs to opt DSR or DG solutions which will benefit customer.  
The differentiation of the incentives should consider the improvement of service in 
prioritising customers with poorer reliability, such as customers in remote areas served by a 
long feeder, at a higher value place. It means that the higher reward related to that 
improvement should be provided. This mechanism is expected to encourage DNSPs to 
improve their service at poorer reliability areas. 
Relevant factors that should be taken into account in the incidence of penalties and rewards 
include the ability of DNSPs to reward for service incentive outcomes to DSR providers, the 
readiness of DSR providers to bear the risk and the willingness of potential customers to 
voluntarily give up their right to guaranteed service level payments associated with non-
network solutions trials. 
Furthermore, the role of DNOs should be extended, i.e. to be more active distribution system 
operators rather than relatively passive and non-innovative, so that in the future, DNOs and 
National Grid can work together much more closely [23]. Also, in order to get substantial 
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benefits from DSR programs, the desired benefits must be appropriately defined and the 
payments must be properly structured. Proper payments structure will follow the benchmark 
of dynamic pricing and explicit contracts [18]. 
2.4 CURRENT INCENTIVES MECHANISMS FOR DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
OPERATORS (DNOs) 
As previously described, DNOs are responsible to operate, maintain and develop electricity 
distribution network within their working area. This role becomes more complex with the 
presence of DG and the implementation of DSR programme on distribution network.  
DNOs must provide more sophisticated network configuration and technology application, 
such as smart grid, smart meters and required automated software, to accommodate DG and 
DSR in their system. As a consequence, there will be costs that must be borne by DNOs 
which are related to meters installation and software purchase, as well as routine operational 
and management fees to operate and maintain them. Therefore, electricity regulators should 
encourage DNOs to be more active in the development of DGs and DSR on their network by 
providing financial incentive mechanisms. 
The following sections describe current incentive mechanisms related to DG connection and 
DSR implementation which are currently applied in some countries, including Australia, 
USA and the UK.  
2.4.1 Current DG Incentive Mechanisms for DNOs 
DG incentive mechanism which is currently applied in the UK, aims to encourage DNOs to 
connect distributed generation by providing incentives for necessary investment. Referring to 
the Regulatory Instructions and Guidance - Version 2, April 2007 [53], there are two main 
purposes of DG incentive mechanism, i.e. encourage DG connection on the distribution 
network and reduce regulatory barriers for DG connection. 
The first purpose, i.e. encouraging DNOs to proactively respond to requests for DG 
connection, aims to attract more DGs to be connected to their network. This effort is aimed to 
achieve the UK renewable targets in 2020. In line with the connection request, DNOs must 
provide efficient and economical investment.  
The second purpose, i.e. ensuring that there will be no regulatory barriers for DG connection 
request, even if the proposed connected capacity or the cost exceeding the forecast. This 
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mechanism will protect both DNOs and customers. DNOs will get certainty to deal with 
unpredicted cost increment for DG connections. While the customer will not have to pay 
more for their usage, due to the increment of DG connection cost that must be borne by 
DNOs. 
A. Cost Elements of DG Connection 
Figure 2.4 shows the cost elements of DG connection assets [54]. Every DG connection costs 
will be recovered through two types of charges, i.e. connection charges and use of system 
charges. The calculation of DG incentive and pass-through is based on the use of system 
connection assets cost only, which is being recovered via use of system charges. This means 
that if a DG connection does not require use of system connection assets, there is no incentive 
related to this connected DG. 
 
Figure 2.4 Cost Elements of DG Connection Assets [54] 
B. Structure of Current DG Incentive 
The structure of current DG Incentive comprises of two hybrid elements, i.e. the pass-through 
mechanism and an additional DG Incentive value [54]. Pass-through mechanism is a 
mechanism to give the DNO a partial percentage pass-through treatment of the reinforcement 
costs incurred in providing network access to DG, to be passed on the customers who seek 
for the connection. While additional DG incentive value is calculated based on the capacity 
of the connected DG, expressed in £/kW/year. This framework is annuitized over the 
assumed life of DG connection assets, which is 15 years after the connection date. Since the 
incentive is given based on the capacity of connected DG, this mechanism can also be 
referred to as capacity-based DG incentive mechanism. 
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1). Level of Pass-through  
In order to encourage DNOs to be more proactive in the deployment of DG connection and to 
deal with the higher variability associated with DG connection, the UK’s Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (OFGEM) provided a slightly higher pass-through and lower strength of 
incentives for the DNOs to recover their costs associated with DG connection [55]. 
Based on the OFGEM’s modelling, 70% pass-through will give a minimum guaranteed real 
return of 1.4% to the DNOs on any individual project. While 80% pass-through is equivalent 
to 3.2% minimum real return. Given the lower real return might cause DNOs to delay major 
strategic reinforcement project, OFGEM adopts 80% pass-through rate for the DG incentive 
scheme [55]. 
2). Current DG Incentive Rate 
According to Anna Rossington from OFGEM [56], the capacity-based DG incentive can be 
calculated as follows: 
Parameters Calculations  Results  
Average connection cost /kW   £34.00 
pass through rate   80.0% 
pass through revenue /kW = £34 x 80% £27.20 
additional return   1.0% 
pre-tax WACC   5.6% 
desired return  = 1% + 5.6% 6.6% 
combined revenue /kW given desired return = £34 + 6.6% x £34 £36.24 
Incentive rate required /kW = £36.244 - £27.2 £9.04 
Years (nper)                 15  
Annual Incentive Rate /kW/year  = PMT(5.6%, 15, -£9.04) £0.91 
Table 2.3 Parameters of Capacity-Based DG Incentives [56] 
In the Distribution Price Control Review 5 (DPCR 5) [24], which is running from 1 April 
2010 until 31 March 2015, the cost of use of system connection assets is set at £34/kW. 80% 
of this cost, i.e. £27.20, will be passed on to the customer who seeks for connection.  
As shown in table 2.5, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM – the UK’s energy 
regulator) has set a pre-tax Weighted Average of Cost of Capital (WACC) of 5.6% plus an 
additional rate of return of 1%. These two rates will result in a desired rate of return for 
DNOs of 6.6%. 
By multiplying the desired rate of return with the average connection cost, then subtracts the 
result with 80% pass-through will give an incentive rate required as: 
= £34 x (1+ 6.6%-80%) = £9.04 /kW 
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Considering the value of incentive rate required, the WACC, the additional rate of return and 
the interval period, the annual DG incentive rate can be obtained from: 
=  
Incentive rate required∗(1+WACC+additional return−passthrough)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper




 = £0.91/kW 
Then, the value of the DG incentive rate, which is £0.91/kW, is rounded to £1/kW/year.  
3). The Maximum and Minimum Thresholds on DNOs Returns 
The maximum (cap) and minimum (collar) thresholds on DNO returns are aimed to protect 
the DNO as well as the customers against cost uncertainty [54]. The minimum rate of return 
is set equal to the assumed cost of debt, i.e. 3.6% pre-tax, and the maximum rate of return is 
set equal to two times the pre-tax WACC, i.e. 11.2%. The WACC stands for Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital, i.e. the average rate of return that a company is expected to pay to 
all its creditors, owners, and other providers of capital, based on its existing assets [56].  
4). High Costs Projects 
High cost project are defines as projects which require significantly high cost in excess of the 
DNO’s standard. OFGEM allows DNOs to undertake projects with maximum direct 
reinforcement cost of £200/kW [54]. 
2.4.2 Current DSR Incentive Mechanisms for DNOs 
A. Costs of Demand Side Response 
As presented in table 2.4, there are two cost categories for DSR implementation, i.e. 
participant cost and system costs [17][49]. Participant costs, i.e. the costs that will be directly 
passed onto the customers who participating in DSR programme, include costs for 
technology (for smart meters and smart appliances), response plan, comfort/inconvenience, 
reduced amenity/lost business, and onsite generator fuel and maintenance. While systems 
costs include all costs associated with metering/communication system upgrade (system 
settlement), utility equipment/software, consumer education, program administration, 









Enabling technology investment 
Establishing response plan or strategy 
Even specific costs 
Comfort/inconvenience costs 
Reduce amenity/loss business 
Rescheduling costs (e.g. overtime pay) 




Metering/communication system upgrades 






Payments to participating customers 
Programme evaluation 
Metering/communication 
Table 2.4 Costs of DSR Implementation [17] 
However, the DSR establishment cost is unique to each situation. It depends on the nature of 
the DSR programme its self, including its reliability, availability and duration [57]. In case of 
a DSR trial in the UK [58], customers who involved in DSR will be compensated for any 
costs related to inconvenience, lost business, fuel and other expenses. Then, the DNOs wrap 
these costs up into a single price, as the cost of DSR. The DNOs are also responsible in 
covering the cost of software, billing systems, education etc.  
B. Implemented DSR Incentives Mechanisms 
The following sections describe current incentive mechanisms for DSR implementation in 
some countries, including Australia, USA and the UK. 
1). DSR Incentives for DNOs in Australia 
The New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), one of 
Australian jurisdictional regulators, has implemented a demand management incentive 
mechanism called ‘D-factor’ [25]. This mechanism acts as an additional incentive for 
Distribution Network Service Providers (DNSPs) to recover the costs and forgone revenues 
associated with DSR initiatives and effectively allows these costs to be passed through into 
higher prices with a maximum value equivalent to the expected avoided distribution costs. 
2). DSR Incentives for DNOs in United States of America 
In terms of incentive mechanisms, some forms of incentives that have been trialled in USA, 
include Shared Savings, Rate of Return and Avoided Cost [26]. 
Shared Savings allows utilities to receive a percentage share of the energy saving as a result 
of Demand Response (DR) or Energy Efficiency (EE) program. When a utility can increase 
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their participation or saving levels, they will receive higher shared savings percentage.  This 
mechanism will promote cost-effective DR and EE as well as encourage better cost 
management since ineffective spending might reduce the incentives available. This 
mechanism has been trialled in Minnesota. 
Under rate of return approach, a utility has an opportunity to earn profit on DR and EE 
investment, based on the utility’s rate base, in the same manner as other capital investments. 
This will encourage utilities to optimise their planning on supply and demand resources. This 
approach has been implemented in Nevada. 
Avoided cost mechanism will give a utility a percentage of their avoided supply costs as their 
DR and EE savings compensation. This approach has been proposed by Duke Energy 
Carolina, known as Save-A-Watt. This program allowed utility, who can produce save-a-
watts, to recover the amortization of and a return on 90 percent of the avoided costs. 
3). DSR Incentives for DNOs in the United Kingdom 
The Office of Gas and Electricity Market (OFGEM), as the UK’s energy regulator, 
encourages DNOs to facilitate DSR by establishing the Low Carbon Networks (LCN) Fund 
scheme [47]. The scheme allows DNOs to try out new technologies, such as smart meters and 
smart appliances, or commercial arrangements to ahead a low carbon electricity system, in 
terms of security of supply at value for money. 
DNOs can collaborate with other parties in conducting DSR trials on their network. Some 
DSR trials projects [47], which are funded by Low Carbon Network Fund, include Low 
Carbon London,  Customer Led Network Revolution (CLNR), Capacity to Customers (C2C), 
Demonstrating the Functionality of Automated Demand Response ADR and New Thames 
Valley Vision. 
Low Carbon London [57] is a series of DSR trials project to examine the effects of energy 
efficiency schemes and time of use tariffs on industrial and commercial customers. This 
project also implemented active network management (ANM) which aims to automatically 
manage network constraints. The trials are run between January 2011 and December 2014 
and are operated by UK Power Networks. 
Customer Led Network Revolution (CLNR) [58], which is operated by Northern Power Grid, 
aims to address the potential for new network technology and flexible customer response to a 




Capacity to customer (C2C) project was carried out by Electricity North West [59]. This 
project began in January 2012 and completed in December 2014. The aim of this project is 
releasing the redundant assets of high voltage network and offering customers to provide a 
post-fault DSR. The project offers customers a reduction in distribution charges in return for 
agreeing to a delayed power restoration following an outage. Typically, after an outage, 
power must be restored within one hour but C2C customers can be delayed up to eight hours 
and the participated customers will be directly connected to high voltage network. 
Demonstrating the Functionality of Automated Demand Response (ADR) is a DSR trial 
project operated by Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution [46][62]. This project 
aims to demonstrate the use of Automated Demand Response (ADR) technology at 
commercial buildings in load reduction at times of peak demand. The project is carried out 
from June to November 2011. 
New Thames Valley Vision, which is also operated by Scottish & Southern Energy Power 
Distribution, aims to manage the existing network more intelligently to move towards low 
carbon technologies. The project is carried out by running a mixture of analytic, 
technological and commercial solutions, and is built on a successful previous Automated 
Demand Response (ADR) project. The period of the project is five years, started in 2012 
[63][64]. 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The presence of DGs and DSR programme on the distribution network has an impact in 
reducing greenhouse gasses emissions and increasing the penetration of renewable energy 
sources in electricity production. Therefore, countries around the world are trying to enhance 
the deployment of DGs and the implementation of DSR programme in their electricity 
distribution networks. 
Currently, the contribution of DGs and the participation of associated parties in DSR 
programme are quite low. Considering this condition, some countries, including Australia, 
USA and the UK, have introduced policies and incentive mechanisms to support the 
development of DGs and DSR programmes.  
The obstacles and mitigation measures related to the development of DGs and DSR 




Objective Obstacles Mitigation Measures 
DGs Deployment Payment warranty for 
exported electricity 
- Feed in Tariffs mechanism  
  (Australia, USA and UK) 
- Default Network Support Payments 
  (Australia) 
Lack of reliable information Providing information for all aspects of DG 
Planning permission  Licence-exempt certificate for small generation 
Electricity industry issues - Establishing discussion and research groups 
- Public Recognition and Award 
  (Australia) 
- Renewable Obligation and Green Energy 
  Certificates (UK) 
Incentives for DNOs - DG Incentive mechanism (UK) 
DSR Implementation Low Participant - Different tariffs for peak and off-peak times 
- DSR compensation mechanisms (USA) 
- Capacity Market mechanism 
  (Australia and UK) 
- Aggregate the DSR participation  
  (Australia and UK) 
Use of Advance 
Technologies 
- Smart meters roll-out  
  (Australia, USA and UK) 
Regulation - Reward and penalty scheme (Australia) 
- Dynamic pricing (UK) 
Incentives for DNOs - Demand Management incentive mechanism  
  (Australia) 
- Shared Savings, Rate of Return  
  and Avoided Cost (USA) 
- Low Carbon Network Fund (UK) 




3 IMPACT OF DISTRIBUTED GENERATION CONNECTION AND 
DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE ON DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
The existing electricity distribution networks are conventionally developed to meet the 
requirement to deliver power in one direction, from generation units to end users. The 
presence of distributed generation (DG) causes the change of the power flow pattern on the 
distribution network. The power, which conventionally flows in one directional way from the 
distribution network to the customers, will flow in two directional ways, i.e. from the 
distribution network to the customers’ side and from the customers’ side to the distribution 
network [65]. 
A number of studies and researches have been done to investigate the effect of DG on the 
distribution network, including the impact of DG on power quality, reliability, and control of 
the utility system of the distribution network [8], the impact of DG on the protection of 
distribution networks [66], the impact of DG on voltage levels in radial distribution systems 
[67] and the effects of DG penetration on energy losses minimization [6][68][69]. 
In terms of demand side response (DSR), this mechanism can be used to reduce peak 
demand. DSR can also be used to respond the requirement to balance the system due to the 
demand is greater than the supply, by running on-site generation [19].  
Some projects have examined the impact of implementing demand side management in 
association with the deployment of DG connection. One of the projects [80] shows that DSM 
can maintain the balance between supply and demand. At times when the supply is abundant, 
for instance there is a lot of wind energy but the consumption of electricity is low, the system 
will allow customers’ devices to store energy. While at times of supply scarcity, the system 
will allow customers to reduce their electricity consumption.  
This chapter describes the impact of DG connection and DSR implementation on the 
performance of a distribution network, in terms of voltage level, network capacity utilization, 
and power losses. 
A. Voltage Level 
The distribution network is designed for delivering electricity from transmission network to 
the demand side. In the presence of distributed generation (DG), it is used to transfer 
electricity generated by DGs to the load centres. The voltage levels for distribution network 
39 
 
vary amongst different countries. In the UK, distribution networks cover from low to high 
voltage levels, i.e. 230/400V, 11kV, 33kV, 66kV and 132kV [70]. In Australia, the distribution 
networks operate at voltage levels of 230/400V, 11kV, 22kV and 33kV [71]. Meanwhile, in 
United States, the voltage levels for distribution network are in the range between 120/240V 
and 34.5kV [72]. 
The impact of DG connection on the voltage level of a distribution network can be 











]        ... (3.1) 
Where, ∆P and ∆Q represent the changes of real and reactive power injections at a particular 
bus, ∆δ and ∆|V represent the changes of bus voltage angles and magnitudes, and J1, J2, J3 
and J4 are the elements of Jacobian matrix. 
Then, the changes of bus voltage angles and magnitudes can be calculated by inversing the 










]       ... (3.2) 
Where, JB1, JB2, JB3 and JB4 are the elements of the inverse of the Jacobian matrix. 
B. Network Capacity Utilization 
The term network utilisation is used to explain the capacity of a particular network that has 
been utilised by network’s users, either by DGs or by loads. The unit of network utilisation is 
expressed in percentage (%), i.e. derived from [74]: 
Network Capacity Utilization (%) =
Networkpower flow
Networkcapacity rate
x100%   ... (3.3) 
Where, Networkpower Flow represents the line’s power flow and Networkapacity rate 
represents the capacity rate of the line.  
C. Power Losses 
Power losses are defined as the amount of power which is lost during power distribution 
process on the network. Simply, power losses are equal to power generated by at generation 
sites less power consumed at demand sites. 
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Referring to figure 3.1, power losses between bus (k) and bus (k+1) can be calculated by 
using the following equation [67]: 





2        … (3.4) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Distribution system with DG installation [67] 
While the total power losses of the feeder (PT,Loss) can be derived by summing up all the line 
sections losses as [67]: 
PT,Loss =  ∑ P_Loss (k, k + 1)
n
k=1        ... (3.5) 
3.1 IMPACT OF DG CONNECTION ON NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
For the purpose of investigating the impact of DG connection on the performance of a 
distribution network, including voltage level, network capacity utilization and power losses, 
the assessment is carried out by connecting a new DG to a generation-dominated busbar and 
a demand-dominated busbar. 
3.1.1 Reference Network 
For the purpose of investigating of the impact of DG connection on a particular busbar, the 
assessment is conducted by using a reference network, as shown in figure 3.2. The network 
configuration is modelled and depicted using the Integrated Power System Analysis (IPSA) 
software version 1.6.9. 
A. Reference Network 
The reference network consists of fifteen busbars with voltage levels range from 275kV 
down to 0.4kV. There are one 275kV busbar, four 33kV busbars, eight 11kV bus bars and one 
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0.4kV bus bar. At 11kV voltage level, there are two generation-dominated busbars, i.e. 
Bus11-2 and Bus11-6, and three demand-dominated busbars, i.e. Bus11-7, Bus11-9 and 
Bus04-1. 
The data of busbars, generators, lines, transformers and loads of the reference network are 
presented in appendix 1. 
 
Figure 3.2 The reference network 
B. Load Flow Analysis of the Reference Network 
The IPSA software version 1.6.9 can be used to analysis the voltage level, power flow and 
power losses of the reference network through load flow analysis mechanisms. There are two 
types of load flow analyse in this software, i.e. busbar load flow analysis and line load flow 
analysis. The busbar load flow analysis will examine the voltage magnitude and the voltage 
angle of each busbar on the network. While the lines load flow analysis will examine the 
power flow and power losses on each line on the network. 
1). Busbar Load Flow Analysis 
Table 3.1 shows the results of busbar load flow analysis of the reference network in figure 
3.2. Besides the voltage magnitude and angle for each busbar, the table also shows the 
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generation and load which are connected to each busbar, as well as the total connected 



























GSP 1.000   2.262 0.419     -0.000 0.000 
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.20         0.000 -0.000 
Bus33-2 1.000 -0.18         -0.000 0.000 
Bus11-1 1.020 4.25         -0.000 0.000 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.51 9.900 4.790     0.000 0.000 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.37         0.000 0.000 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.10     3.600 2.700 0.000 -0.000 
Bus33-4 0.999 -0.21         0.000 -0.000 
Bus11-8 0.985 -3.37         0.000 0.000 
Bus11-9 0.977 -3.69     6.660 2.180 -0.000 0.000 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.22         -0.000 -0.000 
Bus11-4 0.987 -3.35         0.000 0.000 
Bus11-7 0.981 -3.63     7.600 2.500 -0.000 0.000 
Bus11-5 0.983 -3.63     3.800 1.250 0.000 -0.000 
Bus11-6 0.993 -3.42 9.900 4.790     -0.000 -0.000 
Table 3.1 Busbar Load Flow Results for the Reference Network 
2). Line Load Flow Analysis 
The line load flow analysis can be used to examine the power flow and power losses on each 
line of the network, in the forms of real power (MW), reactive power (MVAr) and apparent 























GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 1.149 0.000 0.004 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 1.149 0.000 0.004 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.262 2.269 0.002 -0.054 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.172 6.299 0.028 0.498 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.702 5.756 0.046 0.031 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.990 0.998 0.001 -0.013 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 4.500 0.096 0.552 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 4.234 0.013 0.242 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 4.867 0.036 0.023 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.643 1.653 0.001 -0.054 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.925 2.932 0.003 -0.053 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 4.169 0.013 0.234 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.232 5.277 0.038 0.024 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 0.709 0.714 0.001 -0.013 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 1.278 0.001 -0.054 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.910 3.915 0.005 -0.052 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.048 1.055 0.002 -0.012 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.232 2.236 0.008 -0.006 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 3.502 0.019 0.005 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 5.936 6.002 0.053 0.040 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 4.958 5.002 0.037 0.023 
Table 3.2 Line Load Flow Results for Reference Network 
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The IPSA software version 1.6.9 can also be used to depict the results given in table 3.1 and 
3.2 on a model network. As seen in figure 3.3, the voltage magnitudes (pu) and voltage angle 
for each busbar are presented. Per unit (pu) of voltage magnitudes is the ratio of actual 
voltage level and rated voltage level of each busbar. The figure also shows the power 
generated from each generators and the power absorbed by each connected load.  
 
Figure 3.3 Voltage Level and Power Flow of the Reference Network  
 
Figure 3.4 Voltage Level and Power Losses of the Reference Network 
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Besides the voltage level and power flow of the network, the IPSA software version 1.6.9 can 
also be used to show the power losses of the modelled network, as depicted in figure 3.4 
3.1.2 DG Connection at a Generation-dominated Busbar 
There are two generation-dominated busbars on the reference network, i.e. Bus11-2, and 
Bus11-6. In order to analyse the impact of DG connection, a new DG will be connected to 
one of these busbars. The DG is assumed to be an onshore wind generation with the capacity 
of 4.5MVA, the power factor of 0.9 and the capacity factor of 0.35. The impact of connecting 
a new DG to those busbars, in terms of voltage level, network capacity utilization and power 
losses are explained as follows.  
1) Impact of DG Connection on the Voltage Level  
In terms of voltage level, the impact of a new DG connection at a generation-dominated 
busbar is presented in table 3.3. The terms of dV in table 3.8 represents the changes of 
voltage level. The unit of dV is expressed in percent (%), which can be obtained from the 
following equation [74]: 
dV (%) =  
kVn−kV0
kV0
x100%       ... (3.6) 
Where kV0 is the initial voltage magnitude and  kVn is the voltage magnitude after a new DG 
connected to a designated bus bar. 
Bus 
Name 





















GSP 1   1     1     
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.2 1.001 0.15 0.2% 1.003 0.15 0.4% 
Bus33-2 1 -0.18 1.003 0.18 0.3% 1.004 0.17 0.4% 
Bus11-1 1.02 4.25 1.045 7.28 2.5% 1.025 4.57 0.5% 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.51 1.061 7.63 2.9% 1.035 4.82 0.4% 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.37 1.048 7.44 2.6% 1.025 4.68 0.4% 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.1 0.963 3.22 3.2% 0.938 0.25 0.5% 
Bus33-4 0.999 -0.21 1.001 0.14 0.2% 1.003 0.14 0.4% 
Bus11-8 0.985 -3.37 0.987 -3.01 0.2% 1.004 -1.51 1.9% 
Bus11-9 0.977 -3.69 0.979 -3.33 0.2% 0.999 -1.76 2.3% 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.22 1 0.13 0.2% 1.003 0.13 0.5% 
Bus11-4 0.987 -3.35 0.989 -2.98 0.2% 1.007 -1.47 2.0% 
Bus11-7 0.981 -3.63 0.983 -3.27 0.2% 1.007 -1.64 2.7% 
Bus11-5 0.983 -3.63 0.986 -3.27 0.3% 1.012 -1.58 3.0% 
Bus11-6 0.993 -3.42 0.995 -3.05 0.2% 1.024 -1.32 3.1% 
Table 3.3 Impact of DG Connection on Voltage Level at Generation-dominated Busbars 
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As presented in table 3.3, the connection of a new DG to a generation-dominated busbar will 
increase the network’s voltage level, especially for the busbars which are close and 
interconnected with the targeted busbar.  
DG connection at Bus11-2 will increase the initial voltage level of the related busbars to 
increase by 2.5% until 2.9%. The same impact also occurs in the connection of a new DG at 
Bus11-6, which causes the initial voltage level of the related busbars to increase by 2.7% 
until 3.1%. The highest increase of the voltage level occurs on the targeted busbar, where the 
DG is connected. 
2) Impact of DG Connection on the Network Capacity Utilization  
Table 3.4 shows the impact of connecting a new DG to a generation-dominated busbar on the 
network capacity utilization of related busbars on the network. The terms of dSpowerflow in 
table 3.9 represents the changes of the network utilization of a particular busbar. The unit of 
dSpowerflow is expressed in percent (%), which can be derived from [74]: 
dSPower Flow (%) =  
Spowerflow−n−Spowerflow−0
Spowerflow−0
x100%    ... (3.7) 
Where Spowerflow-o is the initial power flow of the line and Spowerflow-n is the power flow of the 














GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 0.889 2.2% 1.272 3.2% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 0.889 2.2% 1.272 3.2% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.269 14.7% 4.799 31.1% 3.094 20.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63.0% 10.656 106.6% 6.302 63.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 81.7% 8.753 124.2% 5.757 81.7% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.998 14.2% 2.143 30.4% 0.997 14.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 65.6% 4.896 65.3% 4.919 65.6% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 42.9% 4.295 43.0% 2.220 22.2% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 69.6% 4.908 69.6% 3.321 47.1% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.653 10.7% 0.636 4.1% 0.548 3.6% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.932 19.0% 2.425 15.7% 1.231 8.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 42.2% 4.213 42.1% 2.174 21.7% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 74.9% 6.695 95.0% 5.276 74.8% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 0.714 10.1% 0.710 10.1% 1.236 17.5% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 8.3% 1.788 11.6% 1.009 6.5% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.915 25.4% 5.433 35.2% 3.116 20.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.055 15.0% 1.056 15.0% 2.487 35.3% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.236 31.7% 2.235 31.7% 3.874 55.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 49.9% 3.520 49.9% 1.435 20.4% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85.1% 6.002 85.1% 8.998 127.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71.0% 5.002 71.0% 6.504 92.3% 
Table 3.4 Impact of DG Connection on Network Capacity Utilization  
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As presented in table 3.4, the connection of a new DG connection to one of generation-
dominated busbars, either Bus11-2 or Bus11-6 will increase the network capacity utilization 
of the lines which are connected to the targeted busbar.  
Due to DG connection at Bus11-2 the network capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-
2 and Bus11-1 increases from 81.7% to 124.2%. This connection also increases the network 
capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-2 and Bus11-3, from 74.9% to 95.0%. The 
similar impact also occurs when a new DG connected to Bus11-6. This connection causes 
network utilization to increase from 85.1% to 127.6% on the line between Bus11-6 and 
Bus11-7, and on the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-5, the network capacity utilization 
increases from 71.0% to 92.3%. 
The increase of the network capacity utilization is caused by the increase of the power which 
is flowing through the lines. This due to the energy generated from the new DG connection is 
distributed in the same direction with the initial power flow of those lines, so that, those two 
powers will add each other. 
3) Impact of DG Connection on the Power Losses  
The impact of connecting a new DG to a generation-dominated busbar on the power losses of 
the lines is presented in table 3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.5 shows the impact of DG connection at 
Bus11-2, while table 3.6 shows the impact of DG connection at Bus11-6. The terms of 
dSLosses represents the changes of power losses on a particular line. The unit of dSLosses is 
expressed in percent (%), which can be obtained by using the following equation [74]: 
dSLosses (%) =  
SLosses−n−SLosses−0
SLosses−0
x100%     ... (3.8) 
Where SLosses-o is the power losses of the initial network and SLosses-n is the power losses after a 














Initial Network DG Connection at Bus11-2 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.002 0.002 -50.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.002 0.002 -50.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.007 -0.051 0.051 -4.7% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.075 1.361 1.363 173.3% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.1 0.083 0.130 134.3% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.006 -0.009 0.011 -17.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.091 0.518 0.526 -6.1% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.013 0.241 0.241 -0.4% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.002 -0.054 0.054 1.8% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.013 0.232 0.232 -0.9% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.06 0.044 0.074 65.5% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.009 -0.049 0.050 -4.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.0% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.053 0.039 0.066 -0.9% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.0% 
Total Power Losses 0.403 1.369 1.427 0.533 2.27 2.332 63.4% 
Table 3.5 Impact of DG Connection on Power Losses at Bus11-2 
As seen in table 3.5, DG connection at Bus11-2 will increase the power losses on the lines 
which are directly connected to Bus11-2. This connection increases the power losses of the 
line between Bus11-2 and Bus11-1 by 134.3%, compared with the initial level. This 
connection also increases the initial power losses of the line between Bus11-2 and Bus11-3 

















Initial Network DG Connection at Bus11-6 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.005 0.005 25.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.005 0.005 25.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.003 -0.053 0.053 -1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.027 0.495 0.496 -0.6% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.045 0.03 0.054 -2.5% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.096 0.546 0.554 -1.1% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.004 0.064 0.064 -73.5% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.016 0.002 0.016 -62.3% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0 -0.055 0.055 3.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.003 0.061 0.061 -73.9% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.038 0.023 0.044 -1.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.002 -0.012 0.012 -6.7% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.003 -0.053 0.053 1.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.009 -0.005 0.010 -15.4% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.022 0.008 0.023 134.1% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.003 -0.011 0.011 -42.0% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.113 0.098 0.150 125.3% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.059 0.044 0.074 68.9% 
Total Losses 0.403 1.369 1.427 0.445 1.069 1.158 -18.8% 
Table 3.6 Impact of DG Connection on Power Losses at Bus11-6 
Table 3.6 shows that the connection of a new DG at Bus11-6 causes the increase of power 
losses on the lines which are connected to Bus11-6. This connection increases the power 
losses of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-5 by 68%, compared with the initial level. This 
connection also increases the initial power losses of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 
by 125.3%. 
The increase of power losses in both cases is caused by increase of power which is flowing 
through those lines. The energy generated from the new DG connection at Bus11-2 or Bus11-
6 will be distributed through those lines in the same direction with the initial power flow. 
This will increase the amount of power which is flowing through those lines. As the power 
flow increased, the power losses will increase as well. 
To be clear, the results of the above analysis can be depicted on a network model, as depicted 





Figure 3.5 Load Flow Analysis for DG Connection at Bus11-2 
As shown in figure 3.5, the connection of a new DG at Bus11-2 causes the power flow on 
some branches/lines are exceeding the capacity standard of those lines. The amount of power 
flow on the line between Bus11-2 and Bus11-1 is 8.753MVA, exceeding its capacity rating of 
7.049MVA. While on the line between Bus11-1 and Bus33-2, the amount of power is 
10.656MVA, exceeding the line’s capacity standard of 10.000MVA.  
  
Figure 3.6 Load Flow Analysis for DG Connection at Bus11-6 
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Figure 3.6 shows the impact of a new DG connection to Bus11-6. This connection causes the 
power flow on the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 to increase up to 8.998MVA, 
exceeding its capacity standard of 7.049MVA.  
3.1.3 DG Connection at a Demand-dominated Busbar 
The impact of DG connection on a demand-dominated busbar is investigated using the same 
reference network depicted in figure 3.1. There are three demand-dominated busbars on the 
network, i.e. Bus11-7, Bus11-9, and Bus04-1. Since the DG will operate at 11kV, the analysis 
includes the 11kV busbars only. The DG that will be connected to the network is assumed to 
be an onshore wind generation with the capacity of 4.5MVA, the power factor of 0.9 and the 
capacity factor of 0.35. The following sections describe the impact of connecting a new DG 
to those busbars, in terms of voltage level, network capacity utilization and power losses. 
1) Impact of DG Connection on the Voltage Level 
Busbar 
Name 





















GSP 1   1   0.0% 1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.2 1.003 0.16 0.4% 1.003 0.16 0.4% 
Bus33-2 1 -0.18 1.004 0.17 0.4% 1.004 0.18 0.4% 
Bus11-1 1.02 4.25 1.025 4.57 0.5% 1.025 4.58 0.5% 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.51 1.035 4.83 0.4% 1.035 4.83 0.4% 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.37 1.025 4.68 0.4% 1.025 4.69 0.4% 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.1 0.938 0.26 0.5% 0.938 0.26 0.5% 
Bus33-4 0.999 -0.21 1.003 0.14 0.4% 1.003 0.15 0.4% 
Bus11-8 0.985 -3.37 1.005 -1.47 2.0% 1.006 -1.44 2.1% 
Bus11-9 0.977 -3.69 1 -1.72 2.4% 1.003 -1.64 2.7% 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.22 1.003 0.13 0.5% 1.003 0.14 0.5% 
Bus11-4 0.987 -3.35 1.008 -1.43 2.1% 1.007 -1.44 2.0% 
Bus11-7 0.981 -3.63 1.008 -1.59 2.8% 1.005 -1.65 2.4% 
Bus11-5 0.983 -3.63 1.01 -1.6 2.7% 1.007 -1.65 2.4% 
Bus11-6 0.993 -3.42 1.019 -1.39 2.6% 1.016 -1.44 2.3% 
Table 3.7 Impact of DG Connection on Voltage Level at Demand-dominated Busbars 
Table 3.7 shows the impact of connecting a new DG to a demand-dominated area on the 
voltage level of related busbars. This connection increases of the network’s voltage level, 
especially for the busbars which are close and interconnected with the targeted busbar. DG 
connection at Bus11-7 will increase the initial voltage level of related busbars by 2.1% until 
2.8%. While the connection of a new DG at Bus11-9 causes the initial voltage level of related 
busbars to increase by 2.1% until 2.7%. The highest increase of the voltage level occurs on 
the targeted busbar, where the DG is connected.  
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2) Impact of DG Connection on the Network Capacity Utilization 
Table 3.8 shows the impact of connecting a new DG to a demand-dominated area on the 














GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 1.339 3.3% 1.360 3.4% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 1.339 3.3% 1.360 3.4% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.269 14.7% 3.115 20.2% 3.128 20.3% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63.0% 6.302 63.0% 6.302 63.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 81.7% 5.757 81.7% 5.757 81.7% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.998 14.2% 0.997 14.1% 0.997 14.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 65.6% 4.919 65.6% 4.919 65.6% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 42.9% 2.180 21.8% 2.148 21.5% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 69.6% 3.283 46.6% 2.248 31.9% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.653 10.7% 0.578 3.7% 0.606 3.9% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.932 19.0% 1.213 7.9% 1.205 7.8% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 42.2% 2.139 21.4% 2.143 21.4% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 74.9% 5.276 74.8% 5.276 74.8% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 0.714 10.1% 1.251 17.7% 0.185 2.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 8.3% 1.003 6.5% 1.025 6.6% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.915 25.4% 3.097 20.1% 3.087 20.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.055 15.0% 1.058 15.0% 1.058 15.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.236 31.7% 3.921 55.6% 0.594 8.4% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 49.9% 1.437 20.4% 2.055 29.2% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85.1% 6.003 85.1% 6.003 85.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71.0% 5.001 70.9% 5.001 70.9% 
Table 3.8 Impact of DG Connection on Network Utilization at Demand-dominated Busbars 
As presented in table 3.8, the connection of a new DG to Bus11-7 causes the network 
capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-4 to decrease from 49.9% down 
to 20.4%.  The reduction of network capacity utilization due to the power generated from the 
connected DG at Bus11-7 can be used to supply the demand connected to Bus11-7 itself. 
Since the demand connected to Bus11-7 has been partly supplied by the energy from the new 
DG, the amount of power which previously flows from Bus11-4 to Bus11-7 will decrease. As 
the power flow on this line decreases, so does the network capacity utilization. However, this 
connection will increase the network capacity utilization of another line, such as the line 
between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9, from 31.7% to 55.6%. This is because the power generated 
from the connected DG at Bus11-7 can also be used to supply the demand connected at 
Bus11-9. Since, initially, the power needed to supply demand at Bus11-9 also came from 
Bus11-7 to Bus119, the additional power from the DG connected at Bus11-7 will increase the 
total power flow on the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9.  
To complement the analysis above, the impact of DG connection at Bus11-7 can be seen in 
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figure 3.7.  The connection of a new DG to a demand-dominated at Bus11-7, i.e. a demand-
dominated busbar, does not cause the standard capacity of related lines which are connected 
to this busbar to be exceeded.  
 
Figure 3.7 A New DG Connection at Demand-dominated Busbar (Bus11-7) 
Meanwhile, the connection of a new DG to Bus11-9 will cause the network capacity 
utilization of the lines connected to Bus11-9 to decrease. This connection reduces the 
network capacity of the line between Bus11-9 and 11-8, from 69.6% down to 31.9%.  In this 
case, the reduction of the network capacity utilization due to the energy generated from the 
connected DG at Bus11-9 is used to supply the demand connected at Bus11-9 itself. Since the 
demand connected to Bus11-9 has been partly supplied by the energy from the new DG, the 
amount of power which previously flows from Bus11-7 to Bus11-9 will decrease. As the 
power flow on this line decreases, so does the network capacity utilization. Furthermore, the 
energy from DG connected at Bus11-9 can also be used to supply demand connected at 
Bus11-7. This means that the power is flowing from Bus11-9 to Bus-11-7. This power flow is 
in the opposite direction with the initial one which is flowing from Bus11-7 to Bus11-9. As 
the result, the total amount of power flow on this line is reduced, which in turn, it will reduce 
the network capacity utilization of the line. As presented in table 3.13, the network capacity 





Figure 3.8 A New DG Connection at Demand-dominated Busbar Bus11-9 
To complement the analysis above, the impact of DG connection at Bus11-9 can be seen in 
figure 3.8.  The connection of a new DG to a demand-dominated at Bus11-9 does not cause 
the standard capacity of related lines which are connected to this busbar to be exceeded.  
3) Impact of DG Connection on the Power Losses 
The impact of connecting a new DG to a demand-dominated on the power losses of the lines 
which is connected to the targeted busbar are presented in table 3.9 and 3.10. Table 3.9 shows 
the impact of DG connection at Bus11-7, while table 3.10 shows the impact of DG 














Initial Network DG Connection at Bus11-7 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.006 0.006 50.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.006 0.006 50.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.003 -0.053 0.053 -1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.027 0.495 0.496 -0.6% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.045 0.03 0.054 -2.5% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.095 0.546 0.554 -1.1% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.003 0.062 0.062 -74.4% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.016 0.002 0.016 -62.3% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0 -0.055 0.055 3.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.003 0.059 0.059 -74.8% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.038 0.023 0.044 -1.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.002 -0.012 0.012 -6.7% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.003 -0.053 0.053 1.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.022 0.008 0.023 134.1% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.003 -0.011 0.011 -42.0% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.051 0.036 0.062 -6.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.035 0.021 0.041 -6.3% 
Total Losses  0.403 1.369 1.427 0.349 0.975 1.036 -27.4% 
Table 3.9 Impact of DG Connection on Power Losses at Bus11-7 
As presented in table 3.9, the connection of a new DG at Bus11-7 causes the power losses of 
the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 to increase by 134% from the initial level. This due to 
the energy generated from the new DG is distributed at the same direction with the existing 
power flow to supply the demand at Bus11-9. This will increase the amount of power flow on 
the line. As the power flow increases, so does the power losses. However, this connection 
causes the decrease of power losses of other lines. The power losses of the line between 
Bus11-7 and Bus11-6 decreases by 42% from the initial level, while the initial power losses 
of the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-4 decreases by 6%. The decrease of power losses due 
to the energy from DG at Bus11-7 is used to supply demand at Bus11-7 itself. Because the 
demand connected at Bus11-7 has partly supplied, the power which previously flows from 
Bus11-4 to Bus11-7 to supply the demand will be reduced. As a result, this will reduce the 












Initial Network DG Connection at Bus11-9 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.006 0.006 50.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.006 0.006 50.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.003 -0.053 0.053 -1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.027 0.495 0.496 -0.6% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.045 0.03 0.054 -2.5% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.095 0.546 0.554 -1.1% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.003 0.06 0.060 -75.2% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.007 -0.007 0.010 -76.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0 -0.055 0.055 3.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.003 0.059 0.059 -74.8% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.038 0.023 0.044 -1.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0 -0.014 0.014 7.4% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.003 -0.053 0.053 1.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.001 -0.013 0.013 30.4% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.006 -0.008 0.010 -49.1% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.051 0.037 0.063 -5.1% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.035 0.021 0.041 -6.3% 
Total Losses  0.402 1.369 1.427 0.323 0.944 0.998 -30.1% 
Table 3.10 Impact of DG Connection on Power Losses at Bus11-9 
Table 3.10 presents the impact of connecting a new DG to Bus11-9, which is a demand-
dominated busbar. This connection has the same impact as connecting DG to Bus11-7, i.e. in 
one hand, it will increase the power flow of some lines, but on the other hand, it will increase 
the power losses of other lines. As shown in table 3.15, this connection causes the power 
losses on the line between Bus11-9 and Bus11-7 to increase by 30% from the initial level. 
The increase occurs due to the energy from DG at Bus11-9 is also distributed in the same 
direction with the initial power flow, to supply the demand at Bus11-7. So that, the power 
flow on that line will increase. As the power flow increase, the power losses will increase as 
well. 
Different impact of the connection occurs on the line between Bus11-9 and Bus11-8, of 
which, the power losses on this lines decreases by 76.8% from the initial level. The decrease 
occurs due to the energy from DG at Bus11-7 can be used to supply demand at Bus11-9 itself. 
As the demand has been partly supplied, the required power which is previously flows from 
Bus11-8 to Bus11-9 will be reduced. So, this will reduce the power flow on the line. For the 




3.1.4 DG Curtailment and Network Reinforcement 
Impact of DG connection on DG curtailment and network reinforcement can be examined in 
the event of connecting a new DG to a generation-dominated busbar. As explained in the 
previous section, this connection might cause failure in the network due to the power flowing 
through one or more lines of the network exceeding the standard capacity of those lines. 
In order to deal with this condition, there are two options that can be taken into account, i.e. 
DG curtailment and network reinforcement. DG curtailment is a mechanism to curtail the 
output energy of the DG to suit the standard capacity of a line/branch. While network 
reinforcement, is done by upgrading the capacity of the line/branch to accommodate all 
available DG capacity. 
By referring to figure 3.4 and figure 3.5, the connection of a new DG at a generation-
dominated busbar, either to Bus11-2 or Bus11-6 will increase the power flow on the lines 
connected to the designated busbar. The DG connection at Bus11-2 will cause the power 
flowing through the lines between Bus11-2 and Bus11-1 and between Bus11-1 and Bus33-2 
exceed the standard capacity of those lines. While connecting a new DG at Bus11-6, it will 
increase the power flowing through the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 exceeding the 
standard capacity of that line. 
Figure 3.9 shows a closer look of the impact of connecting a new DG to one of generation-
dominated busbars, i.e. Bus11-2 and Bus11-6.   
 
Figure 3.9 Impact of DG connection at Bus11-2 and Bus11-6 
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A. DG Curtailment Scheme 
There are three parameters that must be considered in DG Curtailment scheme, i.e. power 
flow sensitivity factor, energy curtailment and energy curtailment cost.  
1). Power Flow Sensitivity Factor 
The active and reactive power flow of a simple network consisting of two nodes, p and q, as 
depicted in figure 3.10 can be expressed as a function of bus voltage magnitude and phase 
angle as follows [73]: 
Pm = Gm|Vi|
2 − Gm|Vi||Vk|cos(δi − δk) − Bm|Vi||Vk|sin(δi − δk)    ..(3.9) 
Qm = −Bm|Vi|
2 + Bm|Vi||Vk|cos(δi − δk) − Gm|Vi||Vk|sin(δi − δk)   ..(3.10) 
 
Figure 3.10 A Simple Network Diagram with Two Nodes 
The concept of sensitivity factor is derived from the following equation [73]: 
Pm = Pm
0 + ∆Pm         ..(3.11) 
Where, (Pm
0 ) is the base case active power flow and (∆Pm) is incremental active power flow. 
By applying partial derivative of (3.8), ∆Pm can be expressed as a function of the bus power 









i=1 ∆Qi      ..(3.12) 






 are the representation of the sensitivity of bus i to line m, i.e. the line 
between bus p and bus q. ∆Pi and ∆Qi are the representation of the incremental of active and 
reactive power in bus i. NB represents the number of busbars in the system. 
By replacing the element of 
∂Pm
∂Pi
 with Fp(m. i) and element of 
∂Pm
∂Qi
 with Kp(m. i), equation 
(3.12) can be written as [73]: 
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∆Pm = ∑ Fp(m. i) 
NB
i=1 ∆Pi + ∑ Kp(m. i)
NB
i=1 ∆Qi     ..(3.13) 
Then, by substituting ∆Pm in (3.11) into (3.12)  
Pm = Pm
0 + ∑ Fp(m. i) 
NB
i=1 ∆Pi + ∑ Kp(m. i)
NB
i=1 ∆Qi    ..(3.14) 
Since any changes in bus power injection cause variations in all bus voltage magnitudes and 
phase angles, Fp(m. i) and Kp(m. i) can be calculated as follows [73]: 















m = 1. 2. .... NL         ... (3.15) 
and 















m = 1. 2. .... NL         ... (3.16) 
Where, NL denotes the number of lines in the system.  
The summation of the differential terms in (3.15) and (3.16) can be written as [73]: 
























  … (3.17) 


























































































































0  represent the voltage magnitude and the phase angle at bus p and 
bus q, in base case loading. 
2). DG Output Curtailment  
In the event of power flow congestion, the amount of generator power output required can be 







         ..(3.23) 
Where ∆DGp,m  represents the amount of the DG real power output curtailment at node m. 
∆Pik  represents the change in real power which is flowing from node i to node k, 
dPik
dGDp.m
   is 
the sensitivity factor, which expresses the relationship between  the change in real power 
injection at node m with the change in power flow from node i to node k. 
∆Pi,k , which represents the change in real power on the line between node p to node q, can be 
obtained from [75]:  









    ..(3.24) 
Where ∝ is the target utilisation of the congested component, Si,k
lim is the thermal rating of the 
congested component, ′Si,k is the initial apparent power flow of the line between node k and 
node k, ′Qi,k is the initial reactive power flow  of the line between node i and  node k, ′′Qi.k is 
the target reactive power flowing from node i to node k. The term ‘initial’ refers to the 
condition before DG curtailment applied while the term ‘target’ refers to the condition after 
DG curtailment applied. 
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The above equation neglected the power losses. Considering that the power losses on 
distribution network are around 5%, the calculation of ∆Pi,k in this research also considers the 
power losses. Hence, equation (3.24) becomes: 














           ..(3.25) 
Where PLoss−i,k is the initial active power losses between node i and node k and QLoss−i,k is 




   which represents the sensitivity factor for the change in real power injection of  




  = Fp(m. i) + j Kp(m. i) 
dPik
dDGp.m

















































)   ..(3.26) 
3). Energy Curtailment  
Energy Curtailment of DG-p at bus m (DGp,EnergyCurtail) can be calculated using the 
following equation [29]:  
DGp,EnergyCurtail = ∆DGp.mxDGp.cfxDGp.oprtime    ..(3.27) 
Where, ∆Gp.m is the amount of DG-p output curtailment in MW, DGp.cf is the capacity factor 
of DG-p and DGp.oprtimeis the operation time of DG-p in hours. So, the unit of energy 
curtailment is in MWh. 
4). Energy Curtailment Cost 
Energy curtailment cost is the cost emerged as a result of curtailing energy output from DG. 
This cost will be borne by DG investors.  
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Energy Curtailment Cost of DG-p at bus m (DGp,CurtailCost) can be derived by multiplying 
the energy curtailment of DG-p, which is expressed in MWh, with the levelised cost of 
energy generation of DG-p (DGp.LCOEG), expressed in £/MWh [29]. Hence, the unit of energy 
curtailment cost is expressed in £. 
DGp,CurtailCost = DGp,EnergyCurtailxDGp.LCOEG     ..(3.28) 
DGp,CurtailCost = ∆DGp.mxDGp.cfxDGp.oprtimexDGp.LCOEG   ..(3.29) 
Where there are some DGs that must be curtailed at bus m. the total Energy Curtailment Cost 
(EnCostm) is 
EnCostm = ∑ DGp,EnergyCost
k
p=1       ..(3.30) 
EnCostm = ∑ ∆DGp.mxDGp.cfxDGp.oprtimexDGp.LCOEG
k
p=1    ..(3.31) 
B. Network Reinforcement Scheme  
Besides DG curtailment scheme, another option to deal with the impact of DG connection at 
a generation-dominated busbar, i.e. when the network capacity is exceeded due to the new 
DG connection, is network reinforcement scheme. Network reinforcement scheme can be 
carried out by upgrading/reinforcing the capacity of the associated network components, such 
as lines, transformers and circuit breaker. 
As shown in figure 3.11, a new DG connection requires a new infrastructure to be built 
between point of connection and point of supply. This connection might also require the 
existing network/line must be reinforced to accommodate additional DG capacity. 
 
Figure 3.11 A New DG Connection at a Distribution Network [76] 
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The new infrastructure and the required reinforcement cause two main cost components in 
network reinforcement scheme, i.e. the sole-use connection assets and the shared-use 
connection assets [77][78]. The first cost component will be directly passed on to the 
customer since the assets are merely be used by that customer. While the second one becomes 
system assets, i.e. the assets will be used by all customers connected to that particular line. 






Assessment and Design for all relevant work 
Assessment and Design of the Non-Contestable Work 
Design Approval of the Contestable Work 
Final Works and Phased Energisation 
Inspection and Monitoring - HV Network Site Visit 
Land Rights 
Installation of a 500m HV cable 
HV circuit Breaker at customer substation with suitable protection 
Actuators and Remote Control (RTU) 
Shared-Use 
Connection Assets 
2 HV Circuit Breakers at Primary substation  
Re-conductor of a 3000m HV overhead line 
Replacement of existing 11 panel 11kV switchgear  
Installation of a 500m HV cable  
Replace two 60MVA, 132/33kV transformers with two 90MVA 
transformers.  
Table 3.11 Cost Components of DG Connection [77][78] 
Since the sole-use connection assets costs has been directly passed on the customers who 
seek for connection, the amount of investment cost will be based on the shared-use 
connection assets costs only. 
A. Network Reinforcement Cost vs DG Curtailment Cost  
Costs comparison between network reinforcement scheme and DG curtailment scheme is 
needed to decide whether network reinforcement or DG curtailment is a more worthy choice. 
In terms of financial expenses, the lower cost the better option. This means that the network 
reinforcement cost must be higher than or, at least equal to, the maximum DG curtailment 
cost.  
1). Maximum DG Output Curtailment 
The maximum DG output curtailment is calculated based on the assumption that DG energy 
curtailment cost is equal to the required reinforcement cost. 
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By assuming that the network reinforcement cost, InvCostm, is equal to the DG curtailment 
cost, EnCostm, the maximum output of DGp to be curtailed, ∆DGmaxp.m, can be calculated 
as follows [79]: 




       ... (3.32) 
Where 
EnCostp      = Energy Curtailment Cost of DGp (£) 
InvCostm    = Investment Cost to reinforce line –m (£) 
DGp.cf  = capacity factor of DGp  
DGp.oprtime   = annual operational time of DGp (hours) 
DGp.LCOEG     = levelised cost of energy generation of DGp (£/MWh) 
∆DGp.m          = required out put of DGp to be curtailed (MW) 
∆DGmaxp.m  = maximum out put of DGp to be curtailed (MW) 
Given the maximum DG output curtailment, ∆Gmaxp.m, the amount of energy curtailment at 
this point can be calculated using the following equation: 
DGp,EnergyCurtailMax = ∆DGmaxp.mxDGp.cfxDGp.oprtime   ... (3.33) 
2). Energy Conveyed from the New Connected DG 
By assuming that the standard capacity of the network or the line is Si.k
lim, the apparent power 
flowing through the line before the connection is Si.k, and the line power losses before the 










 is the sensitivity factor for the change in real power injection of  DGp at node m 
with the change in power flow from node i to node k, as shown in equation (3.26). Therefore, 
the amount of energy conveyed through the network from the new connected DG, without 






= Lineik,capacity ∗ DGp.pf ∗ DGp.cf*DGp.oprtime   ... (3.35) 
3). The Minimum Requirement for Energy to be Conveyed  
The minimum requirement for energy to be conveyed from the new connected DG, 
Energyreq, can be obtained by considering the amount of maximum DG energy can be 
conveyed without network reinforcement, EnConvey 
p
m
, and the amount of maximum DG 
energy curtailment, EnCur 
p
m
, in 1 year period (8760 hours) [79].  
DGp,EnergyReq = DGp,EnergyCurtailMax + EnConvey p
m
    … (3.36) 




lim − Si.k + SLosses−i.k) ∗ DGp.pf) ∗
DGp.cf*8760        … (3.37) 
 
Figure 3.12 Cross Section between Curtailment Cost and Reinforcement Cost 
Figure 3.12 shows the cross section between DG output Curtailment Cost and Network 
Reinforcement Cost. The horizontal line shows the network reinforcement cost and the linear 
curve shows the energy curtailment cost. The cross section point indicates the network 
reinforcement cost has the same value with the energy curtailment cost.  


































This means that below this point, the energy curtailment cost is less than the network 
reinforcement cost. This also means that starting from this point and beyond, the energy 
curtailment cost is higher than the network reinforcement cost. 
The comparison of DG curtailment cost and Network Reinforcement cost will lead to the 
decision which scheme is better, in terms of cost, i.e. the lower the cost the better.  
3.2 IMPACT OF DEMAND SIDE RESPONSE ON NETWORK PERFORMANCE 
As described in section 2.3.1, Demand Side Response can be defines as a deliberate act of 
end user, either as an individual or a group, to change their demand in response to energy 
market price or the signals of congested network [15].  
In this section, the impact of DSR on the performance of distribution network in terms of 
voltage level, network capacity utilization, and power losses, is examined by considering the 
response of end users to congested network through demand reduction, demand shifting and 
running on-site generation.  
3.2.1 DSR Mechanisms 
There are three DSR mechanisms examined in this thesis, i.e. demand reduction, demand 
shifting and running on-site generation mechanisms. 
Demand reduction mechanism is a mechanism to reduce electricity demand following an 
outage on the network in order to avoid further failure. In this case, the demand from the 
participated customers will be reduced when a particular line, i.e. the line between Bus11-4 
and Bus11-7, is out of service.  
Demand shifting mechanism is a mechanism to shift electricity consumption from peak times 
to off-peak times of the day. In this case, the customers who participate in DSR programme 
are willing to shift their electricity consumption during peak times (in the evening) to other 
off-peak times of the day, for one hour period. 
Running on-site generation is a mechanism to operate generations which are installed and 
owned by end users. In this case, this mechanism is applied in response to supply scarcity due 




3.2.2 DSR Participation 
Another important factor in examining the impact of DSR is related to the participation of 
end user in DSR programme. Assuming that the participation of consumers in the DSR 
programme implemented on the network in figure 3.13 is given in table 3.12. 
Type of DSR 










Sub Total 1.50 






Sub Total 1.00 




Sub Total 0.45 
Table 3.12 DSR Participation 
Table 3.12 shows the total available DSR capacity from customers who participate in DSR 
programme. There are five industrial/commercials customers, i.e. MD1, MD2, MD3, MD4 
and MD5, who participate in demand reduction DSR with total contribution of 1.5MW. 
These customers also install on-site generations with total capacity of 1MW. While three 
groups of household customers, i.e. LD1, LD2 and LD3, participate in load shifting DSR 
with total capacity of 0.45MW. 
3.2.3 DSR with Demand Reduction Mechanism  
The first mechanism of DSR implementation is demand reduction mechanism, i.e. demand 
side response which is done by reducing the use of electricity by consumers. This mechanism 
can be investigated through the case where a failure occurs on a particular line of the 
network.  
For instance, an outage occurs at the power line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7. This is 
indicated by the absence of the power flow on that line, as depicted in figure 3.13. This 





Figure 3.13 Load Flow Results Following a Line Outage 
To deal with this condition, i.e. avoiding further network failure, the DNO can require the 
customers, who participate in Demand Reduction DSR programme, to reduce their electricity 
consumption. As presented in table 3.15, the total of 1.5MW capacity can be participated in 
demand reduction DSR.  
The impact of demand reduction on the network performance is depicted in figure 3.13. The 
details, including the impact on voltage level, power flow and power losses, are presented in 





Figure 3.14 Demand Reduction after a Line Outage 
Bus  
Name 














GSP 1   1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.2 0.999 -0.21 0.0% 
Bus33-2 1 -0.18 1 -0.19 0.0% 
Bus11-1 1.02 4.25 1.02 4.25 0.0% 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.51 1.031 4.5 0.0% 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.37 1.021 4.36 0.0% 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.1 0.933 -0.11 0.0% 
Bus33-4 0.999 -0.21 0.998 -0.22 -0.1% 
Bus11-8 0.985 -3.37 0.982 -3.55 -0.3% 
Bus11-9 0.977 -3.69 0.967 -4.17 -1.0% 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.22 0.998 -0.23 0.0% 
Bus11-4 0.987 -3.35 0.988 -3.25 0.1% 
Bus11-7 0.981 -3.63 0.967 -4.4 -1.4% 
Bus11-5 0.983 -3.63 0.969 -4.4 -1.4% 
Bus11-6 0.993 -3.42 0.979 -4.18 -1.4% 
Table 3.13 Impact of Line Outage on Voltage Level 
In this case, the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 is out of service. This outage causes the 
voltage level of Bus11-4 to increase by 0.1% from the initial level. This is because the line 
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outage reduces the demand connected to Bus11-4. As the result of demand reduction, the 
voltage level will increase.  
Contrary, the line outage will reduce the supply to the demand connected at Bus11-7.  As the 
result of supply reduction, which also means the reduction in power generation, the voltage 
level at Bus11-7 will decrease by 1.4% from the initial level.  
 Bus  
Name 














GSP 1   1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.21 1 -0.08 0.1% 
Bus33-2 1 -0.19 1.001 -0.06 0.1% 
Bus11-1 1.02 4.25 1.022 4.37 0.2% 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.5 1.032 4.62 0.1% 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.36 1.022 4.48 0.1% 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.11 0.934 0.02 0.1% 
Bus33-4 0.998 -0.22 1 -0.09 0.2% 
Bus11-8 0.982 -3.55 0.988 -2.83 0.6% 
Bus11-9 0.967 -4.17 0.977 -3.35 1.0% 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.23 0.999 -0.1 0.1% 
Bus11-4 0.988 -3.25 0.993 -2.57 0.5% 
Bus11-7 0.967 -4.4 0.978 -3.53 1.1% 
Bus11-5 0.969 -4.4 0.98 -3.52 1.1% 
Bus11-6 0.979 -4.18 0.99 -3.31 1.1% 
Table 3.14 Impact of Demand Reduction on Voltage Level 
The outage of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 will cause another failure on the 
network, i.e. the power flow on the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 is exceeding its 
standard capacity. To deal with this problem, the customers who are participating in DSR 
programme are required to reduce their energy consumption. As presented in table 3.14, the 
demand reduction causes the voltage level of the related busbars to increase by around 1.1% 

















Network Capacity Utilization 
Initial Network Line Outage Demand Reduction 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 1.200 3.0% 0.437 1.1% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 1.200 3.0% 0.437 1.1% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.269 14.7% 2.225 14.4% 2.524 16.4% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63.0% 6.299 63.0% 6.299 63.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 81.7% 5.756 81.7% 5.756 81.7% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.998 14.2% 0.999 14.2% 0.998 14.2% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 65.6% 4.923 65.6% 4.922 65.6% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 42.9% 4.567 45.7% 3.733 37.3% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 69.6% 8.467 120.1% 6.955 98.7% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.653 10.7% 1.747 11.3% 1.143 7.4% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.932 19.0% 2.893 18.7% 2.224 14.4% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 42.2% 4.051 40.5% 3.310 33.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 74.9% 5.277 74.9% 5.277 74.9% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 0.714 10.1% 4.011 56.9% 3.289 46.7% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 8.3% 1.161 7.5% 1.086 7.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.915 25.4% 3.960 25.7% 3.661 23.7% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.055 15.0% 1.054 15.0% 1.232 17.5% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.236 31.7% 1.883 26.7% 1.476 20.9% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 49.9%         
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85.1% 6.002 85.1% 6.100 86.5% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71.0% 5.002 71.0% 4.903 69.6% 
Table 3.15 Impact of Line Outage and Demand Reduction on Power Flow  
As presented in table 3.15, the line outage significantly increases the power flowing through 
the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9. This power flow exceeds the standard rating of the 
line by 120.1%. Then, after demand reduction mechanism is applied, the power flowing 
through this line decrease down to 98.7% of the standard rating, avoiding further outage on 


















Initial Network Line Outage 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.004 0.004 0.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.004 0.004 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.097 0.552 0.560 0.0% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.015 0.274 0.274 13.2% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.109 0.095 0.145 238.5% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.012 0.215 0.215 -8.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.024 0.011 0.026 102.5% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.011 0.011 -8.1% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0.006 -0.007 0.009 -7.8% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020         
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.055 0.042 0.069 4.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.038 0.025 0.045 4.4% 
Total Losses  0.403 1.369 1.427 0.482 1.477 1.554 8.9% 
Table 3.16 Impact of Line Outage on Power Losses 
The failure of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 causes the increase of the power losses 
on particular lines but it decreases the power losses of other lines on the network. As seen in 
table 3.16, the power losses of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-8 increases by 102.5%, 
while the power losses of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 increases by 238.5% from 
the initial level. The increase of power losses due to additional power, which is previously 
flowing through the failed line, will flow through these lines. As the power increased, the 
















Line Outage Demand Reduction 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.001 0.001 -75.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0 0.001 0.001 -75.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.027 0.497 0.498 -0.2% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.045 0.031 0.055 -1.5% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.097 0.552 0.560 0.096 0.55 0.558 -0.4% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.015 0.274 0.274 0.01 0.182 0.182 -33.6% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.109 0.095 0.145 0.072 0.058 0.092 -36.1% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.002 -0.054 0.054 1.8% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.012 0.215 0.215 0.008 0.143 0.143 -33.5% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.038 0.023 0.044 -1.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.024 0.011 0.026 0.016 0.002 0.016 -38.9% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.055 0.055 1.9% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.004 -0.052 0.052 -0.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.011 0.011 0.002 -0.011 0.011 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.006 -0.007 0.009 0.003 -0.01 0.010 13.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7               
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.055 0.042 0.069 0.056 0.042 0.070 1.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.038 0.025 0.045 0.036 0.022 0.042 -7.2% 
Total Losses  0.482 1.477 1.554 0.418 1.248 1.316 -15.3% 
Table 3.17 Impact of Demand Reduction on Power Losses 
Following the failure on the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, the customers who 
participate in DSR programme are required to reduce their demand. As presented in table 
3.17, demand reduction mechanism will reduce the power losses of the line between Bus11-
4 and Bus11-8, and of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 by 38.9% and 36.1%, 
respectively. As the demand reduced, the amount of power to supply the demand will 
decrease, which in turn, it will decrease the power losses. This reduction is calculated based 
on the level of power losses at the event of failure.  
3.2.4 DSR with Demand Shifting Mechanism  
Demand Shifting is a mechanism in DSR programme to shift the electricity consumption 
from peak times to off-peak times. So, the customers do not reduce their total electricity 
consumption but they change the time to consume electricity. This will reduce the peak 
demand and increase electricity consumption during off-peak time, which in turn, it will 
flatten or smoothen the load profile. 
In electricity market, where time off use (TOU) tariffs or dynamic pricing has been 
implemented, consumers who shift their consumption from peak to off-peak times will 
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benefit for paying less bills with the same amount of electricity consumption, since the price 
during off-peak is lower than peak times [49].     
Peak demand will force system components to run on its maximum capacity. At some points, 
it might cause the system needs to be upgraded to fulfil the demand. Therefore, demand 
shifting which flatten the peak demand and move it to other off-peak times during the day can 
avoid or defer network reinforcement.  
 
Figure 3.15 Impact of Demand Shifting on Load Profile [49] 
As seen in figure 3.15, the peak demand during evening is moved to off-peak times during 
night. It also can be done by filling the valley where the electricity consumption is quite low. 
Domestic customers contribute the most in demand shifting due to their flexibility in 
electricity consumption. Some of their household appliances, such as storage heaters, 
washing machines and dishwashers can be operated during off-peak instead of peak times. 
This mechanism requires customers to change their behaviour which might cause some 
inconvenience but, in turn, they will benefit for paying less electricity bills for the same 
usage. 
In the UK, domestic customers contribute around 0.25 GW in demand shifting through 
storage heaters which are automatically operated at night. The implementation of lower 
prices, such as Economy 7 tariffs, has encouraged customers to shift approximately 20% of 




3.2.5 DSR with Running On-Site Generation Mechanism 
Another DSR mechanism is on-site generation. On-site generation is generation that is 
installed either by industrial, commercial or household sectors as stand-by generator to back 
up the electricity supply when generation scarcity occurs in the distribution system due to 
power line’s failure or DG outage. 
  
Figure 3.16 Load Flow Results Following a DG Outage 
As shown in figure 3.16, the outage of DG4 which is connected to Bus11-6 will cause the 
capacity of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, is exceeded. The power flow increases up 
to 7.322 MVA, exceeding the rating capacity of 7.049 MVA.  
To deal with this condition, i.e. avoiding another failure occurs in the system, the DNO can 
require the customers to run their on-site generations which act as stand-by reserve. As 
presented in table 3.15, each industrial customer has installed on-site generation with the 
capacity of 0.2 MVA. When required by the DNO, all industrial customers can provide 
reserve generation capacity of 1 MVA. By running on-site generation at Bus11-7, following 
DG outage at Bus11-6, the power flowing through the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 
decreases, so the line capacity is not exceeded anymore. The impact of running on-site 





Figure 3.17 Running on-site Generation after a DG Outage 
Bus  
Name 














GSP 1   1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 0.999 -0.2 0.992 -0.72 -0.7% 
Bus33-2 1 -0.18 0.993 -0.7 -0.7% 
Bus11-1 1.02 4.25 1.013 3.8 -0.7% 
Bus11-2 1.031 4.51 1.024 4.06 -0.7% 
Bus11-3 1.021 4.37 1.013 3.91 -0.8% 
Bus04-1 0.933 -0.1 0.925 -0.63 -0.9% 
Bus33-4 0.999 -0.21 0.991 -0.73 -0.8% 
Bus11-8 0.985 -3.37 0.952 -6.29 -3.4% 
Bus11-9 0.977 -3.69 0.939 -6.75 -3.9% 
Bus33-3 0.998 -0.22 0.99 -0.74 -0.8% 
Bus11-4 0.987 -3.35 0.952 -6.31 -3.5% 
Bus11-7 0.981 -3.63 0.938 -6.79 -4.4% 
Bus11-5 0.983 -3.63 0.936 -6.88 -4.8% 
Bus11-6 0.993 -3.42 0.942 -6.74 -5.1% 
Table 3.18 Impact of DG Outage on Voltage Level 
At the event of a failure, i.e. when a DG at Bus11-6 is out of service, the voltage level of 
some busbars will decrease. As seen in table 3.18, the decrease of voltage level is in the range 
between 3.4% until 5.1% from the initial level. The highest voltage reduction occurs at the 


















GSP 1   1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 0.992 -0.72 0.994 -0.64 0.2% 
Bus33-2 0.993 -0.7 0.994 -0.62 0.1% 
Bus11-1 1.013 3.8 1.014 3.87 0.1% 
Bus11-2 1.024 4.06 1.025 4.13 0.1% 
Bus11-3 1.013 3.91 1.015 3.98 0.2% 
Bus04-1 0.925 -0.63 0.926 -0.55 0.1% 
Bus33-4 0.991 -0.73 0.992 -0.65 0.1% 
Bus11-8 0.952 -6.29 0.958 -5.82 0.6% 
Bus11-9 0.939 -6.75 0.945 -6.24 0.6% 
Bus33-3 0.99 -0.74 0.992 -0.66 0.2% 
Bus11-4 0.952 -6.31 0.958 -5.83 0.6% 
Bus11-7 0.938 -6.79 0.945 -6.28 0.7% 
Bus11-5 0.936 -6.88 0.943 -6.37 0.7% 
Bus11-6 0.942 -6.74 0.949 -6.23 0.7% 
Table 3.19 Impact of Running On-site Generation on Voltage Level 
In order to deal with the supply scarcity on the network, due to one of the DGs connected to 
Bus11-6 is out of service, the DSR participants are required to run their on-site generations. 
This mechanism causes the voltage level of some busbars to increase in the range between 









Network Capacity Utilization 
Initial Network DG Outage On-site Generation 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 4.709 11.8% 4.121 10.3% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 2.9% 4.709 11.8% 4.121 10.3% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.269 14.7% 1.196 7.7% 1.328 8.6% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63.0% 6.293 62.9% 6.294 62.9% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 81.7% 5.754 81.6% 5.754 81.6% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.998 14.2% 1.001 14.2% 1.001 14.2% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 65.6% 4.931 65.7% 4.930 65.7% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 42.9% 7.696 77.0% 7.135 71.4% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 69.6% 7.322 103.9% 6.838 97.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.653 10.7% 4.261 27.6% 3.833 24.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.932 19.0% 5.959 38.6% 5.464 35.4% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 42.2% 7.676 76.8% 7.114 71.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 74.9% 5.280 74.9% 5.279 74.9% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 0.714 10.1% 0.102 1.4% 0.088 1.2% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 8.3% 1.725 11.2% 1.656 10.7% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.915 25.4% 5.167 33.5% 4.963 32.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.055 15.0% 1.205 17.1% 1.077 15.3% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.236 31.7% 0.307 4.4% 0.272 3.9% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 49.9% 7.464 105.9% 6.931 98.3% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85.1% 1.682 23.9% 1.749 24.8% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71.0% 2.833 40.2% 2.766 39.2% 
Table 3.20 Impact of DG Outage and On-site Generation on Network Capacity Utilization  
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As shown in table 3.20, the failure of a DG connected to Bus11-6 can cause the power flow 
on the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 will exceed the standard rating by 105.9%. This 
connection also increases the power flow on the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 by 
103.9%.  
To avoid further failures, the on-site generations connected to Bus11-9, Bus11-7 and Bus11-5 
are operated. The power generated from on-site generations can be used to replace the lost 
power from the failed DG at Bus11-6. As presented in table 3.20, the operation of on-site 
generation can reduce the network capacity utilization of the line between Bus 11-8 and 
Bus11-9, from 104.9% down to 97.0%. On the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, the 






Initial Network DG Outage 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.069 0.069 1626.6% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.069 0.069 1626.6% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.002 -0.054 0.054 0 -0.054 0.054 -0.1% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.498 0.499 0.028 0.505 0.506 1.4% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.031 0.055 0.046 0.032 0.056 1.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.552 0.560 0.098 0.562 0.570 1.8% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.013 0.242 0.242 0.044 0.789 0.790 226.1% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.036 0.023 0.043 0.086 0.073 0.113 164.1% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.006 -0.05 0.050 -6.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.011 -0.047 0.048 -9.1% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.013 0.234 0.234 0.043 0.786 0.787 235.9% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.024 0.045 0.039 0.024 0.046 1.9% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0 -0.012 0.012 -8.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.001 -0.053 0.053 -1.9% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.005 -0.052 0.052 0.009 -0.049 0.050 -4.6% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.01 0.010 -16.2% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.008 -0.006 0.010 0 -0.012 0.012 20.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.019 0.005 0.020 0.09 0.077 0.118 502.9% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.053 0.04 0.066 0.005 -0.007 0.009 -87.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.037 0.023 0.044 0.013 0.001 0.013 -70.1% 
Total Losses  0.403 1.369 1.427 0.528 2.68 2.732 91.4% 
Table 3.21 Impact of DG Outage on Power Losses 
The failure of a DG at Bus11-6 causes the increase of the power losses on particular lines but 
it decreases the power losses of other lines on the network. As seen in table 3.21, the power 
losses of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 increases by 502.9%, while the power losses 
of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 increases by 164.1% from the initial level. The 
increase of power losses on those lines is caused by additional power from the lines above 
Bus11-4 and Bus11-8. The additional power is needed to replace the power which is 
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previously supplied by the failed DG at Bus11-6. As the power flow increased, the power 
losses will increase as well. 
Contrary, the DG failure at Bus11-6 will reduce the supply to the demand connected at 
Bus11-5 and Bus11-7.  As the result, the power which flows through the line between Bus11-
6 and Bus11-5, and through the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 will decrease by 70.1% 






DG Outage On-site Generation 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0.003 0.069 0.069 0.003 0.053 0.053 -23.1% 
GSP Bus33-1 0.003 0.069 0.069 0.003 0.053 0.053 -23.1% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0 -0.054 0.054 0.001 -0.054 0.054 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.028 0.505 0.506 0.028 0.504 0.505 -0.2% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.046 0.032 0.056 0.046 0.031 0.055 -1.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.098 0.562 0.570 0.098 0.56 0.569 -0.3% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.044 0.789 0.790 0.037 0.676 0.677 -14.3% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.086 0.073 0.113 0.074 0.061 0.096 -15.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0.006 -0.05 0.050 0.005 -0.051 0.051 1.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0.011 -0.047 0.048 0.01 -0.048 0.049 1.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.043 0.786 0.787 0.037 0.673 0.674 -14.4% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.039 0.024 0.046 0.039 0.024 0.046 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0 -0.012 0.012 0 -0.013 0.013 8.3% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0.001 -0.053 0.053 0.001 -0.053 0.053 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.009 -0.049 0.050 0.008 -0.049 0.050 -0.3% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.002 -0.01 0.010 0.002 -0.01 0.010 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0 -0.012 0.012 0 -0.012 0.012 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.09 0.077 0.118 0.077 0.063 0.099 -16.0% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.005 -0.007 0.009 0.005 -0.007 0.009 0.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.013 0.001 0.013 0.012 0 0.012 -8.0% 
Total Losses   0.528 2.68 2.732 0.487 2.388 2.437 -10.8% 
Table 3.22 Impact of Running On-site Generation on Power Losses 
Table 3.22 shows that running on-site generation mechanism can reduce the power losses of 
the interconnected lines in the range of 8% and 16%, compared to the level of power losses at 
the event of DG outage.  
DG outage at Bus11-6 causes scarcity of supply on the network. Therefore, by running 
onsite-generations, the energy generated from those generations can be used to replace the 
energy lost from the failed DG. Since the energy generated from the on-site generations can 
be directly used by the nearby demand, this will reduce the power drew from the network. As 




3.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the impact of DG connection and DSR implementation on an existing 
distribution network, in terms of voltage level, network capacity utilization and power losses 
of the network.  
The impact of DG connection is examined by connecting a new DG to a generation-
dominated busbar and a demand-dominated busbar. At a generation dominated-busbar, the 
impact of connecting of a new DG can be summarized as follow: 
- DG connection at a generation-dominated busbar will increase the voltage level of the 
related busbars. Referring to the examples used in this research, the voltage level can 
increase up to 3.1% from the initial level. The highest increase of the voltage level 
occurs on the targeted busbar. 
- The DG connection will also increase the network capacity utilization of the lines which 
are connected to the targeted busbar, due to the energy from the connected DG will be 
conveyed in the same direction with the initial power flow. As a result, it will increase 
the power flow on those lines. The analysis shows that the network capacity utilization of 
the lines will increase up to 42.5% from the initial level. 
- As the power flow increased, the power losses will increase as well. In the examined 
case studies, the initial power losses increased up to 134.3%. 
Meanwhile, at a demand-dominated busbar, a new DG connection might cause the 
followings: 
- The connection of a new DG to a demand-dominated busbar will increase the voltage 
level of the related busbars. Based on the analysis for the case studies, this connection 
can increase the initial voltage level up to 2.8%. The highest increase of the voltage level 
occurs on the targeted busbar. 
- At a demand-dominated busbar, the connection of a new DG might have different 
impacts, in terms of network capacity utilization. In one hand, this connection can reduce 
the network capacity utilization of some lines, but on the other hand, it will increase the 
network capacity utilization of other lines.  
The reduction of network capacity utilization due to the energy generated from the DG is 
used to supply the demand at the targeted busbar, so that, it will reduce the imported 
power from outside. Referring to the case studies, the reduction of the network capacity 
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utilization can reach 47.2% from the initial level. Meanwhile, the increase of the network 
capacity utilization is caused by the energy from DG which is distributed in the same 
direction with the initial power flow to supply demand at particular busbars. The analysis 
shows that this will increase the initial power flow on those busbars up to 23.9%.  
- The pattern of the power losses will follow the pattern of the power flow. If the power 
flow on a particular line decreased, the power losses on that line will also decrease, and 
vice versa. In the case studies, the connection of DG at a demand-dominated busbar will 
cause the initial power losses of some lines to decrease down to 76.8%. However, on 
some other lines, the DG connection will increase the power losses until 134% from the 
initial level. 
For the purpose of examining the impact of DSR programme on the distribution network, the 
implementation of DSR is examined through three mechanisms, including demand 
reduction, demand shifting and running on-site generation.  
- Demand reduction mechanism is applied following an outage on the network, i.e. when a 
particular line is out of service. Following the failure event, the initial voltage level of the 
busbar at one end of the line will increase by 0.1%, but at the other end, the initial 
voltage level will decrease by 1.4%. This failure causes the network capacity utilization 
of another line on the network to increase by 120.1%, which can lead to another failure. 
In addition, the initial power losses of this line increased by 238.5%. 
Through demand reduction mechanism, the voltage level of the related busbars increased 
by 1.1%, compared with the level at failure event. This mechanism will reduce the 
network capacity utilization and the power losses at the event of failure, down to 21.4% 
and 38.9%, respectively. 
- Demand Shifting mechanism, which aims to shift the electricity consumption from peak 
times to of off-peak times, can reduce and flatten the electricity peak demand. 
- On-site generations will be operated at the time of supply scarcity due to one DG is out 
of service. Following the outage, the initial voltage level of related busbars will decrease 
down to 5.1%. The largest voltage reduction occurs at the busbar where the DG 
previously connected. The DG outage will cause the power flow of the lines which are 
connected to the targeted busbar to increase up to 105.9%, while the initial power losses 
increased by five times. 
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- By running on-site generations, the voltage level at the event of failure will increase by 
0.7%. This mechanism will cause the network capacity utilization of the exceeded line to 
decrease down to 97.0%, while the power losses at the event of failure can be reduced 




4 EFFECTIVE DG INCENTIVE FOR DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
OPERATORS 
One of the purposes of connecting DGs to the distribution network is to increase the use of 
renewable energy sources to produce electricity, in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
from electricity generation. It is expected that if more DGs connected to the network, more 
fossil-fuelled power plants will be replaced, eventually resulting less greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
The existing mechanism, which incentivises a DNO merely based on the connected DG 
capacity (kW), seems to be a bit contrast with the purpose. The DNO will receive a higher 
incentive, if many more DGs can be connected to its network. Although the new connected 
DGs will only operate infrequently, the amount of incentive for the DNO will not be affected.  
In addition, the value of the incentives given to the DNOs is the same across the country, i.e. 
at £1/kW [54]. 
By considering that DG has many types of technology to generate energy, the current 
mechanism might give unfair treatment for every DG connection. The type of DG technology 
will determine the energy output from the connected DG. Different type of DG technology 
will have different value of DG parameters, including capacity factor, operational time and 
levelised cost of energy generation. As a result, the same DG capacity from different DG 
technologies will generate different amount of energy.  
Another consideration that must be taken into account is the proposed location of DG 
connection because it will impact on the required investment cost to provide DG connection. 
Connecting DG in a remote area to the existing distribution network will require higher 
investment cost. The location of DG connection will also impact on the number of 
components that might be affected by that connection. The more the number of affected 
components, the higher the investment cost required. 
Based on those two reasons, this research proposes a new approach in incentivising DNOs 
which is based on the utilization of available DG energy on the network and its relation with 
the requirement to upgrade the existing network, called energy-based DG incentive 
mechanism. The details of the principles, the structure and the methodology of the proposed 




4.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY-BASED DG INCENTIVES 
4.1.1 Principles of the Energy-based DG Incentives 
Energy-based DG Incentive mechanism is developed to incentivise DNOs in facilitating DG 
connection on their distribution networks. The incentive is based on the utilization of 
available DG energy on the network, i.e. the actual amount of energy conveyed from the 
connected DG over the standard energy rated of the DG, and its relation with the requirement 
for network reinforcement. This mechanism considers two main parameters, i.e. the type of 
DG technology which will be connected to the network and the reinforcement cost needed to 
provide the connection.  
4.1.2 Structure of the Incentive Mechanism 
The structure of the proposed energy-based DG incentive adopted current DG incentive 
framework, which is established from a hybrid mechanism, i.e. giving DNOs a partial pass-
through treatment and additional incentive rate to provide DG connection to their distribution 
network.  
1). Level of Pass-through 
As applied in current capacity-based DG incentive [54], energy-based DG incentive allows 
DNOs to pass 80% of their DG connection investment cost on to the customer who seeks for 
the connection.  
2). Energy-based DG Incentive Rate 
The energy-based DG incentive rate is developed from the remaining 20% of DG connection 
investment cost and is annuitized for a particular period of time. The period of time is 
assumed to be 15 years, as the assumed life time of DG connection assets. 
3). Minimum and Maximum Thresholds of DG Incentive 
The maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNOs if the connected DG can 
convey energy at its standard energy rating. While the minimum threshold will be given if 






Figure 4.1  Flowchart for Energy-based DG Incentive Mechanism
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4.1.3 Methodology to Develop Energy-based DG Incentive 
The methodology used to develop energy-based DG incentive mechanism can be summarized 
by using the flowchart depicted in figure 4.1 (the details of the flowchart can be seen in 
appendix 2). The explanation of this methodology is as follows:  
A. Determining the Reinforcement Cost 
There are two main cost components in providing DG connection on distribution network, 
including the sole-use connection assets cost and the shared-use connection assets cost 
[77][78].  
The sole-use connection assets are provided only for the customer who is seeking for DG 
connection. So that, the cost of these components will be directly passed on to the customers, 
while the shared-use connection assets will be used by all customers connected to the 
distribution network. Since the sole-use connection assets costs has been directly passed on to 
the customers, the reinforcement cost needed to provide DG connection is calculated based 
on the shared-use connection assets costs only.  
In a case where the connection of a new DG does not require the network to be reinforced, 
which also means DNO do not need to spend any reinforcement costs, there will be no 
incentives given to the DNO. 
B. Determining the Capacity and the Type of DG Technology 
Different types of DG technology will have different value of DG parameters, including 
power factor (DGp.pf), capacity factor (DGp.cf), operational time (DGp.oprtime) and levelised 
cost of energy generation (DGp.LCOEG). These parameters will determine the maximum energy 
that can be generated from the DG (DGp,EnergyMax), as writen as:  
DGp,EnergyMax = DGp,Cap ∗ DGp,cf ∗ DGp,cf ∗ DGp,oprtime   … (4.1) 
C. Determining the Maximum DG Output Curtailment 
The maximum DG output curtailment represents the maximum energy that might be curtailed 
from the connected DG in order to suit the available capacity of the existing network. In 
terms of the variety of DG technologies, as previously explained, different DG technology 
will generate different amount of energy. Since the value of levelised cost of energy 
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generation (DGp.LCOEG) for each DG technology is different, the energy curtailment for each 
DG technology will be different as well, as written in equation (3.27) as: 
DGp,EnergyCurtail = ∆DGp.mxDGp.cfxDGp.oprtime     
Where, DGp,EnergyCurtail represents the energy curtailment of the DG with the unit 
expressed in MWh and ∆DGp.m represents the capacity curtailment of the DG with the 
unit expressed in MW. Then, the DG energy curtailment cost (DGp,CurtailCost) can be 
calculated by using equation (3.29), as: 





In a case where network reinforcement mechanism is chosen to provide DG connection, the 
required reinforcement cost must have a value that corresponds to the cost of DG energy 
curtailment (DGp,CurtailCost), or it is assumed that the DG energy curtailment is equal to the 
reinforcement cost (InvCostm). So that, in order to calculate the maximum DG output 









Power Flow Sensitivity Factor represents the sensitivity factor for the change in real power 
injection of  DGp at node m with the change in power flow from node i to node k can be 
obtained from equation (3.26) as:  
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E. Determining the Initial Network Parameters 
The initial network parameters, including the thermal rating (Si,k
lim), the initial apparent power 
(Si,k) and the initial power losses (SLoss−i,k) of the line, are taken into account for the purpose 
of calculating the minimum required energy to be conveyed. 
F. Determining the Minimum Required Energy to Be Conveyed (DGp,EnMin) 
The required energy to be conveyed is obtained from the summation of the maximum DG 
energy curtailment and the available network capacity prior to DG connection, as written in 
equation (3.37) as: 





lim − Si,k + SLoss−i,k) ∗ DGp,pf) ∗ DGp,cf* DGp,oprtime  




lim − Si,k + SLoss−i,k) represents the available network capacity 
prior to DG connection, expressed in MVA. Since the unit of ∆DGmaxp,m is expressed in 
MW, the value of network’s available capacity must be multiplied by the power factor of the 
DG (DGp,pf).  
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Then, the result of the capacity summation is multiplied by the capacity factor and the 
operational time of the connected DG, to obtain the minimum required energy to be conveyed 
by the DG. 
G. Determining the DG Energy Utilization (DGEU)  
DG energy utilisation (DGEU) is described as the level of energy use from the maximum 
energy that can be generated from a particular DG. The unit of DGEU is expressed in %, 




      ... (4.2) 
Where, DGEU represents the DG energy utilisation, DGp,EnergyMax represents the maximum 
energy generated by DG and DGp,EnCurtail represents the amount of energy curtailment of the 
DG. Since the subtraction of maximum energy generated by energy curtailed is equal to 




        ... (4.3) 
H. Determining the DG Incentive Unit Cost (DGUC)  
The unit cost (DGUC) of the energy-based DG incentive rate is derived from the reinforcement 





        ... (4.4) 
I. Determining the DG Incentive Rate (DGIR) 
DG Incentive Rate (DGIR) is determined based on the DG Incentive Unit Cost (DGUC) which 
is annuitized for a particular period of time. The lifetime of the network component is 
assumed to be the period of time used for DG incentive rate calculation. Moreover, the value 
of DG incentive rate is calculated based on the 20% of the required reinforcement cost to 
provide DG connection. This due to 80% of the cost has been passed through to the 
customers who seek for DG connection. 
As applied in the current DG incentive rate, there are two rate of return that will be 
considered to determine the annuitized unit cost or the DG incentive rate, i.e. the WACC and 
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the additional rate of return. Current DG incentive rate used WACC of 5.6% and another 1% 
additional rate of return. Hence, the annuitized unit cost can be written as [79]: 
DGIR =  
DGUC∗(1+0.066−0.8)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
      ... (4.5) 
Where WACC represents the weighted average cost of capital of the investment and nper 
represent the lifetime of network component. 
J. Determining Annual DG Incentive  
Based on annuitized unit cost that has been calculated in (4.4), the energy-based DG 
incentive for distribution network operator (DGInc), with the unit expressed in (£), can be 
calculated as follows: 
DGInc = DGIR ∗  DGEU ∗ DGp,EnergyCvy      ... (4.6) 
The above equation states that the amount of DG incentive that will be received by the DNO 
will be based on the amount of energy conveyed through the network.  
K. Determining the Minimum Threshold of the Incentive  
The minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive is calculated based on the minimum 
requirement of energy must be conveyed through the network (DGp,EnergyReq).  
By substituting the value of energy conveyed through the network, DGp,EnergyCvy in equation 
(4.2) with the value of minimum required energy to be conveyed,DGp,EnergyReq, the 




       ... (4.7) 
Hence, the minimum annual DG incentive can be calculated as  
DGIncMin = DGIR  ∗  DGEUMin ∗ Energyreq,DG      ... (4.8) 
L. Determining the Maximum Threshold of the Incentive 
The maximum value of DG incentive is set based on the rated energy of the new connected 
DG on the network. In other words, maximum DG incentive will be given if the new DG is 
fully utilised, i.e. at the point where DG energy utilization, DGEU, is equal to 100%. Hence, 
the maximum annual DG incentive can be calculated as  
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DGIncMax = DGIR  ∗  DGEUMax ∗ DGp,EnergyMax       
DGIncMax = DGIR  ∗  100% ∗ Energyrated,DG       ... (4.9) 
4.2 CASE STUDIES 
4.2.1 Network Configuration 
 
Figure 4.2 The Initial Network Power Flow 
The initial network configuration and its power flow are depicted in figure 4.2. There are two 
generators which are already connected to Bus11-6, i.e. DG3 and DG4. Both DGs are hydro 
generations with the capacity of 6.5MVA for DG3 and of 4.5MVA for DG4. Then, a new DG 
will be connected to Bus11-6. The new DG is assumed to be an onshore wind generation with 
a capacity of 4.5MVA. 
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of a new DG connection at Bus11-6. This connection causes the 
standard capacity of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 is exceeded. As shown, the 
power flowing through this line is 8.998MVA, which is exceeding the line’s standard 




Figure 4.3 The Network Power Flow after DG Connection at Bus11-6 
This condition requires the DNO to take one of the two possible mechanisms, either by 
curtailing the energy from connected DG or by reinforcing the network. Each mechanism is 
explained in the following sections. 
4.2.2 DG Curtailment Mechanism 
The first option to deal with the above problem is by curtailing the capacity of connected 
DGs at Bus11-6. The mechanism chosen for DG curtailment is by curtailing the capacity of 
the last connected DG to the system, known as Last in First out (LIFO) mechanism [26]. This 
mechanism is adopted because the energy conveyed from the DGs which are already 
connected to the network should not be affected by the new connection that comes later. 
The connection of a new DG will impact on the value of the change in real power on the line 
between node-i to node-k (∆Pi,k), which can be derived from equation (3.25) as: 
















Assuming the following values of: ∝ = 100%, Si.k
lim = 7.049MVA, ′′Qi.k= 3.214MVAr, ′Si.k= 
6.002MVAr and ′Qi.k= 2.774MVAr, PLoss−i.k = 0.053MW and QLoss−i.k = 0.040MVAr, the 
value of ∆Pi.k can be calculated and is equal to 0.995MW. 
The sensitivity factor that relates the change in nodal real power injection at node m with the 
change in power flowing from node i to node k (
dPik
dDGp.m






















































The above equation can be solved using MATLAB programme. For this particular example, 
the value of the sensitivity factor that relates the change in nodal real power injection at 
Bus11-6 with the change in power flowing from Bus11-6 to Bus11-7 is 0.3566.  
Considering the value of ∆Pi.k =0.995 and the value of 
dPik
dDGp.m
 = 0.3566, the amount of DG 
output that must be curtailed to release the congestion (∆DGp.m), can be obtained by using 







 = 2.79MW                      
By applying Last in First Out mechanism, the DG curtailment of 2.79MW will be applied to 
the new connected DG only. Since the new DG is a 4.5MVA wind generation with power 
factor of 0.9, it has rating capacity of 4.05MW and 1.96MVAr. By curtailing the output 
capacity with 2.79MW, it means that the remaining connected capacity is equal to 1.26MW 
and 0.610MVAr. The power flow analysis result after DG curtailment, to match the standard 





Figure 4.4 Network Power Flow after DG Curtailment at Bus11-6 
Figure 4.4 shows the impact of DG curtailment mechanism which is applied on the new 
connected DG on Bus11-6. By curtailing 2.79MW of the connected DG, the power flows on 
the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 decreases from 8.998MVA to 6.934MVA. 
4.2.3 Network Reinforcement 
In order to accommodate all connected DG capacity at Bus11-6, the line between Bus11-6 
and Bus11-7 needs to be reinforced. Assuming that the standard line capacity will upgraded 
from 7.049MVA to 10.288MVA. The cost components of this reinforcement are presented in 










Sole-Use Connection Assets  
Feasibility Studies £2,080.00 
Assessment and Design for all relevant work £1,893.00 
Assessment and Design of the Non-Contestable Work £1,320.00 
Design Approval of the Contestable Work £553.00 
Final Works and Phased Energisation £1,342.00 
Inspection and Monitoring - HV Network Site Visit £3,168.00 
Land Rights £1,880.00 
Contestable Work  
Installation of a 500m HV cable £41,500.00 
HV circuit Breaker at customer substation with suitable 
protection 
£30,000.00 
Actuators and Remote Control (RTU) £16,000.00 
Sub Total £99,736.00 
Shared-Use Connection Assets  
Non-Contestable Work  
2 HV Circuit Breakers at Primary substation @51,800.00 £103,600.00 
Re-conductor of a 3000m HV overhead line £80,000.00 
Sub Total £183,600.00 
Table 4.1 Network Reinforcement Cost Components. 
As described in chapter 2, the cost components considered in the calculation process to 
determine DG incentive only include the shared-use connection assets costs. So, in this 
particular example, the network reinforcement cost is £183,600.00. 
The impact of network reinforcement is depicted in figure 4.5. The figure shows that after the 
line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 is upgraded, all connected DG capacity at Bus11-6 can be 






Figure 4.5 Network Power Flow after Network Reinforcement at Bus11-6 
4.2.4 Impact of DG Curtailment and Network Reinforcement on Network Performance 
The impact of both DG Curtailment and Network Reinforcement on the performance of the 
distribution network, including voltage level, network capacity utilization and network losses, 
are presented in table 4.2, table 4.3 and table 4.4, respectively. 




DG Connection at 
Bus11-6 























GSP 1   1   0.0% 1   0.0% 
Bus33-1 1.003 0.15 1 -0.09 -0.3% 1.003 0.15 0.0% 
Bus33-2 1.004 0.17 1.001 -0.07 -0.3% 1.004 0.17 0.0% 
Bus11-1 1.025 4.57 1.022 4.35 -0.3% 1.025 4.57 0.0% 
Bus11-2 1.035 4.82 1.032 4.61 -0.3% 1.035 4.82 0.0% 
Bus11-3 1.025 4.68 1.022 4.46 -0.3% 1.025 4.68 0.0% 
Bus04-1 0.938 0.25 0.935 0.01 -0.3% 0.938 0.26 0.0% 
Bus33-4 1.003 0.14 1 -0.1 -0.3% 1.003 0.14 0.0% 
Bus11-8 1.004 -1.51 0.991 -2.78 -1.3% 1.004 -1.49 0.0% 
Bus11-9 0.999 -1.76 0.984 -3.08 -1.5% 0.999 -1.73 0.0% 
Bus33-3 1.003 0.13 1 -0.11 -0.3% 1.003 0.13 0.0% 
Bus11-4 1.007 -1.47 0.993 -2.75 -1.4% 1.007 -1.45 0.0% 
Bus11-7 1.007 -1.64 0.989 -3 -1.8% 1.007 -1.61 0.0% 
Bus11-5 1.012 -1.58 0.992 -2.98 -2.0% 1.01 -1.51 -0.2% 
Bus11-6 1.024 -1.32 1.003 -2.75 -2.1% 1.02 -1.2 -0.4% 
Table 4.2 Impact of DG Curtailment and Network Reinforcement on Voltage Level 
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As presented in table 4.2, both DG curtailment and network reinforcement mechanism can 
reduce the voltage level of some busbars on the network.  
The reduction of voltage level due to DG curtailment mechanism is in the range between 
1.8% and 2.1% from the initial level, while network reinforcement mechanism will reduce 
the voltage level by 0.2% until 0.4% from the initial level. The largest decrease occurs on the 
targeted busbar, where the DG is connected.  















GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.272 3.2% 529 1.3% 1.295 3.2% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.272 3.2% 529 1.3% 1.295 3.2% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 3.094 20.0% 2.526 16.4% 3.104 20.1% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.302 63.0% 6.300 63.0% 6.302 63.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.757 81.7% 5.756 81.7% 5.757 81.7% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.997 14.1% 998 14.2% 0.997 14.1% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.919 65.6% 4.922 65.6% 4.919 65.6% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 2.220 22.2% 3.614 36.1% 2.194 21.9% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 3.321 47.1% 4.405 62.5% 3.300 46.8% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 0.548 3.6% 1.147 7.4% 0.548 3.6% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 1.231 8.0% 2.340 15.2% 1.211 7.8% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 2.174 21.7% 3.537 35.4% 2.148 21.5% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.276 74.8% 5.277 74.9% 5.231 74.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 1.236 17.5% 878 12.5% 1.242 17.6% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.009 6.5% 1.197 7.8% 1.005 6.5% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.116 20.2% 3.660 23.7% 3.106 20.1% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 2.487 35.3% 1.493 21.2% 1.738 24.7% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 3.874 55.0% 2.746 39.0% 3.893 55.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 1.435 20.4% 2.743 38.9% 1.414 20.1% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 8.998 127.6% 6.934 98.4% 9.818 98.2% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 6.504 92.3% 5.469 77.6% 5.789 82.1% 
Table 4.3 Impact of DG Curtailment and Network Reinforcement on Network Utilization 
As previously explained, the connection of a new DG to a generation-dominated area/busbar 
might cause the standard capacity of particular network components are exceeded. DG 
curtailment mechanism aims to reduce the connected DG capacity to suit the standard 
capacity of network components. If the connected DG capacity is reduced, the utilization of 
network capacity will decrease.  
As shown in table 4.3, the curtailment of connected DG at Bus11-6 will impact on reducing 
the network capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-5, from 92.3% down 
to 77.6%. This mechanism also reduces the network capacity of the line between Bus11-6 
and Bus11-7, from 127.6% down to 98.4%.  
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Meanwhile, the aim of network reinforcement mechanism is to upgrade the capacity of 
network components, which in turn, it can accommodate all available DG capacity connected 
to the network. As a result, it can reduce the network capacity utilization of the line. For 
instance, by referring to the line between Bus 11-6 and Bus11-7, the power flow of 
8.998MVA is equal to the utilization of 127.6% of the standard capacity of 7.049MVA. 
Then, by upgrading the network capacity to 10MVA, the power flow becomes 9.818MVA, or 
equal to 98.2% network capacity utilization. The same impact can also be investigated from 
the network capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-5 and Bus11-6, which decreases 
from 92.3% down to 82.1%.     






DG Connection at Bus11-6 After DG Curtailment 
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.005 0.005 0 0.001 0.001 -80.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.005 0.005 0 0.001 0.001 -80.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.002 -0.054 0.054 1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.027 0.495 0.496 0.027 0.497 0.498 0.4% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.045 0.03 0.054 0.045 0.031 0.055 1.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.546 0.554 0.096 0.55 0.558 0.7% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.004 0.064 0.064 0.009 0.171 0.171 167.0% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.016 0.002 0.016 0.029 0.015 0.033 102.5% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0 -0.055 0.055 0 -0.055 0.055 0.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0 -0.055 0.055 0.002 -0.054 0.054 -1.8% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.003 0.061 0.061 0.009 0.164 0.164 168.9% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.023 0.044 0.038 0.023 0.044 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.001 -0.012 0.012 -1.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0 -0.055 0.055 0 -0.054 0.054 -1.8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.004 -0.052 0.052 -1.8% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.009 -0.005 0.010 0.003 -0.01 0.010 0.0% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.022 0.008 0.023 0.011 -0.002 0.011 -52.2% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.003 -0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.002 0.011 -1.9% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.113 0.098 0.150 0.07 0.056 0.090 -40.1% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.059 0.044 0.074 0.043 0.029 0.052 -29.5% 
Total Losses 0.444 1.069 1.158 0.401 1.23 1.294 11.8% 
Table 4.4 Impact of DG Curtailment on Power Losses 
DG curtailment mechanism at Bus11-6 causes the reduction of the power losses on the lines 
which are connected to Bus11-6.  
As seen in table 4.4, the power losses of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 decreased by 
40.1%, while the power losses of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-5 decreases by 29.5%, 
compared with the power losses at the time after a new DG connection took place. The 
decrease of power losses is caused by the curtailment of power supply connected at Bus11-6. 
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This will reduce the power flow on the lines connected to this busbar. As the power flow 






DG Connection at Bus11-6 After Network Reinforcement  
(MW) (MVAr) (MVA) (MW) (MVAr) (MVA) dSlosses 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.005 0.005 0 0.005 0.005 0.0% 
GSP Bus33-1 0 0.005 0.005 0 0.005 0.005 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 0.027 0.495 0.496 0.027 0.495 0.496 0.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 0.045 0.03 0.054 0.045 0.03 0.054 0.0% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.001 -0.013 0.013 0.0% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 0.096 0.546 0.554 0.096 0.546 0.554 0.0% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 0.004 0.064 0.064 0.003 0.062 0.062 -3.2% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 0.016 0.002 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.016 0.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 0 -0.055 0.055 0 -0.055 0.055 0.0% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 0 -0.055 0.055 0 -0.055 0.055 0.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 0.003 0.061 0.061 0.003 0.06 0.060 -1.6% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 0.038 0.023 0.044 0.038 0.023 0.044 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.012 0.0% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 0 -0.055 0.055 0 -0.055 0.055 0.0% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.003 -0.053 0.053 0.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 0.009 -0.005 0.010 0.004 -0.01 0.011 4.6% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 0.022 0.008 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.023 0.0% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 0.003 -0.011 0.011 0.003 -0.011 0.011 0.0% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 0.113 0.098 0.150 0.074 0.107 0.130 -13.0% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 0.059 0.044 0.074 0.047 0.033 0.057 -22.0% 
Total Losses 0.444 1.069 1.158 0.387 1.059 1.127 -2.6% 
Table 4.5 Impact of Network Reinforcement on Power Losses 
Network reinforcement on the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 will also reduce the power 
losses on the reinforced line due to capacity upgrading of the line. This can be seen on the 
reduction of the power losses by 13%, compared with the power losses before network 
reinforcement, as seen in table 4.5.  
Furthermore, upgrading line’s capacity also means increasing the proportion of power flow 
through the reinforced line, which in turn, it will reduce the power flow proportion of another 
line interconnected with this line. As the power flow decreased, the power losses will also 
decrease. This can be seen from the decrease of power losses on the line between Bus11-6 







4.2.5 Incentive Thresholds 
A. The Minimum Threshold of Energy-Based DG Incentive 
As presented in table 4.1, the cost needed to reinforce the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 
is £183.600. In order to determine the minimum value of DG incentive, the values ∆Gmaxp,m 
(maximum DG curtailment) and Energyreq,DG (minimum required energy to be conveyed) 
must be calculated first by using equation (3.32) and (3.37). 
Considering the DG capacity factor (DGp,cf) = 0.35, the DG operational time (DGp,oprtime) = 
8760 hours, and the levelised cost of energy generation (DGp,LCOEG) = £75/MWh, the 




 = 0.798MW   
Given the sensitivity factor (
dPik
dDGp.m
) for the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 = 0.3566, the 
thermal capacity limit of the congetsed line (Si.k
lim) = 7.049MVA, the load flow prior to DG 
connection (Si.k) = 6.002MVA and the initial power losses of the congested line (SLosses−i.k) 
= 0.0664MVA, and the DG power factor (DGp,pf) = 0.9, the required energy to be conveyed 
at this point can be obtained from equation (3.37) as: 




lim − Si.k+SLosses−i.k) ∗ DGp,pf ) ∗ DGp,cf* DGp,oprtime 
                = 3,543MWh 
Hence, the minimum required energy to be conveyed by the new connected DG is 




Figure 4.6 DG Curtailment Cost vs Network Reinforcement Cost 
Given DG capacity (DGp,Cap) = 4.5MVA, the maximum energy that can be generated by DG 
in one year period is calculated using (4.6) as: 
DGp,EnergyMax = DGp,Cap ∗ DGp,pf ∗ DGp,cf ∗ DGp,oprtime     
                               = 12,4179MWh 
By comparing the value of minimum required energy to be conveyed (DGp,EnergyReq) and the 
value of DG rated energy (DGp,EnergyMax), the minimum DG energy utilisation (DGEUMin) can 




  = 28.5%   




 = £14.79/MWh   
The DG incentive rate is calculated based on the value of WACC, which is assumed to be 
5.6%, and additional rate of return, which is assumed to be 1%, and the lifetime of network 
component, which is assumed to be 15 years. By using equation (4.4), the DG incentive rate 
can be obtained from  
DGIR =  
DGUC∗(1+0.066−0.8)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))
−nper  = £0.39/MWh       




































Hence, the minimum annual DG incentive can be calculated using equation (4.8) as: 
DGIncMin = DGIR ∗ DGEUMin  ∗  Energyreq      
                   = £398.88 
B. The Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DG Incentive 
The maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNO if the connected DG can 
convey 100 % of its available energy during one year period, as written in (4.9) as: 
DGIncMax = DGIR ∗ 100% ∗  Energyrated,DG      
               = £4,898.00 
 
Figure 4.7 The Thresholds of Energy-based DG Incentive for Wind Generation  
Figure 4.7 shows the graph of energy-based DG incentive for the DG connection at Bus11-6. 
The energy-based DG incentive for DNOs will increase exponentially in accordance with the 
increase of DG Energy Utilization. 
The minimum threshold of the incentive of £398.88 will be given to the DNO if the 
connected DG, which is a 4.5MVA wind generation, can convey 28.54% of its available 
energy during one year period. If the connected DG cannot meet this minimum requirement, 
the incentive for DNO will be equal to 0. 
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Meanwhile, the maximum incentive of £4,898.00 will be given to the DNO if the connected 
DG can convey 100% of its rated output energy, which is equal to 12,4179MWh, in this 
particular example. 
4.2.6 Assessment of Energy-based DG Incentive Mechanism Associated with DG 
Technology 
This section describes the assessment of energy-based DG incentive mechanism related to the 
impact of the DG technology used to generate energy, the location of DG connection and the 
configuration of the network where the DG connected. 
As described in chapter 2, every DG technology will come along with different parameter 
values including capacity factor, operational time and levelised cost of energy generation. 
The first two parameters will significantly impact on the calculation of the maximum energy 
can be generated from each DG technology, which in turn, it will impact on the calculation of 
the minimum required energy to be conveyed as well as the minimum annual energy-based 
DG incentive for the DNO. 
A). Total Energy Yield per Year for Different DG Technology 
By assuming that all DG technologies have the same capacity of 4.5MVA, power factor of 
0.9 and operational time of 8760 hours/year, the maximum energy can be yielded in one year 
period for each DG technology can be calculated using equation (4.1) as: 












(MVA) (MW) (hours) (MWh) 
Solar PV 4.5 0.9 0.097 0.393 8760 3,441.37 
Onshore Wind 4.5 0.9 0.350 1.418 8760 12,417.30 
Offshore Wind 4.5 0.9 0.430 1.742 8760 15,255.54 
Hydro 4.5 0.9 0.400 1.620 8760 14,191.20 
CCGT CHP 4.5 0.9 0.675 2.734 8760 23,947.65 
Geothermal 4.5 0.9 0.800 3.240 8760 28,382.40 
Biomass 4.5 0.9 0.900 3.645 8760 31,930.20 
Table 4.6 Energy Yield per annum for Various DG Technologies 
As presented in table 4.6, the maximum energy for one DG technology and another, in one 
year period, will be different although the DG capacity is the same for all DG technologies. 
Solar PV will generate the lowest energy of 3,441MWh because it has the lowest capacity 
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factor of 0.097, while biomass, which has the highest capacity factor of 0.9, will generate the 
highest energy of 31,930MWh. 
The comparison of the energy output from one DG technology and another is proportional to 
the ratio of their capacity factor. The higher the capacity factor of the DG, the higher the 
energy output. 
B). Minimum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive  
As described in previous section, the minimum threshold of energy based DG incentive is 
based on the minimum required energy to be conveyed by DG, which can be obtained by 
using equations (3.32) and (3.37) as written as: 










       
From those equations, it can be seen that the parameters attached on each DG technology, 
including capacity factor, operational time and levelised cost of energy generation have 
significant impact in determining the minimum requirement for DG to convey energy through 

















(MVA) (hours) (£/MWh) (£) (MW) (MWh) 
Solar PV 0.097 4.5 0.9 8,760 202.00 183,600.00 1.07 1,212.55 
Offshore wind 0.430 4.5 0.9 8,760 149.00 183,600.00 0.33 2,578.22 
Onshore wind 0.350 4.5 0.9 8,760 75.00 183,600.00 0.80 3,543.59 
Geothermal 0.800 4.5 0.9 8,760 132.00 183,600.00 0.20 3,895.11 
Biomass 0.900 4.5 0.9 8,760 122.40 183,600.00 0.19 4,317.23 
CHP 0.675 4.5 0.9 8,760 60.40 183,600.00 0.51 5,152.65 
Hydro (run of river) 0.400 4.5 0.9 8,760 42.00 183,600.00 1.25 5,623.53 
Hydro (reservoir) 0.400 4.5 0.9 8,760 42.00 183,600.00 1.25 5,623.53 
Table 4.7 Energy Yield per annum for Various DG Technologies 
Referring to table 4.7, if a DNO connected a 4.5MVA DG with Solar PV technology, they are 
required to convey energy as minimum as 1,213MWh per year, in order to receive energy-
based DG incentive. Solar PV has the least energy requirement because it has the highest 
value of levelised costs of energy generation despite it has the lowest capacity factor. 
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Meanwhile, if the connected DG is a hydro technology, the DNO is required to convey 
5,624MWh of energy. Hydro technologies (for both run of river and reservoir mechanisms) 
have the highest energy requirement because their levelised costs of energy generation and 
capacity factor are low. 
Then, by using the same procedures as applied for wind generation connection, the other 
values, including the unit cost of the incentive (DGUC), the minimum DG energy utilization 
(DGEUMin), the incentive rate (DGIR) and, eventually, the minimum annual energy based DG 
incentive (DGIncMin), can be obtained from equations (4.4) and (4.8) as: 
DGIR =  
DGUC∗(1+0.066−0.8)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))
−nper        
DGIncMin = DGIR ∗ DGEUMin ∗ DGp,EnergyReq    
By assuming that the required cost to reinforce the network components is £183,600 and the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 5.6%, the incentive rate and the minimum 
energy-based DG incentive for DNOs related to the connection of different DG technologies 






𝐃𝐆𝐔𝐂 𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐑 𝐃𝐆𝐄𝐔𝐌𝐢𝐧 
𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐌𝐢𝐧 
(MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh) (£) 
Biomass 4,317.23 31,930.20 5.75 0.021 13.52% 89.54 
Geothermal 3,895.11 28,382.40 6.47 0.024 13.72% 92.25 
Offshore Wind 2,578.22 15,255.54 12.03 0.054 16.90% 139.89 
CCGT CHP 5,152.65 23,947.65 7.67 0.044 21.52% 226.75 
Onshore Wind 3,543.59 12,417.30 14.79 0.113 28.54% 398.88 
Solar PV 1,212.55 3,441.37 53.35 0.501 35.23% 608.06 
Hydro 5,623.53 14,191.20 12.94 0.137 39.63% 769.11 
Table 4.8 Minimum Threshold of DG Incentive for Various DG Technologies 
As seen in table 4.8, the incentive rate of energy-based DG incentive (DGIR) depends on the 
unit cost of the incentive (DGUC). This relation can also be seen in equation (4.4). So that, the 
higher the unit cost, the higher the incentive rate. Meanwhile, the minimum threshold of 
energy-based DG incentive (DGIncMin) is related to the minimum DG energy utilization 
(DGEUMin), as written in equation (4.8). Hence, the higher the minimum DG energy 
utilization, the higher the minimum energy-based DG incentive for the DNOs. 
For instances, the biomass technology will attract the lowest minimum threshold of energy-
based DG incentive because it has the lowest DG energy utilization of 13.52%. While hydro 
technology, it will attract the highest minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive 
because it has the highest energy utilization at 39.63%.  
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C). Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive  
As described in the previous section, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG Incentive 
will be given to the DNO if the maximum energy generation from the connected DG can be 
fully utilized, when DG energy utilization (DGEU) is equal to 100%, as written in equation 
(4.9) as:  
DGIncMax = DGIR ∗ 100% ∗  DGp,EnergyMax 
By applying the above equation, the maximum thresholds of DG incentive for different DG 






𝐃𝐆𝐔𝐂 𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐑 𝐃𝐆𝐄𝐔𝐌𝐚𝐱 𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐌𝐚𝐱 
 (MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh)  (£) 
Biomass 31,930.20 31,930.20 5.75 0.153 100,0% 4,897.86 
Geothermal 28,382.40 28,382.40 6.47 0.173 100,0% 4,897.86 
Offshore Wind 15,255.54 15,255.54 12.03 0.321 100,0% 4,897.86 
CCGT CHP 23,947.65 23,947.65 7.67 0.205 100,0% 4,897.86 
Onshore Wind 12,417.30 12,417.30 14.79 0.394 100,0% 4,897.86 
Solar PV 3,441.37 3,441.37 53.35 1.423 100,0% 4,897.86 
Hydro 14,191.20 14,191.20 12.94 0.345 100,0% 4,897.86 
Table 4.9 Maximum Threshold of DG Incentive for Various DG Technologies 
As presented in table 4.9, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive is the same 
for all types of DG technology. This is related to the required reinforcement cost for 
connecting the DG to the network. Since the reinforcement cost is assumed to be the same for 
all types of DG technologies, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive will also 
be the same for all types of DG technologies. 
Further explanation for the relation between DG energy utilization and the thresholds of 




Figure 4.8 Energy Utilization vs DG Incentive for Various DG Technologies 
Figure 4.8 shows that energy-based DG incentive will increase exponentially related to the 
increase of DG energy utilization.  
In this case, if the DNO connected biomass technology DG, they will be required to utilize 
13.52% of the maximum DG energy. This requirement will attract energy-based DG 
incentive for DNO as much as £89.54. If the connected DG is an onshore wind DG, the DNO 
will be required to utilize 28.54% of the maximum DG energy. As a result, DNO will receive 
energy-based DG incentive of £398.88. This means that the increase of DG energy utilization 
increases by 15% will cause an increase of the energy-based DG incentive by 345%.  
If the utilization of DG energy reaches 100%, DNOs will receive the maximum energy-based 
DG incentive of £4,898.00. Compared with the lowest figure, this means that the increase of 
86.48% of DG energy utilization will impact on the rise of energy-based DG incentive by 
5,370%. 
D). Risk Consideration Associated with DG Technologies 
The deployment of distributed generation with renewable resources on electricity distribution 
network will impact on the security and reliability of the system [89]. Renewable energy 
resources, such as wind power and photovoltaics, are usually located in remote areas or 
separate from other power sources. This will require appropriate infrastructure to 




























accommodate the connection. Also, the renewable resources will generate intermittent power 
to the grid, so that, it might increase the uncertainty into power system operation.  
Moreover, the operation and performance of DGs which use renewable resources to generate 
energy will be strongly influenced by the environmental conditions, especially during 
extreme weather, which might deeply degrade or perhaps damage the network’s components. 
The connection of DGs might cause technical problems, such as inacceptable voltage rises 
due to photovoltaics installation on the low voltage level and congestion issues related to the 
connection of wind farms [90]. 
4.2.7 Assessment of Energy-based DG Incentive Mechanism Associated with the Location 
of DG Connection 
Figure 4.9 depicts three possible locations for an additional DG connection on the network 
with the distance of 3000m, 6000m and 9000m from the existing network.  The location of 
DG connection will determine the investment cost to provide connection. The longer the 
network to build, the higher the investment cost to spend.  
 
Figure 4.9 DG connection with different length of the network 
A). Investment Costs 
As previously explained, the considerably cost components are the shared-use connection 
assets. So, for the case shown in figure 4.9, each location has different investment costs, as 
shown in table 4.10. The cost estimation is based on Statement of Methodology and Charges 
for Connection [77][78]. 
Cost Components 
Lines Length 
3000m 6000m 9000m 
Shared-Use Connection Assets    
2 HV Circuit Breakers at Primary substation @51,800.00 £103,600.00 £103,600.00 £103,600.00 
Installation of a HV overhead line @ £80,000.00 £160,000.00 £240,000.00 
Total Reinforcement Cost £183,600.00 £263,600.00 £343,600.00 
Table 4.10 Cost Components for Different Length of Network’s Line 
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B). The Minimum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive 
The new DG is assumed to be an onshore wind generation.  The capacity of DG is 4.5MVA 
with power factor of 0.9, capacity factor of 0.35, operational time of 8760 hours/year and the 
levelised cost of energy generation of £75/MWh.  
In order to determine the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive for those three 
possible locations, the same calculation steps in the previous case are applied. The results are 






𝐃𝐆𝐔𝐂 𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐑 𝐃𝐆𝐄𝐔𝐌𝐢𝐧 
𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐌𝐢𝐧 
(MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh) (£) 
3000m 2,448.00 12,417.30 14.79 0.39 19.71% 190.36 
6000m 3,514.67 12,417.30 21.23 0.57 28.30% 563.37 
9000m 4,581.33 12,417.30 27.67 0.74 36.89% 1,247.72 
Table 4.11 The Minimum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive for Onshore Wind 
Technology with Different Length of Network’s Line 
Table 4.11 shows that the increase of the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive 
(DGIncMin) is related to the increase of the unit cost of the incentive (DGUC) and the minimum 
DG energy utilization (DGEUMin). 
In this case, the increase of the line’s length by 3000m will increase the reinforcement cost by 
£80,000.00. Because of this, the unit cost of the incentive will increase by £6.44/MWh. As a 
result, the incentive rate will increase by £0.17/MWh.  
Meanwhile, the relation between the minimum DG energy utilization and the minimum 





Figure 4.10 Energy Utilisation vs DG Incentive for Different Line’s Length  
As depicted in figure 4.10, the DG energy utilization has an exponential relation with the 
energy-based DG incentive. So, the energy-based DG incentive will exponentially increase in 
accordance with the increase of the DG energy utilization. 
Referring to the case study, the increase of £80,000.00 of reinforcement cost will increase the 
minimum DG energy utilization by 8.59%, which will result in an increase of the minimum 
threshold of energy-based DG incentive by £373.01. However, when the minimum DG 
energy utilization increase by 17.18%, the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive 
will increase by £1,057.36.  
C). The Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive  
The Maximum Thresholds of energy-based DG Incentive for three possible locations for DG 









(MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh) (£) 
3000m 12,417.30 12,417.30 14.79 100% 0.39 4,897.86 
6000m 12,417.30 12,417.30 21.23 100% 0.57 7,032.01 
9000m 12,417.30 12,417.30 27.67 100% 0.74 9,166.15 
Table 4.12 The Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive for Onshore Wind 
Technology with Different Length of Network’s Line 




























As presented in table 4.12, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive increases 
in association with the increase of the line’s length. The longer the line’s length, the higher 
the required reinforcement cost. As a result, the maximum threshold of the incentive for the 
DNOs will be higher as well. 
From the results given in table 4.12, the increase of the line’s length by 3000m will increase 
the reinforcement by £80,000.00. As a result, this will impact on the increase of the 
maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive by £2,134.14. Referring to this case, the 
increase of energy-based DG incentive is estimated to be £711.38/km for the connection of 
4.5MVA onshore wind generation. 
4.2.8 Assessment of Energy-based DG Incentive Mechanism Associated with the Network 
Configuration 
This section describes the impact of network configuration on determining the energy-based 
DG incentive for the DNOs. For the case study, a 4.5MVA onshore wind generation will be 
connected to the network. The possible location for this new connection is at one of two 
generation-dominated area busbars, i.e. Bus11-2 or Bus11-6. The impact of DG connection 
on those two busbars has been explained in chapter 3.  
 
Figure 4.11 Impact of new DG connection: (a) At Bus11-2 and (b) At Bus11-6 
Figure 4.11 shows the impact of connecting a new DG to one generation-dominated areas, i.e. 
Bus11-2 and Bus11-6. DG connection at Bus11-2 will cause two components of the network, 
i.e. the line between Bus11-2 and Bus11-1 and the transformer located between Bus11-1 and 
Bus33-2, to be overloaded. This connection increases the power which is flowing through 
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those two components to exceed the standard capacity of the components. While the new DG 
connection at Bus11-6, it will impact on overloading of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-
7.  In order to deal with the problem, in this case, the DNO decides to reinforce the network 
in order to accommodate the full capacity of the new DG connection.  
A). DG Configuration  
At Bus11-2, there are two DGs that are already connected, both are hydro generations with 
power factor of 0.9, capacity factor of 0.40 and levelised cost of energy generation of 
£42/MWh. One DG is a 4.5MVA generator and the other one is 6.5MVA. The new DG that 
will be connected to the network is a 4.5MVA wind generation with power factor of 0.9, 
capacity factor of 0.35 and levelised cost of energy generation of £75/MWh.  
In order to simplify the comparison, it is assumed that DG configuration at Bus11-6 is similar 
to at Bus11-2. 
B). Network Reinforcement Cost 
In order to accommodate all DG capacity that will be connected either to Bus11-2 or Bus11-
6, the DNO needs to upgrade the network components on the overloaded lines or branches. 
The details of the costs needed to reinforce the network are presented in table 4.13. The cost 
estimation is based on Statement of Methodology and Charges for Connection [77][78]. 
COST COMPONENTS Bus11-2 Bus11-6 
Sole-Use Connection Assets   
Feasibility Studies £2,080.00 £2,080.00 
Assessment and Design for all relevant work £1,893.00 £1,893.00 
Assessment and Design of the Non-Contestable Work £1,320.00 £1,320.00 
Design Approval of the Contestable Work £553.00 £553.00 
Final Works and Phased Energisation £1,342.00 £1,342.00 
Inspection and Monitoring - HV Network Site Visit £3,168.00 £3,168.00 
Land Rights £1,880.00 £1,880.00 
Contestable Work   
Installation of a 500m HV cable £41,500.00 £41,500.00 
HV circuit Breaker at customer substation  £30,000.00 £30,000.00 
Actuators and Remote Control (RTU) £16,000.00 £16,000.00 
Sub Total £99,736.00 £99,736.00 
Shared-Use Connection Assets   
Non-Contestable Work   
2 HV Circuit Breakers at Primary substation @51,800.00 £103,600.00 £103,600.00 
Upgrading a 3000m HV overhead line £80,000.00 £80,000.00 
Upgrading the existing outdoor substation £515,000.00  
Sub Total £698,600.00 £183,600.00 
Table 4.13 The Cost Components for Network Reinforcement 
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As previously explained, the expenses for the sole-use connection assets will be directly 
refunded from the customer through connection charges, so that, the DG incentive calculation 
is based on the shared-use connection assets. From the table, the investment cost needed to 
reinforce the network, as a result of DG connection at Bus11-2, is £698,600.00. While DG 
connection at Bus11-6 requires network reinforcement cost of £183,600.00. 
C). Minimum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive  
Assuming that the new DG which will be connected either to Bus11-2 or Bus11-6 is a 
4.5MVA wind generation, with power factor of 0.9, capacity factor of 0.35, the operational 
time of 8760 hours/year and the levelised cost of energy generation of £75/MWh.   
In order to determine the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive for those two 
network configurations, the same calculation steps in the previous case are applied. The 
minimum thresholds of energy-based DG incentive for DG connection at the two designated 






𝐃𝐆𝐔𝐂 𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐑 𝐃𝐆𝐄𝐔𝐌𝐢𝐧 
𝐃𝐆𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐌𝐢𝐧 
(MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh) (£) 
Bus11-6 3,543.60 12,417.30 14.79 0.39 28.54% 398.88 
Bus11-2 10,754.76 12,417.30 56.26 1.50 86.61% 13,980.08 
Table 4.14 The Minimum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive for Different Network 
Configuration 
Given the DG connection at Bus 11-2 requires reinforcement cost almost four times higher 
than the connection at Bus11-6, the unit cost of energy-based DG incentive (DGUC) for DG 
connection at Bus11-2 will be as higher as four times that the one for DG connection at 
Bus11-6.  As a result, the incentive rate (DGIR) and the minimum DG energy utilization 
(𝐃𝐆𝐄𝐔𝐌𝐢𝐧) will increase by approximately four times, as presented in table 4.14. 
Meanwhile, the relation between the minimum DG energy utilization and the minimum 





Figure 4.12 Impact of Network Configuration on Energy Utilization and DG Incentive 
As depicted in figure 4.12, the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive will 
increase exponentially as a result of the increase in reinforcement cost. The increase of 
reinforcement cost by four times from the initial one will cause the increase of the DG energy 
utilization from 28.54% to 86.61%. However, this will trigger the rise of the minimum 
energy-based DG incentive by approximately thirty five times, from £398.88 to £13,980.08. 
D). The Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive  
The Maximum Thresholds of Energy-based DG Incentive for DG connection at Bus11-2 and 









(MWh) (MWh) (£/MWh) (£/MWh) (£) 
Bus11-6 12,417.30 12,417.30 14.79 100% 0.39 4,897.86 
Bus11-2 12,417.30 12,417.30 56.26 100% 1.50 18,636.42 
Table 4.15 The Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DG Incentive for Different Network 
Configuration 
As shown in table 4.15, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive increases in 
association with the increase of the reinforcement cost. The increase of reinforcement cost by 
almost four times from the initial one will increase the maximum energy-based DG incentive 
also by four times, approximately, from £4,897.86 to £18,636.42  






























4.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN ENERGY-BASED AND CAPACITY-BASED DG 
INCENTIVES 
The comparison between the proposed mechanism, i.e. energy-based DG incentive and 
current mechanism, i.e. capacity-based mechanism can be seen in table 4.16. The comparison 
is based on the assumption that the new connected DG has the capacity of 4.5MVA with the 
power factor of 0.9. 
By considering three factors which might impact DG connection, including the DG 
technology, the location and the network configuration, the energy-based DG incentive for 
each case is presented in table 4.16, based on the assessment in section 4.2.6. 
Meanwhile, the calculation of capacity-based DG incentive is based on the explanation in in 
chapter 2, i.e. the DNOs will receive £1/kW of total connected DG capacity. Hence, for the 
case of connecting 4.5MVA (which is equal to 4.05MW) DG, the DNOs will receive 





















Biomass 13.52% 89.54 4,897.86 4,050.00 
Geothermal 13.72% 92.25 4,897.86 4,050.00 
Offshore Wind 16.90% 139.89 4,897.86 4,050.00 
CCGT CHP 21.52% 226.75 4,897.86 4,050.00 
Onshore Wind 28.54% 398.88 4,897.86 4,050.00 
Solar PV 35.23% 608.06 4,897.86 4,050.00 




3000m 19.71% 190.36 4,897.86 4,050.00 
6000m 28.30% 563.37 7,032.01 4,050.00 
9000m 36.89% 1,247.72 9,166.15 4,050.00 
Network 
Configuration 
Bus11-6 28.54% 398.88 4,897.86 4,050.00 
Bus11-2 86.61% 13,980.08 18,636.42 4,050.00 
Table 4.16 Comparison between Energy-based and Capacity-based DG Incentives 
As presented in table 4.16, there are three factors that must be considered in determining the 
value of energy-based DG incentive for DNOs, i.e. the DG technology, the location of DG 
connection and the network configuration. 
In terms of DG technology, the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive depends 
on the minimum energy utilization of each DG technology (DGEUMin), which is largely 
determined by the parameters attached on each type of DG technology, including capacity 
factor, operational time and levelised cost of energy generation. As seen in table 4.14, the 
lowest value of the minimum energy utilization of each DG technology (DGEUMin) is for 
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biomass technology at 13.52%, while the highest value is for hydro technology at 39.63%. As 
the results, biomass technology has the lowest DG incentive minimum threshold of £89.54 
and hydro technology has the highest one of £769.11. Meanwhile, the maximum threshold of 
energy-based DG incentive is the same for all DG technologies since it will be given if the 
available DG energy can be fully utilized (i.e. at DGEUMax = 100%). 
In terms of the location of DG connection, the minimum threshold of energy-based DG 
incentive increases in accordance with the increase of the distance of DG location. The 
further the location of DG connection, the higher the required reinforcement cost. As a result, 
the minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive will be higher. The location of DG 
connection also impacts on the maximum threshold of the incentive since it will determine 
the required reinforcement cost. As the reinforcement cost increased, the incentive will 
increase as well.   
Meanwhile, the configuration of a network can determine the impact of DG connection, in 
terms of how many network components that might be affected and need to be upgraded. The 
more the affected network components, the higher the required cost. As a result, the incentive 
will be higher, too.  
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes two mechanisms which can be applied to deal with the connection of a 
new DG at a generation-dominated area/busbar, i.e. DG curtailment mechanism and network 
reinforcement mechanism. The impact of both mechanisms on the voltage level, network 
capacity utilization and power losses of the network can be summarized as follow: 
- Both DG curtailment and network reinforcement mechanisms can reduce the voltage 
level of the related busbars. The decrease of voltage level due to DG curtailment can 
reach 2.1% from the initial level, while network reinforcement mechanism will decrease 
the initial voltage level down to 0.4%. The largest reduction occurs on the targeted 
busbar, where the DG is connected. 
- In a generation-dominated area, DG curtailment mechanism will reduce the power flow 
of the related lines, so that, it will reduce the network capacity utilization of those lines. 
As examined in the case study, the network capacity utilization can be reduced down to 
77.6%. Meanwhile, network reinforcement mechanism, which is done by upgrading the 
capacity of the line, will decrease the network capacity utilization down to 82.1%.  
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- Both mechanisms also impact on the reduction of the power losses of the related lines. 
DG curtailment mechanism can contribute in the reduction of power losses by 40.1%, 
while network reinforcement mechanism can contribute in the reduction of power losses 
by 22%. 
This chapter also describes the development of energy-based DG incentive mechanism which 
aims to incentivise DNOs in providing DG connection on their distribution networks. The 
following points explain the summary of this mechanism: 
- Energy-based DG incentive mechanism is based on the utilization of DG energy and its 
relation with the required investment cost to provide connection. 
- The minimum threshold of the energy-based DG incentive is given to the DNOs when 
the connected DGs convey the minimum required energy. If they cannot meet this 
requirement, the incentive for DNOs is equal to 0. Meanwhile, the maximum threshold 
of the incentive is given when the available DG energy can be fully utilized. 
- Since different DG technologies generate different energy output, the minimum 
requirement for energy to be conveyed for each DG technology will be vary. However, 
for the same DG capacity, the maximum threshold of the incentive will be the same, as 
long as the available DG energy can be fully utilized. 
- The location of DG connection on the network will impact the required investment cost 
to provide connection. The further the location of DG connection, the higher the required 
investment cost. As the result, the minimum and maximum thresholds of the incentive 
will be higher. 
- The network configuration can contribute in determining the number of components 
which might be affected or congested due to additional DG connection. The higher the 
number of congested components, the higher the required investment cost to provide 
connection. Consequently, this will result in higher incentive for the DNOs. 
- Comparing with current incentive mechanism, energy-based DG incentive can reflect the 
effectiveness of DNOs to deal with the required investments in association with DG 




5 EFFECTIVE DSR INCENTIVE FOR DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
OPERATORS 
For distribution network operators, there are two main objectives of implementing demand 
side response. The first objective is to avoid excessive demand at peak times, in which this 
may lead to the need of network reinforcement. The second one is to deal with pre-fault and 
post-fault management on the distribution network, to reduce the time for customers not 
being supplied. Also, in longer terms, distribution network must accommodate the possible 
fast growth of electric vehicles, heat pumps and thermal storage [45].  
It is predicted that electricity will be used in transport and heating sectors, which tend to be 
flexible in electricity consumption, in the future. Meanwhile, wind, wave and tidal, as 
electricity generation sources, are variety in their output and inflexible in term of time to 
generate. This combination, i.e. high penetration of DGs combined with high penetration of 
flexible demand, requires a dynamic relationship between supply and demand in distribution 
level [45].  
To deal with the challenge, the Demand Side Response (DSR) mechanism [14], a mechanism 
to manage the consumption of electricity in response to the conditions of electricity supply, 
may have a greater opportunity to apply. DSR can be used to reduce peak demand, as well as 
to respond the requirement to balance the system due to the demand is greater than the 
supply, by running on-site generation. Facilitating DSR on the distribution networks, 
however, require a financial incentive, as a consequent. 
Various incentive mechanisms for DNOs to promote DSR have been trialled and applied in 
different countries, including demand management incentive mechanism, shared savings 
mechanism, rate of return mechanism and avoided cost mechanism [25][26]. These 
mechanisms can be classified into two categories. The first category includes the incentive 
mechanisms which allow DNOs to recover the investment costs and forgone revenues due to 
DSR implementation, such as applied in demand management incentive and avoided cost 
mechanisms. The second category includes the incentive mechanisms which allow DNOs to 
receive compensation as a result of implementing DSR, such as applied in shared savings and 
rate of return mechanisms.  
Currently, the existing DSR incentive mechanisms are operated independently without any 
correlation between them. Therefore, this research proposes a new DSR incentive 
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mechanism, called energy-based DSR incentive, which allows DNOs to recover their 
investment costs by considering the utilization of available DSR energy on the network.  
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF ENERGY-BASED DSR INCENTIVE 
5.1.1 Principles of the Energy-Based DSR Incentive 
Energy-based DSR Incentive mechanism is developed to incentivise DNOs in facilitating 
DSR implementation on their distribution networks. The incentive is based on the utilization 
of available DSR capacity on the network, i.e. it depends on how much energy can be utilised 
from DSR participants. The higher the energy participation, the higher the incentive for the 
DNOs. The maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNOs if they can fully 
utilize the available DSR participation, as required.  
5.1.2 Structure of the Energy-based DSR Incentive  
The structure of the proposed energy-based DSR incentive adopts the hybrid mechanism as 
applied for energy-based DG incentive, i.e. giving DNOs a partial pass-through treatment and 
additional incentive rate to implement DSR programme on their distribution network. 
1). Level of Pass-through 
Energy-based DSR incentive mechanism also adopted the pass-through mechanism which is 
applied in energy-based DG incentive mechanism, i.e. by allowing DNOs to pass 80% of 
their DSR investment cost on to the customers who participate in the DSR programme.  
2). Energy-based DSR Incentive Rate 
The energy-based DSR incentive rate is developed from the remaining 20% of DSR 
investment cost and is annuitized for a particular period of time. The period of time is 
assumed to be 15 years, as the assumed life time of DSR components. 
3). Incentive Thresholds 
The maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNOs if the available DSR 
energy on the network can be fully utilized, as required. Contrary, if the available DSR 
energy is not utilized, the DNOs will not be incentivised. 
5.1.3 Methodology to Develop Energy-Based DSR Incentive 
The methodology used to develop energy-based DG incentive mechanism can be explained 




Figure 5.1 Flowchart for Energy-based DSR Mechanism 
The methodology to develop energy-based DSR Incentive mechanism can be explained as 
follows. 
A. Determining the Investment Cost of a DSR Project 
The costs to implement DSR in the electricity distribution network can be categorized in two 
types, i.e. participant costs and system costs [17]. Participant costs are any associated costs 
that must be borne by the customers who are participating in DSR programme. While the 
system costs, are described as the costs that will be borne by the distribution network 
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Enabling technology investment  Mainly 




Comfort/inconvenience costs  No 
Reduced amenity/lost business  No 
Rescheduling costs (e.g. overtime pay)  No 





Metering/communication system upgrades  Yes 
Utility equipment or software costs, billing 
system upgrades  
Partial 




Programme administration/management  Partial 
Marketing/recruitment  Partial 
Payments to participating customers  Partial 
Programme evaluation  No 
Table 5.1 Different Cost Categories for DSR Implementation [17] 
Table 5.1 does not provide quantitative estimates for all associated costs, only ‘enabling 
technology investment’ is quantified. Enabling technology investment, which falls into 
participant costs, is actually a system cost since suppliers have a mandate to install smart 
meters for the domestic and small and medium non-domestic sectors. However, this cost will 
directly be passed on to end users. Other than technology cots, the remaining costs are 
remaining un-quantified. Meanwhile, regarding the system costs, most of the costs which fall 
onto these categories are able to quantify. Only programme evaluation cost is remaining un-
quantified. 
However, in practice, the costs needed in implementing DSR programme is unique to each 
situation, depends on the nature of the DSR, in terms of its reliability, availability and its 
duration . These elements, then, will be factored to establish the DSR costs [57]. Likewise, 
the breakdown of DSR Project Cost Category varies between one project and another. One 
project might include a particular cost into a particular category, based on their classification. 
This can be seen in the description of each sub category from three DSR trial projects in the 
UK, i.e. Capacity to Customer (C2C) Project, Low Carbon London Project and New Thames 
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Programme Director Project and ICT 
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Business & CIO System 
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Connections  Communications & 
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Network Field Resources 
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LV & HV network 
monitoring installation 
Remote Control Installation 
at Customers' Premises 
Battery storage 
installation 
Contractors Travel & 
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Affected Customers 
Communications 
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modelling and 
management 
Database Licenses Carbon Tool licensing ICT Field Architecture 
Interface Development SGS support & software 
licence 
ICT Field Resource 
Develop Real-time Data 
Update Functionality 
Aggregator IT costs Real-time systems and 
information technology 
equipment 
System Integration & 
Testing 
comms, infrastructure, 
environment and interfaces 
 
Testing and Development 
Workstation 
Logica head end 
Payment to 
Users 
Payment to Users Payment to Users Payment to Users 
Other Costs Publicity and Dissemination Contingency Land 
Accommodations Abnormal travel Learning dissemination, 






Real-time systems and 
information technology 
equipment 
Contingency Inflation Contingency 
Table 5.2 Sub Cost Categories from Different DSR Projects [82] [83] [84] 
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As presented in table 5.2, there are five cost categories in each DSR trial project, including 
employment cost, equipment cost, contractor cost, IT cost, payment to users and other costs. 
By considering these five cost categories, the costs breakdown of each DSR trial project are 
presented in table 5.3. 
Cost Category 
DSR Projects 
C2C Low Carbon London New Thames Valley Vision 
(£ k) (%) (£ k) (%) (£ k) (%) 
Employment Cost 2,512 24.4% 4,594 15.4% 5,932.76 22.1% 
Equipment Cost 3,078 30.0% 4,640 15.5% 4,526.44 16.9% 
Contractors Cost 2,254 21.9% 7,007 23.4% 8,710.71 32.5% 
IT Cost 740 7.2% 3,935 13.2% 5321.70 19.9% 
Payments to Users 300 2.9% 2,440 8.2% 591.00 2.2% 
Other Costs 1,392 13.5% 7,272 24.3% 1,715.60 6.4% 
TOTAL 10,276 100.0% 29,888 100.0% 26,798.21 100.0% 
Table 5.3 Example of DSR Projects Cost Breakdown [82] [83] [84] 
B. Determining DSR Available Capacity 
DSR available capacity, DSRCapAv, is defined as the amount of DSR capacity which is 
available to response to the supply condition in the system. The unit of DSR available 
capacity is expressed in megawatts (MW). 
The available DSR capacity might come from the customers who are participating in DSR 
programme through one of three possible ways, including demand reduction, demand shifting 
and running on-site generation mechanisms. The participants of DSR programme need to 
sign a contract with the associated DNO whether they are willing to reduce their electricity 
consumption, to shift their use of electricity, or to run their on-site generation whenever 
required by the DNO. So, there is a guarantee that the DNO has sufficient amount of 
available DSR capacity that can be used to deal with the changes in supply provision in the 
distribution system. 
C. Determining DSR Energy Utilization 
DSR energy utilization, DSREU (expressed %), is obtained from the comparison of the 
actual DSR energy participation, DSREAc (expressed in MWh), with the available DSR 




  ..(5.1) 
The DSREAc and DSREAv can be derived by multiplying the actual DSR capacity 
participation, DSRCapAc (expressed in MW), and the available DSR capacity, 
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DSRCapAv (expressed in MW), by a particular period of time, timereq (expressed in hrs), 




  ..(5.2) 
In a case where not all DSR participants can participate when required by the DNOs, the 
amount of DSR energy that cannot be utilised, DSRUnutilised (expressed in MWh), can be 
obtained from: 
DSRUnutilised = (DSRCapAv − DSRCapAc) ∗ timereq ..(5.3) 





D. Determining the Unit Cost of DSR Incentive Rate 
The firs parameter that must be calculated is the unit cost of the DSR incentive, DSRUC , 
which is expressed in £/MWh. This unit cost is derived from the cost of DSR project, 
DSRCost (expressed in £) divided by the DSR available energy, DSREAv (expressed in 





E. Determining Energy-Based DSR Incentive Rate 
DSR incentive rate, DSR IR (expressed in £/MWh),  can be calculated by considering the 
DSR unit cost, the DNOs rate of returns including weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
and additional rate of return, and the lifetime of DSR equipment (nper), as follows: 




F. Determining Annual Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
Therefore, the annual DSR Incentive, DSR Inc (expressed in £) , can be obtained by 
multiplying the DSR incentive rate , DSR IR (expressed in £/MWh), with the actual DSR 
energy participation, DSREAc, which is expressed in MWh. 
DSR Inc =  DSR IR ∗ DSREU ∗ DSREAc ..(5.7) 
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G. Determining the Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
The maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive, DSR IncMax (expressed in £), will 
be given to the DNOs if the available DSR energy participation, 
DSR EAv (expressed inMWh), can be fully utilised as required, i.e. when DSREUMAx = 100%, 
and written as: 
DSR IncMax =  DSR IR ∗ DSREUMAx ∗  DSR EAv   
DSR IncMax =  DSR IR ∗ 100% ∗  DSR EAv  ..(5.8) 
 
Figure 5.2 DSR Energy Participation vs DSR Incentive 
The graph depicted in figure 5.2 shows the relation between DSR energy participation and 
the amount of energy-based DSR incentive for DNOs. The energy-based DSR incentive will 
increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DSR energy utilization. The 
maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive is given to the DNOs if the available 
DSR energy can be fully utilized, i.e. when DSR energy utilization is equal to 100%. 
5.2 CASE STUDIES 
The case study is based on the data and information taken from two DSR projects which have 
been trialled in the UK, i.e. the Honeywell I&C ADR: Demonstrating the Functionality of 
Automated Demand Response project and the Low Carbon London project.   

























5.2.1 Case Study 1 
The data for the first case study is taken from the Automated Demand Response (ADR) 
project. This DSR trial project was implemented in three buildings, including a typical public 
sector building, a typical education sector building and a typical commercial building. The 
aim of the project is to investigate the basic functionality of Automated Demand Response.  
A. DSR Investment Cost 
The ADR project is run by Scottish and Southern Energy Power Distribution, one of DNOs 
in the UK. The breakdown of project cost is presented in table 5.4. All cost categories fall 
under DNO’s responsibility. 
Cost Category £ 
Contractor (Honeywell) 219,900.00 




Table 5.4 DSR Costs for Case Study 1 [46] 
B. Available DSR Capacity 
The available DSR capacity is determined by the capacity in which customers are willing to 
participate in DSR programme. The participants and their available capacity for Honeywell 
I&C ADR Project are presented in table 5.5. 
Premises Equipment Rating Capacity (kW) 
Honeywell House Building 
(Commercial Building) 
Air Handling Units 187.0 
Chillers 7.4 
Boilers 3.7 
Sub Total 198.1 
Bracknell & Wokingham (B&C) College 
(Education Sector Building) 
Air Handling Units 98.9 
Chillers 66.1 
Lifts 35.3 
Extract Fans 5.5 
DX Split Unit 2.5 
Heat Pump 35.1 
Sub Total 243.4 
Bracknell Forest Council’s Time Square 
(Public Sector Building) 
Fan Coil Units 
(120 x @2.9kW) 
348.0 
Chiller 66.1 
Sub Total 414.1 
Total  855.6 
Table 5.5 The Available DSR Capacity for Case Study 1 [46] 
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During the project trial in spring 2012, each DSR event was carried out for one hour, between 
3pm and 8pm. The event was scheduled in advance. The participants were notified at least 
two working days before the event took place. Given one hour period of each DSR event, the 

















Commercial Building 198.1 1 91 18,027.1  
Education Sector Building 243.4 1 91  22,149.4  
Public Sector Building 414.1 1 91 37,683.1  
Total    77,859.6  
Table 5.6 The Available DSR Energy for Case Study 1   
C. DSR Energy Utilization 
The actual DSR energy participation from the customers who participate in Honeywell I&C 
ADR Project, which is run during spring season in 2012, can be calculated by using equation 
(5.2) as:   
DSREAc = DSRCapAc ∗ timeact 





















Commercial Sector Building 92.0 8,372.0  18,027.1  10,8% 
Education Sector Building 48.0 4,368.0   22,149.4  5,6% 
Public Sector Building 11.2 1,019.2  37,683.1  1,3% 
Total  13,759.2  77,859.6 17.67% 
Table 5.7 DSR Energy Utilization for Case Study 1 
As presented in table 5.7, the actual DSR participation is quite low. The contribution from 
commercial sector building is around 10.8%, education sector building contributes 5.6% and 
public sector building contributes 1.3% from the available DSR energy on the network. So, in 





D. Unit Cost of DSR Incentive 
Given the DSR investment cost of £260,900.00 and the available DSR energy on the network 
is around 77,859kWh, the unit cost of DSR incentive for this project, DSRUC, can be obtained 




 = £3.35/kWh  
E. DSR Incentive Rate 
By applying the energy-based DSR mechanism, 80% of DSR cost will be passed onto the 
customers and the DNO will receive additional DSR incentive which will be annuitized for 
15 years, as the estimated lifetime of DSR components.  
Given the DNO’s rate of return including the weighted average of capital (WACC) of 5.6% 
and 1% additional rate, and the estimated life time of DSR components of 15 years, the DSR 
incentive rate can be calculated using equation (5.6) as:  
DSR IR =  
DSRUC ∗(1−80%+WACC+additional rr)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
 =  £0.09/kWh           
F. Annual DSR Incentive 
The annual DSR Incentive for the DNO, which is based on the actual DSR energy 
participation during winter season in 2012, can be calculated using the equation (5.7) as:  
DSR Inc =  DSR IR ∗ DSREU ∗ DSREAc = £217.40 
G. The Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
Since the amount of DSR incentive is based on the utilization of the available DSR energy on 
the system, the maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive will be given to the DNO 
if they can fully utilised the available DSR energy on their system, i.e. DSR energy utilization 
(DSREU) is equal to 100%. So, the maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive can be 
calculated using equation (5.8) as: 




Figure 5.3 The Energy-based DSR Incentive for Case Study 1 
As shown in figure 5.3, the energy-based DSR incentive has exponential relation with the 
DSR energy utilization. Therefore, if the DSR energy utilization is low, the energy-based 
DSR incentive will be small. As applied in this case study, the DNO can only utilize 17.67% 
of the available DSR energy of 77,859kWh, they will only receive energy-based DSR 
incentive as much as £217.4. The maximum threshold of the incentive of £6,958.10 will be 
given to the DNO if the available DSR energy on the network can be fully utilized, as 
required. 
5.2.2 Case Study 2 
The data for the second case study is taken from the Low Carbon London project. This DSR 
trial project was a series of DSR trials project to examine the effects of energy efficiency 
schemes and time of use tariffs on industrial and commercial customers.  
A. DSR Investment Cost 
The Low Carbon London Project is run by another UK’s DNO, i.e. the UK Power Networks. 
The breakdown of project cost is presented in table 5.8.  
 




























Cost Category Sub Cost Category £ k 
Employment Costs Programme Director 512 
  Programme Management Other 310 
  Communications & Commercial Managers 468 
  Administrative Support 154 
  Technical Lead 630 
  Network Operations Staff 2,520 
  Sub Total 4,594 
Equipment Costs 5 ANM schemes 844 
  40 aggregator equipment/devices 650 
  smart metering 693 
  Plugged in Places contribution 1,125 
  Substation works 1,328 
  Sub Total 4,640 
Contractor Costs    - 
Customers & Users Payment   2,440 
IT Costs IT costs – operational data store 2,001 
  IT costs – Carbon Tool licensing 70 
  IT costs – SGS support & software licence 465 
  IT costs – Aggregator IT costs 163 
  IT costs – comms, infrastructure, environment and interfaces 640 
  IT costs – Logica head end 596 
 Sub Total 3,835 
Other Costs  Contingency 3,247 
  Abnormal travel 20 
  Public engagement/learning dissemination 1,728 
  Inflation 747 
  Partner/Collaborator labour costs 7,007 
  Other solution/implementation costs 380 
  Programme Management Other 1,150 
  Sub Total 19,019 
Total Costs   29,888 
Table 5.8 DSR Costs for Case Study 2 [83] 
As seen in table 5.8, the column of contractor costs is blank. This means that all cost 
categories, in total of £29,888,000.00, are under DNO’s responsibility. 
B. Available DSR Capacity 
For the Low Carbon London project, the details of participants and their available capacity 
are not provided but the achievement of the DSR trial is provided, as described in section C. 
C. DSR Energy Utilization 
Since there is no information related to the available DSR capacity in Low Carbon London 
Project, the calculation of DSR energy utilization for this project is based on the actual 
















Diesel Generation 24 47.38 
CHP 37 71.66 
Demand Reduction in Building  59 11.08 
Sub Total 120 130.12 
Wind-twinning Trial   
Diesel Generation  36 
CHP  29 
Sub Total 9 65.00 
Total  195.12  
Table 5.9 DSR Energy Participation for Case Study 2 [57] 
As seen in table 5.9, the trial was run in the period from 1 November 2013 until 28 February 
2014 and was reported successfully done. So, it can be assumed that the DSR participants can 
fully delivered their energy participation, or in other words, 100% of the available DSR 
energy which is equal to the actual DSR energy participation, can be utilised during the trial. 
Hence, the DSR energy utilization for this project is considered equal to 100%. 
D. Unit Cost of DSR Incentive 
Given the DSR investment cost of £29,888,000.00 and the available DSR energy is assumed 
to be 195.12MWh, the unit cost of DSR incentive for this project can be obtained from 





E. DSR Incentive Rate 
By considering the 80% of pass-through, the DNO’s weighted average of capital (WACC) of 
5.6% and 1% additional rate, and the estimated  life time of DSR components of 15 years, the 
incentive rate for the Low Carbon London project can be calculated by using equation (5.6) 
as:  
DSR IR =  
DSRUC ∗(1−80%+WACC+additional rr)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
 =  £4.09/kWh  
F. Annual DSR Incentive 
Based on the actual DSR energy participation during winter season in 2013, in which the 
utilization of available DSR energy is equal to 100%, the annual DSR incentive for case 
study 1 is calculated using equation (5.7) as:  
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DSR Inc =  DSR IR ∗ DSREU ∗ DSREAc = £797,316.45 
G. The Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
The maximum threshold of the incentive for case study 2 is equal to the annual DSR energy-
based DSR incentive. 
DSRIncMax =  DSR IR ∗ 100% ∗ DSREAc  = £797,316.45 
  
Figure 5.4 The Energy-based DSR Incentive for Case Study 2 
Figure 5.4 shows the graph of energy-based DG incentive for case study 2. The energy-based 
DG incentive will increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DSR energy 
utilization. As the available DSR energy is assumed to be fully utilized, the DSR energy 
utilization is assumed to be equal to 100%. As a result, the DNO will receive the maximum 
threshold of energy-based DSR incentive of £797,316.45. 
5.2.3 Case Study 3 
In this case study, the DSR programme will be implemented in the network depicted in figure 
3.2. The details of DSR capacity participation and the available DSR energy on the network 
are given in table 5.10 and 5.11. 
 






























A. DSR Capacity Participation 
As depicted in figure 5.5, the customers who are connected to the network consist of five 
industrial/commercial customers and three household groups of customers. The 
industrial/commercial customers include MD1, MD2, MD3, MD4 and MD5 are connected to 
the 11kV busbars. While the household customers, including LD1, LD2 and LD3 are 
connected to the 0.4kV busbars. The details of their participation in DSR programme is 
presented in table 5.10. 
 




Type of DSR 
Participated Capacity 
(MW) 
MD1 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD2 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD3 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD4 – Industrial/Commercial 3.5 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD5 – Industrial/Commercial 3.5 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
LD1  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
LD2  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
LD3  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
Table 5.10 The DSR Capacity Participation for Case Study 3 
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In this scenario, it is assumed that the customers who are participating in demand reduction 
and on-site generation mechanisms will be called in the events of failure on the network. The 
participants of demand reduction mechanism will be required to reduce their electricity 
consumption in the failure caused by a line outage. The total capacity that can be participated 
in this mechanism is about 1.5MW. For the customers who have installed on-site-generations, 
they will be required to run their generation in the event of supply scarcity due to a DG is out 
of service. In total, the on-site generation can contribute 1.0MW of capacity.  
In terms of demand shifting mechanism, the participants will be required to shift their 
electricity consumption from peak times to off-peak times, so that the peak demand can be 
flattened. Considering the electricity demand profile in the UK, the times of peak demand 
occur in the period between 5pm and 9pm, during winter and autumn seasons, as depicted in 
figure 5.6. 
 
Figure 5.6 Electricity Demand Profile in the UK [86] 
In order to determine the available DSR energy participated in DSR programme, some 
assumptions are taken into account. In one year period, the time duration for demand 
reduction following a line outage on the network is estimated for 10 hours. The same number 
is also assumed to be applied for running on-site generation following a DG outage. 
Regarding the demand shifting, the customers are required to shift their electricity 
consumption for one hour at times of peak demand during winter and autumn seasons. Since 
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the number of days during winter and autumn seasons is 180 days in total, the duration of 
DSR participation is equal to 1 x 180 = 180 hours in one year period. 







Demand Reduction 1.50 10 15,000 
On-site Generation 1.00 10 10,000 
Demand Shifting 0.45 180 81,000 
Total 106,000 
Table 5.11 The Available DSR Energy  
As presented in table 5.11, the total available DSR energy on the network is around 
106,000kWh. From this total energy, 14.5% of it comes from demand reduction participants 
and 9.5% of it comes from on-site generation participants. Meanwhile, the contribution from 
demand shifting participants is around 76%. 
B. DSR Costs 
In this particular example, the costs that must be borne by the DNO including the capital cost 
and the operational cost. The breakdown of the required investment cost is presented in table 
5.12. 
Cost Category Per Site (£) Units Total (£) 
Capital Cost 35,000.00 8 280,000.00 
Operational Cost 5% of total capital cost 14,000.00 
Total 294,000.00 
Table 5.12 DSR Investment Cost for Case Study 3  
As shown in table 5.12, the required capital cost is estimated to be £35,000.00 per site and the 
required operational cost to implement DSR programme on the network is estimated as 5% 
from the total capital cost [85]. So, in total, the required investment cost is estimated to be 
£294,000.00. 
C. DSR Energy Utilization 
By assuming that the available DSR energy can be fully utilized during one year period, the 









D. Unit Cost of DSR Incentive Rate 
Given the total DSR cost of £294,000 and total available DSR energy of 106,000 kWh, the 




 = £2.77/kWh  
E. Energy-Based DSR Incentive Rate 
By considering the WACC of 5.6% and additional 1% rate of return and the lifetime of DG 
connection assets of 15 years, the incentive rate can be obtained from equation (5.6) as: 
DSRIR    =  
DSRUC∗(1−80%+WACC+additional rr)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
 = £0.07/kWh  
F. Annual Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
Given the actual DSR energy of 106,000 kWh, which is equal to 100% of DSR energy 
utilization, and the incentive rate of £0.07/kWh, the annual energy-based DSR incentive for 
the DNO can be calculated using equation (5.7) as: 
DSR Inc =  DSR IR ∗ DSREU ∗ DSREAc = £7,842.98  
G. Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
The maximum threshold of the incentive for this study is equal to the annual DSR energy-
based DSR incentive. 




Figure 5.7 Energy-based DSR Incentive for Case Study 3 
Figure 5.7 shows the graph of energy-based DSR incentive for case study 3. The energy-
based DSR incentive will increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DSR 
energy utilization. As the available DSR energy is assumed to be fully utilized, the DSR 
energy utilization is assumed to be equal to 100%. As a result, the DNO will receive the 
maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive of £7,842.98. 
5.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN ENERGY-BASED DSR INCENTIVE AND CURRENT 
MECHANISMS 
Based on the explanation of current DSR incentive mechanism in chapter 2, the comparison 
between the proposed mechanism, i.e. energy-based DSR incentive mechanism, and current 



































DSR Incentive Mechanism Implementation 
Demand Management Incentive 
Mechanism  
Allowing DNOs to recover the costs and 
forgone revenues associated with DSR 
initiatives through higher electricity prices  
Rate of Return Mechanism Allowing DNOs to earn profit on DSR 
investment, based on the utility’s rate 
base, in the same manner as other capital 
investments 
Shared Savings Mechanism Giving DNOs a percentage share of the 
energy saving as a result of  DSR 
programme 
Avoided Cost Mechanism  Giving DNOs a percentage of their 
avoided supply costs as their DSR 
compensation 
Low Carbon Network Fund Giving financial support to DNOs for 
DSR trials or initiatives on their network 
Energy-based DSR Incentive 
Mechanism 
Allowing DNOs to receive additional 
incentive based on the utilization of 
available DSR energy and its relation with 
the required investment cost 
Table 5.13 Comparison between Energy-based DSR Incentive and Current Mechanisms 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The implementation of proposed energy-based DG incentive mechanism on case study 1, 2 
and 3 can be summarized as follows: 
 Case Study 1 Case Study 2 Case Study 3 
Investment Cost (£) 260,900.00 29,888,000.00 294,000.00 
Available DSR Energy (kWh) 77,859.60 195,120.00 106,000.00 
Actual DSR Energy Participation (kWh) 13,759.20 195,120.00 106,000.00 
DSR Energy Utilization (%) 17.67 100.00 100.00 
Unit Cost of Energy-based DSR Incentive (£/kWh) 3.35 153.18 2.77 
Energy-based DSR Incentive Rate (£/kWh) 0.09 4.09 0.07 
Annual Energy-based DSR Incentive (£) 217.4  797,316.45  7,842.98 
Maximum Threshold of Energy-based DSR Incentive (£) 6,958.10  797,316.45  7,842.98 
Table 5.14 Energy-based DSR Incentive Mechanism for Case Study 1, 2 and 3 
As presented in table 5.14, the incentive for DNOs associated with DSR implementation on 
their distribution networks depends on the utilization of available DSR energy on the network 
and its relation with the required investment cost. The higher the DSR energy utilization, the 
higher the incentive for the DNOs. 
Comparing with current incentive mechanism, energy-based DSR incentive can reflect the 
effectiveness of DNOs to deal with the required investments in association with DSR 




6 MIXED INCENTIVES FOR DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
OPERATORS  
In association with the deployment of distributed generation (DG) and the implementation of 
demand side response (DSR) programme on electricity distribution networks, the role of 
Distribution network operators (DNOs) is vital because they are responsible in operating, 
maintaining and developing the distribution networks.  
Currently DNOs do not have huge experience in connecting large amount of DG as well as 
deploying DSR programmes on their network. In order to encourage DNOs to be more active 
in the development of DGs and DSR programmes, financial incentives for DNOs related to 
those activities are required.  
The proposed energy-based DG incentive mechanism, which is described in chapter 4, aims 
to incentivise DNOs in providing DG connection on their network. The incentive is 
calculated based on the utilization of DG energy available on the network and its relation 
with the requirement of network reinforcement. This mechanism can reflect the effectiveness 
of DNOs to deal with the required investment associated with DG connection. 
Meanwhile, the proposed energy-based DSR incentive, which is described in chapter 5, aims 
to incentivise DNOs associated with DSR initiatives. This mechanism allows DNOs to 
receive incentive based on the utilization of DSR energy available and its relation with the 
required investment cost. Therefore, it can reflect the effectiveness of DNOs in their 
investment related to the implementation of DSR programme on their network.  
In order to find out more about the proposed mechanisms and the relation between them, this 
chapter describes the assessment of the impact of connecting DG and implementing DSR 
programme on the same network to the amount of incentives for the DNOs.  
6.1 IMPLEMENTATION OF MIXED ENERGY-BASED DG AND DSR INCENTIVES  
6.1.1 Principles of the Mixed Energy-based DG and DSR Incentives 
Basically, the mixed energy-based DG and DSR Incentives mechanism combines the two 
incentive mechanisms, i.e. energy-based DG incentive and energy-based DSR incentive 
mechanisms. The DNOs will be incentivised for their investment in providing DG connection 
and implementing DSR programmes on their distribution networks.   
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The energy-based DG incentive is calculated based on the utilization of DG energy available 
on the network in association with the network reinforcement cost. Meanwhile, energy-based 
DSR incentive will be given in accordance with the utilization of DSR energy participation 
by considering the required investment cost. 
The mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives consider the interaction between 
connecting DG and implementing DSR programme on the same distribution network. The 
participation of customers in DSR programme, especially in demand reduction and running 
on-site generations mechanisms, is related to the single outage (N-1) contingency. When an 
outage occurs, the customers will be asked to reduce their energy consumption and to operate 
their on-site generation to deal with the outage. In case where the connection of a new DG 
requires the network to be reinforced, the functionality of DSR programme on that particular 
network will be affected. After the network has been reinforced, the single outage (N-1) 
contingency might not interrupt the operation of the network, so that, the customers are not 
required to participate in one of DSR mechanisms. This indicates that the DNOs do not 
necessarily need to invest in DSR programme on that particular network but they might be 
still required to implement DSR programme on other parts of the network. 
Therefore, by implementing mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives mechanism, the 
DNOs are expected to be more effective on their investment in accommodating DG 
connection and implementing DSR programme on their network. 
6.1.2 Structure of the Incentive Mechanism 
The mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives mechanism also adopts the hybrid 
mechanism, i.e. by giving a partial pass-through mechanism and additional incentive rate. 
Pass-through mechanism allows DNOs to pass 80% of their investment cost on to the 
customers. Then, they will receive additional 20% incentive rate which will be annuitized for 
a particular period of time, by considering the rate of return of the investment cost and the life 
time of the reinforced components. 
6.1.3 Methodology to Develop Mixed Energy-based DG and DSR Incentives 
Mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentive mechanism is developed based on the 
combination of methodologies used in both DG and DSR incentive mechanisms, which will 
be explained further in the case study. 
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6.2 CASE STUDY 
For the purpose of investigating of the impact of connecting DG and implementing DSR 
programme, the assessment is conducted by using the same reference network which is used 
in the previous chapters.  
6.2.1 Load Flow Analysis of the Reference Network 
The connection of DG and the implementation of DSR on the distribution network will 
impact on the network performance, including voltage level, network capacity utilization and 
power losses. Amongst these three parameters, the level of network capacity utilization will 
determine whether a particular network component needs to be upgraded or not. If the 
network capacity utilization is more than 100%, which means that the capacity standard of 
the component is exceeded, network reinforcement is required. Therefore, in this case study, 
the analysis will focus on the power flow on each branch/line.      
 
Figure 6.1 Load Flow Analysis of the Reference Network 
Figure 6.1 depicts the load flow analysis results of the reference network. The figure shows 
the voltage level of each busbar, expressed in (pu) and the voltage angle. The connected 
capacity of each DG is expressed in (MVA) and the demand is expressed in (MW). While the 
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power flow, is expressed in (MVA). The details of the power flow on each branch/line are 













GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 3% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.150 3% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.269 15% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 82% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 998 14% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 66% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.292 43% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.908 70% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.653 11% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.932 19% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.218 42% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 75% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 714 10% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.286 8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.915 25% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.055 15% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 2.236 32% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049 3.520 50% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71% 
Table 6.1 Load Flow Analysis for the Reference Network 
6.2.2 Assessment of Single Outage (N-1) Contingency Criterion  
Single outage (N-1) contingency criterion means that the network should continue to operate 
following a failure of a network component [89]. This can be caused by one of the lines, 
transformers, or a generation unit is out of service.  
The (N-1) criterion for the reference network will be examined by disconnecting one of the 
lines on the network, including the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, the line between 
Bus11-7 and Bus11-9, and the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9. The assessment of (N-1) 
contingency is also carried out by disconnecting DG3 from Bus11-6. The result of load flow 




















(MVA) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (MVA) (%) 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.200 3% 1.170 3% 1.248 3% 4.709 12% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.200 3% 1.170 3% 1.248 3% 4.709 12% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2.225 14% 2.253 15% 2.267 15% 1.195 8% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.299 63% 6.299 63% 6.298 63% 6.293 63% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.756 82% 5.756 82% 5.756 82% 5.754 82% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.998 14% 0.998 14% 0.999 14% 1.001 14% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.923 66% 4.923 66% 4.924 66% 4.931 66% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 4.567 46% 4.395 44% 4.117 41% 7.696 77% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 8.467 120% 7.100 101%     7.322 104% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 1.747 11% 1.689 11% 1.657 11% 4.261 28% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 2.893 19% 2.920 19% 3.120 20% 5.959 39% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 4.051 41% 4.163 42% 4.591 46% 7.676 77% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.277 75% 5.277 75% 5.277 75% 5.280 75% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 4.011 57% 2.870 41% 4.073 58% 0.102 1% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1.161 8% 1.245 8% 1.473 10% 1.725 11% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.960 26% 3.931 25% 3.916 25% 5.167 33% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.054 15% 1.056 15% 1.054 15% 1.205 17% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 1.883 27%     7.103 101% 0.307 4% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049     1.883 27% 8.554 121% 7.464 106% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6.002 85% 6.002 85% 6.002 85% 1.682 24% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.002 71% 5.001 71% 5.002 71% 2.833 40% 
Table 6.2 Load Flow Analyses for (N-1) Contingency of the Reference Network  
Table 6.2 shows the analysis results for the (N-1) contingency of the reference network due to 
one of the outages presented in the table. These outages will cause the power flow of 
particular lines to exceed the standard capacity, indicated by the network capacity utilization 
is more than 100%.  
As presented in table 6.2, the outage of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 will cause the 
network capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 to reach 120%. The 
capacity standard of the same line will also be exceeded because of the outage of the line 
between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9, indicated by its network capacity utilization of 101%. 
The impact of (N-1) contingency of the reference network can also be explained by referring 
to the network depicted in figure 6.2. The network depicts the load flow analysis result of the 




Figure 6.2 Load Flow Analysis of (N-1) Contingency Caused by a Line Outage  
As shown in figure 6.2, if the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 is out of service, the power 
flow of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, of 8.554MVA, and the power of the line 
between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9, of 7.103MVA, are higher than their capacity standard of 
7.049MVA. The triple arrows on those lines indicate that the network capacity utilization of 
the lines are more than 100%. The increase of the power flow of those lines is caused by the 
power, which is previously distributed through the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9, will 
flow through other lines to supply the demand. As a result, it will increase the initial power 




Figure 6.3 Load Flow Analysis of (N-1) Contingency Caused by a DG Outage  
Figure 6.3 depicts the impact of a DG3 outage which is previously connected to Bus11-6. 
This outage causes the power flow of particular lines to increase exceeding their capacity 
standard. The power flow of line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 reaches 7.464MVA which is 
equal to 106% of the capacity standard, the power flow of line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 
reaches 7.322MVA which is equal to 104% of the capacity standard.   
The outage of DG3 means that the power which is previously generated by DG 3 to supply 
demand connected to Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 is cut. Therefore, those demands will be supplied 
by the power from network which is flowing through the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, 
and through the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9. Because of this additional power, the 
power flow on those lines increases.  
6.2.3 Implementing DSR to Deal with the Single Outage (N-1) Contingency  
The single outage (N-1) contingencies, including line and DG outages might cause the 
network capacity of particular lines to exceed 100%. In order to deal with this problem, DSR 
mechanisms, including demand reduction and running on-site generation can be applied. 
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Demand reduction mechanism aims to reduce the electricity demand, so that, the power flow 
on the related lines will decrease. While running on-site generation mechanism aims to 
generate electricity at customers’ side to supply their demand, so that, it will decrease the 
power imported from the network. Moreover, the excess power from the on-site generation 
can be exported to the network. As a result, this will decrease the network utilization of the 
related lines. 
1). DSR Capacity Participation 
As depicted in figure 6.3, the customers who are connected to the network consist of eight 
groups of customers include MD1, MD2, MD3, MD4, MD5, LD1, LD2 and LD3. The letters 
MD means that the customers are connected to the medium voltage of 11kV, while LD 
indicates the low voltage of 0.4kV. In this case, the participation of each customer group in 




Type of DSR 
Participated Capacity 
(MW) 
MD1 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD2 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD3 – Industrial/Commercial 4 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD4 – Industrial/Commercial 3.5 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
MD5 – Industrial/Commercial 3.5 
Demand Reduction 0.3 
On-site Generation 0.2 
LD1  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
LD2  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
LD3  – Household Group 1.5 Demand Shifting 0.15 
Table 6.3 The DSR Capacity Participation for Case Study 3 
In the event of failure, the customers who are participating in demand reduction will be 
required to reduce their electricity consumption, while the customers who have installed on-
site-generations will be required to run their generation. As seen in table 6.3, the total 
participated capacity in demand reduction mechanism is around 1.5MW and the total 
participation of on-site generation is estimated at 1.0MW.  
Meanwhile, the customers who participate in demand shifting mechanism are required to 
shift their energy consumption at peak demand times to off-peak demand times, for the 




2). Impact of DSR Implementation on Single Outage (N-1) Contingency 
Table 6.4 presents the results of load flow analysis for the implementation of DSR 
mechanisms on (N-1) contingency. The DSR mechanisms, including demand reduction and 





















(MVA) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (%) 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 351 1% 351 1% 320 1% 3.274 8% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 351 1% 351 1% 320 1% 3.274 8% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 2719 18% 2.727 18% 2.754 18% 1.579 10% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6300 63% 6.300 63% 6.300 63% 6.295 63% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5757 82% 5.757 82% 5.757 82% 5.755 82% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 998 14% 998 14% 998 14% 1.000 14% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4921 66% 4.921 66% 4.921 66% 4.928 66% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 3207 32% 3.134 31% 2.889 29% 6.310 63% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 5999 85% 6.069 86%   6.107 87% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 782 5% 759 5% 732 5% 3.209 21% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 1810 12% 1.843 12% 1.959 13% 4.740 31% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 2843 28% 2.928 29% 3.219 32% 6.289 63% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5277 75% 5.277 75% 5.277 75% 5.279 75% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 2835 40% 3.078 44% 2.878 41% 74 1% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 1036 7% 1.087 7% 1.268 8% 1.554 10% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3471 22% 3.462 22% 3.437 22% 4.660 30% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1361 19% 1.363 19% 1.361 19% 885 13% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 1544 22%   6.070 86% 242 3% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049   1.548 22% 6.056 86% 6.131 87% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 7.049 6168 88% 6.168 88% 6.168 88% 1.845 26% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 4835 69% 4.835 69% 4.835 69% 2.667 38% 
Table 6.4 Load Flow Analyses after DSR Implementation 
As presented in table 6.4, the implementation of DSR mechanism following an outage can 
reduce the network capacity utilization, less than 100%. This due to demand reduction 
mechanism can reduce the power consumed by demand, so that the power flow on the 
network will decrease. Meanwhile, on-site generation can generate power to supply near-by 
demand. As the demand has been partly supplied by on-site generation, the amount of 
imported power can be reduced, as a result, the power flow on the related lines will decrease. 
As the power flow decrease, the network capacity utilization will decrease as well. 
For instance, the outage of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus117 will cause the network 
capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 reaches 120%. After demand 
reduction and running on-site generation mechanisms are applied, the network capacity 
utilization of the line decreases by 35%. While the implementation of these DSR mechanisms 
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following the outage of the line between Bus117 and Bus11-9 will decrease the network 
capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 from 101% down to 86%.      
The impact of DSR mechanisms, which is applied following the outage of the line between 
Bus11-8 and Bus 11-9, can be explained by using figure 6.4. 
 
   Figure 6.4 Load Flow Analyses for DSR Implementation Following a Line Outage 
Following the outage of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9, the network utilization of the 
line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 and the network utilization of the line between Bus11-7 
and Bus11-9 will reach 101% and 121%, respectively. By applying demand reduction and 
on-site generation mechanisms, as depicted in figure 6.4, the power flow on those lines can 
be reduced down to 6.070MVA and 6.056MVA, which are equal to the reduction of network 




   Figure 6.5 Load Flow Analyses for DSR Implementation Following a DG Outage 
Figure 6.5 shows the impact of reducing demand and running on-site generation on the power 
flow of the related lines. Following the outage of the DG3 which is previously connected to 
Bus11-6, the network utilization of the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 and the network 
utilization of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 will increase up to 106% and 104%, 
respectively. Then, by applying demand reduction and on-site generation mechanisms, the 
power flow on those lines can be reduced down to 6.131MVA and 6.107MVA, which are 
equal to the reduction of network capacity utilization of those lines by 19% and 17%, 
respectively. 
6.2.4 Implementation of Energy-based DSR Incentive  
The energy-based DSR incentive is developed in association with the implementation of DSR 
programme on the distribution network.  
A. Available DSR Energy 
In this case, it is assumed that the period of customers’ participation both in demand 
reduction and on-site generation mechanisms will be for two and a half hours during the 
event of failure. There are four failures examined in this case, including the outage of the line 
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between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7, the outage of the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9, the 
outage of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9, and the outage of DG3 which is connected 
to Bus11-6. It is also assumed that each outage might happen once in a year.  
In terms of demand shifting mechanism, the customers are required to shift their energy 
consumption from peak demand times to off-peak demand times for one hour period, during 
winter and autumn seasons. Since the number of days during winter and autumn seasons is 
180 days in total, the duration of DSR participation is equal to 1 x 180 = 180 hours in one 
year period. Hence, the total the total available DSR energy on the network is around 
106,000kWh, as presented in table 6.5. 







The line between 
Bus11-4 and 
Bus11-7 is out of 
service 
Demand Reduction 1.50 2.5 3,750 
On-site Generation 1.00 2.5 2,500 
The line between 
Bus11-4 and 
Bus11-7 is out of 
service 
Demand Reduction 1.50 2.5 3,750 
On-site Generation 1.00 2.5 2,500 
The line between 
Bus11-4 and 
Bus11-7 is out of 
service 
Demand Reduction 1.50 2.5 3,750 
On-site Generation 1.00 2.5 2,500 
DG3 is out of 
service 
Demand Reduction 1.50 2.5 3,750 
On-site Generation 1.00 2.5 2,500 
Demand Shifting 0.45 180.0 81,000 
Total 106,000 
Table 6.5 The Available DSR Energy 
B. DSR Costs 
The costs that must be borne by the DNO in implementing DSR programme include the 
capital cost and the operational cost. The breakdown of the required investment cost is given 
in table 6.6. 
Cost Category Per Site (£) Units Total (£) 
Capital Cost 35,000.00 8 280,000.00 
Operational Cost 5% of total capital cost 14,000.00 
Total 294,000.00 
Table 6.6 DSR Investment Cost for Case Study 4  
As presented in table 6.6, the required capital cost is estimated to be £35,000.00 per site and 
the required operational cost to implement DSR programme on the network is estimated as 
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5% from the total capital cost [85]. So, in total, the required investment cost is estimated to be 
£294,000.00 
D. Unit Cost of DSR Incentive Rate 
Given the total DSR cost of £294,000 and total available DSR energy of 106,000 kWh, the 




 = £2.77/kWh  
E. Energy-Based DSR Incentive Rate 
By considering the WACC of 5.6% and additional 1% rate of return and the lifetime of DG 
connection assets of 15 years, the incentive rate can be obtained from equation (5.6) as: 
DSRIR    =  
DSRUC∗(1−80%+WACC+additional rr)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
 = £0.07/kWh  
C. DSR Energy Utilization 
DSR energy utilization can be calculated from the actual DSR energy participation over the 





G. Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
The maximum threshold of the incentive for this study is obtained at the point where the DSR 
energy utilization is equal to 100%, as written as:  






Figure 6.6 Energy-based DSR Incentive for Case Study 4 
Figure 6.6 shows the graph of energy-based DSR incentive for case study 4. The energy-
based DSR incentive will increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DSR 
energy utilization. The maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive of £7,842.98 will 
be given to the DNO if the available DSR energy can be fully utilized, where DSR energy 
utilization is equal to 100%. 
6.2.5 DG Connection at a Generation-dominated Busbar 
Figure 6.7 shows the impact of connecting a new DG at one of generation-dominated 
busbars, i.e. at Bus11-6. The new DG is assumed to be an onshore wind generation with a 
capacity of 4.5MVA. This connection causes the standard capacity of the line between 
Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 is exceeded. As shown, the power flowing through this line is 
8.998MVA, which is exceeding the line’s standard capacity of 7.049MVA.  
In order to accommodate all DG capacity connected to Bus11-6, the line between Bus11-6 
and Bus11-7 needs to be reinforced, i.e. by upgrading the line’s capacity up to 10.288MVA.  





























Figure 6.7 Impact of a New DG Connection on Network’s Power Flow 
After the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 has been upgraded, the load flow analysis 
results of the network will change, as depicted in figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8  Impact Network Reinforcement on Network’s Power Flow 
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As depicted in figure 6.8, by reinforcing the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7, the power 
flow of the line does not exceed its capacity standard, so that, the network can accommodate 
all capacity of the connected DGs. However, the power flow on the line between Bus11-6 
and Bus11-7 increases from 8.998MVA to 9.818MVA. This due to the increase of line 
capacity will increase the portion of power which is flowing through the line. As a result, the 
portion of power which is flowing through other line will decrease. This can be seen from the 
decrease of power flow on the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-5, from 6.504MVA down to 
5.789MVA. 
6.2.6 Implementation of Energy-based DG Incentive  
A. Network Reinforcement Cost 
The required reinforcement cost for this DG connection has been examined in chapter 2. The 
cost components considered in the calculation process to determine DG incentive only 
include the shared-use connection assets cost, which is estimated equal to £183,600.00. 
B. Minimum Requirement for DG Energy to be conveyed  
The new DG that will be connected to Bus11-6 is assumed to be an onshore wind generation 
with the capacity of 4.5MVA. Given the power factor (DGp,pf) = 0.9, the capacity factor 
(DGp,cf) = 0.35, the DG operational time (DGp,oprtime) = 8760 hours, and the levelised cost of 
energy generation (DGp,LCOEG) = £75/MWh, the minimum required energy to be conveyed 
can be obtained equal to 3,543MWh. This is equal to 28.5% utilization of the available DG 
energy of 12,417MWh. The details of the calculation process are examined in chapter 2. 
C. Minimum and Maximum Thresholds of Energy-based DG Incentive  
The minimum and maximum thresholds of energy-based DG incentive for the connection of 
a new DG to Bus11-6 can be seen in figure 6.9. The graph shows that the energy-based DG 
incentive for DNOs will increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DG 
Energy Utilization. 
The minimum incentive of £398.90 will be given to the DNO if the connected DG can 
conveyed 28.5% of its available energy during one year period. If the connected DG cannot 
meet this minimum requirement, the incentive for DNO will be equal to 0. 
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Meanwhile, the maximum incentive of £4,898.00 will be given to the DNO if the available 
DG energy of 12,417MWh can be fully utilized.   
 
Figure 6.9 The Thresholds of Energy-based DG Incentive for Wind Generation  
6.2.7 Impact of Network Reinforcement on Single Outage (N-1) Contingency  
The network reinforcement is carried out by upgrading the capacity of the line between 
Bus11-6 and Bus11-7. By upgrading the line’s capacity, all DG capacity connected to Bus11-
6 can be accommodated. Beside this impact, this network reinforcement might also impact on 
the single outage (N-1) contingency of the network. The load flow analysis results of the (N-
































(MVA) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (MVA) (%) (MVA) (MVA) (%) 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.281 3% 1.228 3% 1.240 3% 2.174 5% 
GSP Bus33-1 40.000 1.281 3% 1.228 3% 1.240 3% 2.174 5% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-1 15.433 3.089 20% 3.063 20% 3.114 20% 1.908 12% 
Bus33-2 Bus11-1 10.000 6.302 63% 6.302 63% 6.302 63% 6.297 63% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-2 7.049 5.757 82% 5.757 82% 5.757 82% 5.756 82% 
Bus11-1 Bus11-3 7.049 0.997 14% 0.997 14% 0.997 14% 0.999 14% 
Bus11-3 Bus04-1 7.500 4.919 66% 4.919 66% 4.919 66% 4.925 66% 
Bus33-4 Bus11-8 10.000 2.301 23% 2.330 23% 2.080 21% 5.286 53% 
Bus11-8 Bus11-9 7.049 4.336 62% 7.096 101%     5.630 80% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-4 15.433 0.546 4% 0.459 3% 0.557 4% 2.411 16% 
Bus33-1 Bus33-3 15.433 1.174 8% 1.235 8% 1.258 8% 3.811 25% 
Bus33-3 Bus11-4 10.000 2.047 20% 2.148 21% 2.313 23% 5.224 52% 
Bus11-3 Bus11-2 7.049 5.276 75% 5.276 75% 5.276 75% 5.278 75% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-8 7.049 2.047 29% 4.959 70% 2.080 30% 0.482 7% 
Bus33-3 Bus33-4 15.433 0.942 6% 0.959 6% 1.127 7% 1.415 9% 
Bus33-2 Bus33-4 15.433 3.121 20% 3.140 20% 3.097 20% 4.283 28% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-7 7.049 1.738 25% 1.739 25% 1.738 25% 0.065 1% 
Bus11-9 Bus11-7 7.049 3.756 53%     7.097 101% 1.515 21% 
Bus11-4 Bus11-7 7.049     3.761 53% 4.383 62% 4.682 66% 
Bus11-7 Bus11-6 10.288 9.818 95% 9.818 95% 9.818 95% 5.097 50% 
Bus11-5 Bus11-6 7.049 5.789 82% 5.789 82% 5.789 82% 3.971 56% 
   Table 6.7 Load Flow Analyses after the Network Reinforcement 
As shown in table 6.7, after the line between Bus11-6 and Bus11-7 is upgraded, the outage of 
the line between Bus11-4 and Bus11-7 will not disrupt the operation of the network. Neither 
does the outage of DG3 at Bus11-6. This can be seen from the network capacity utilization of 
other lines which are still less than 100% following these two outages. 
However, for other two outages, i.e. the outage of the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 and 
the outage of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 still causes the network capacity 





Figure 6.10 Load Flow Analysis for the Line outage between Bus 11-7 and Bus11-9 after 
Network Reinforcement  
As presented in figure 6.10, the outage of the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 causes the 
power flow on the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 increases to 7.096MVA, exceeding its 
capacity standard. The power flow is depicted on the direction from Bus11-8 to Bus11-9, 
which means the power is used to supply demand connected to Bus11-9.  
In order to deal with this condition, the demand connected at Bus11-9 should be reduced. The 




 Figure 6.11 Load Flow Analysis after Reducing Demand at Bus11-9 Following the Outage of 
the Line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 
Figure 6.11 shows the impact of reducing demand at Bus11-9 on the power flow of the line 
between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9. The demand reduction mechanism is carried out by reducing 
0.3MW of MD4. This reduction can decrease the power flow on the line between Bus11-8 
and Bus11-9 from 7.096MVA down to 6.784MVA, less than its capacity standard. 
Meanwhile, the outage of the line between Bus 11-8 and Bus11-9 after the network 
reinforcement took place, causes the network capacity utilization of the line between Bus11-7 




Figure 6.12 Load Flow Analysis for the Line outage between Bus 11-8 and Bus11-9 after 
Network Reinforcement  
As shown in figure 6.12, the outage of the line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 causes the 
power flow on the line between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9 increases to 7.097MVA, exceeding its 
capacity standard. The power flow is depicted on the direction from Bus11-7 to Bus11-9, 
which means the power is used to supply demand connected to Bus11-9.  
In order to deal with this condition, the demand connected at Bus11-9 should be reduced. The 




Figure 6.13 Load Flow Analysis after Reducing Demand at Bus11-9 Following the Outage of 
the Line between Bus11-8 and Bus11-9 
Figure 6.13 shows the impact of reducing demand at Bus11-9 on the power flow of the line 
between Bus11-7 and Bus11-9. The demand reduction mechanism is carried out by reducing 
0.3MW of MD4. This reduction can decrease the power flow on the line between Bus11-7 
and Bus11-9 from 7.097MVA down to 6.785MVA, less than its capacity standard. 
6.2.8 Impact of Network Reinforcement on the Functionality of DSR Programme  
As described in section 6.27, the network reinforcement, which is carried out by upgrading 
the capacity of the line between Bus11-6 and Bus117, has affected the single outage (N-1) 
contingency of the network. This impact of network reinforcement on the functionality of 
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Total 2.95  1.05 
Table 6.8 Comparison of DSR Participation 
Table 6.8 shows the comparison of the required DSR participation from the customers related 
to the single outage (N-1) contingency of the network, before and after network 
reinforcement. Where, the network reinforcement is carried out in order to accommodate a 
new DG connection on a generation-dominated busbar.  
As presented in table 6.8, network reinforcement can reduce the functionality of DSR 
mechanism. In other words, DSR activities are not required in particular outage events due to 
the network has been upgraded. The reduction of the DSR activities will impact on the 
reduction of available DSR energy on the network, which in turn, it will impact on the value 
of energy-based DSR incentive to be given to the distribution network operators (DNO).  
6.2.9 Impact of Network Reinforcement on Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
There are three mechanisms in implementing DSR programmes, including demand reduction, 
running on-site generations and demand shifting. Based on the previous analysis of this case, 
network reinforcement will impact on the requirement of DSR participation.  In terms of 
demand reduction and running on-site generation mechanisms, the requirement can be met by 
one customer group, i.e. MD4, while in terms of demand shifting mechanism, the 
participation from LD1, LD2 and LD3 is still required.  
A. DSR Costs 
The costs that must be borne by the DNO in implementing DSR programme include the 
capital cost and the operational cost. The breakdown of the required investment cost is given 
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in table 6.9. It is assumed that the required capital cost is estimated to be £35,000.00 per site 
and the required operational cost to implement DSR programme on the network is estimated 
as 5% from the total capital cost [85]. 
Cost Category Per Site (£) Units Total (£) 
Capital Cost 35,000.00 4 140,000.00 
Operational Cost 5% of total capital cost 7,000.00 
Total 147,000.00 
Table 6.9 DSR Investment Cost for Case Study 5  
As presented in table 6.9, the capital cost is needed to implement DSR programme at four 
sites, i.e. MD4, LD1, LD2 and LD3. So, in total, the required investment cost is estimated to 
be £147,000.00 
B. DSR Available Energy 
The customers, who participate in demand reduction and running on-site generation 
mechanisms, are required to reduce their energy demand and to operate their on-site 
generation for 2.5 hours at the event of a failure. While the customers of demand shifting 
mechanism are required to shift their energy consumption for one hour, from peak demand 
times to off-peak demand times, during winter and autumn seasons (180 days). Hence, the 
available DSR energy on the network can obtained as presented in table 6.10. 
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MD4 0.30 2.5 750 
Outage of the line 








0.45 180 81,000 
Total 82,500 
Table 6.10 Available DSR Energy for Case Study 5 
D. Unit Cost of DSR Incentive Rate 
Given the total DSR cost of £147,000.00 and total available DSR energy of 82,500 kWh, the 








E. Energy-Based DSR Incentive Rate 
By considering the WACC of 5.6% and additional 1% rate of return and the lifetime of DG 
connection assets of 15 years, the incentive rate can be obtained from equation (5.6) as: 
DSRIR    =  
DSRUC∗(1−80%+WACC+additional rr)∗WACC
(1−(1+WACC))−nper
 = £0.05/kWh  
C. DSR Energy Utilization 
DSR energy utilization can be calculated from the actual DSR energy participation over the 





G. Maximum Threshold of Energy-Based DSR Incentive  
The maximum threshold of the incentive for this study is obtained at the point where the DSR 
energy utilization is equal to 100%, as written as:  
DSRIncMax =  DSR IR ∗ 100% ∗ DSREAc = £3,921.00 
 
Figure 6.14 Energy-based DSR Incentive for Case Study 5 
Figure 6.14 shows the graph of energy-based DSR incentive for case study 5. The energy-
based DSR incentive will increase exponentially in accordance with the increase of DSR 







































energy utilization. The maximum threshold of energy-based DSR incentive of £3,921.00 will 
be given to the DNO if the available DSR energy can be fully utilized, as required. 
6.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN SINGLE AND MIXED ENERGY-BASED DG AND 
DSR INCENTIVE 
The terms of single incentive mechanism refers to the implementation of one incentive 
mechanisms, either energy-based DG incentive or energy-based DSR incentive separately, 
without considering the relation amongst them. Meanwhile, mixed energy-based DG and 
DSR incentives mechanism indicates the implementation of both incentive mechanisms on 
the same network, simultaneously. The comparison between single and mixed energy-based 
DG and DSR incentives can be summarised in table 6.11. 
Components 
Single Energy-based Incentive 
Mechanism 
Mixed Energy-based Incentive 
Mechanism 
DSR Incentive DG Incentive DSR Incentive DG Incentive 
Investment Cost (£) 294,000.00 183,600.00 147,000.00 183,600.00 
Available Energy (kWh) 106,000 12,417.30 82,500 12,417.30 
Unit Cost (£/kWh) 2.77 14.79 1.78 14.79 
Incentive Rate (£/kWh) 0.07 0,394 0.05 0,394 
Minimum Energy Utilization  - 28.5% - 28.5% 
Minimum Threshold (£) - 398.88 - 398.88 
Maximum Threshold (£) 7,842.98 4,897.86 3,921.00 4,897.86 
Table 6.11 Comparison between Single and Mixed Energy-based Mechanism 
As presented in table 6.11, the total investment cost that must be borne by DNOs to apply 
energy-based DG and DSR incentive mechanisms separately is more than the one for 
applying mixed energy-based mechanism. In this case, if DNOs apply both mechanisms 
separately, they are required to invest approximately of £477,600.00. However, by applying 
both mechanisms simultaneously, they will spend less investment cost, approximately of 
£330,600.00. Although the required investment is different, the benefits from connecting a 
new DG and implementing DSR programme remain the same, for both scenarios. 
As the required investment cost is lower, the amount of incentives for DNOs will be lower, 
too. From the energy regulator’s point of view, who is responsible to incentivise the DNOs, 
this also becomes a benefit. They will be required to give less incentive to the DNOs, but in 
return, the benefits from DG connection and DSR implementation remain the same. 
Hence, the mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives mechanism will encourage DNOs to 
be more effective in providing DG connection and implementing DSR programme on their 
networks.   
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6.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There is an interaction between providing DG connection and implementing DSR on the 
same network. Based on the single outage (N-1) contingency analysis of the case study, the 
connection of a new DG which leads to network reinforcement, will impact on the 
functionality of DSR.  
The participation of customers in DSR programme is required to deal with the single outage 
(N-1) contingency on the network, in a condition where the outage can disrupt the network 
operation. By reinforcing the network, a particular outage might not impact on the operation 
of the network, so that, this will not require customers to participate in DSR programme. 
Referring to this, DNOs do not necessarily need to invest in DSR programme. As a result, 
this can reduce the required investment cost to provide DG connection and to implement 
DSR programme on their network.  
The mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentive mechanism considers the interaction 
between providing DG connection and implementing DSR programme on the same network. 
The incentives will be given to the DNOs based on the utilization of DG and DSR energy on 
the network and its relation with the required network reinforcement. It is expected that this 
mechanism can encourage DNOs to be more effective in their investments related to DG 




7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 CONCLUSION 
7.1.1 Development of DG and DSR  
The deployment of distributed generation (DG) and the implementation of demand side 
response (DSR) programme have significant impact on achieving the target in reducing 
greenhouse gasses emissions and increasing the penetration of renewable energy sources in 
electricity production. Since most of DGs come from renewable resources they can contribute 
in reducing carbon emissions from the electricity sector and increasing the use of renewable 
sources to replace fossil fuels. Meanwhile, the implementation of DSR, through demand 
reduction and demand shifting mechanisms will impact on the more efficient use of 
electricity generation as well as minimising the use of less efficient generation plants, which 
mostly come from fossil fuelled power plants. 
In some countries, the penetration of DGs on the distribution network is quite low. The data 
shows that DG only contributes 1.36% of the total electricity generation in Australia. In the 
United Kingdom, 7.5% of the total electricity generation comes from DGs. While in the 
United States of America, the penetration of DGs is around 18.98% of the total electricity 
generation. The obstacles in the deployment of DGs include payment warranty for exported 
electricity, inadequate information, planning permission, electricity industry issues and 
incentives for DNOs. One of the key issues is related to the incentives for DNOs. Currently, 
DNOs have not received appropriate incentives to provide DG connection on their networks. 
The implementation of DSR programme on the distribution network also encountered some 
barriers. The obstacles to the implementation of DSR include several things, amongst which 
are low participation of relevant parties, use of advance technologies, regulation and 
incentives for DNOs. The incentives for DNOs become one of the key issues that must be 
taken into account. DNOs require appropriate incentives to implement and develop DSR 
programme on their distribution networks. 
Thus, of all the existing barriers associated with the deployment of DG and DSR 





7.1.2 Current Incentives for DNOs related to DG Connection and DSR Implementation 
The incentives for DNOs include DG Incentive and DSR Incentive, aims to give financial 
support to the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) in order to provide the connection of 
distributed generation (DG) and to facilitate the implementation of demand side response 
(DSR) on the distribution network.  
Current DG incentive, which is applied in the United Kingdom, is given to the DNOs based 
on the capacity (kW) of the connected DG. The higher the DG capacity connected to the 
network, the higher the amount of incentive for the DNOs. In addition, the incentive is 
uniform across the country. 
This mechanism might give unfair treatment for every DG connection considering two 
reasons. The first reason is related to the technology used to generate energy. Each 
technology has different value of DG parameters, including the capacity factor, the 
operational time and the levelised cost of energy generation. These parameters are used to 
determine the amount of energy that can be generated from DG. So that, at the same standard 
capacity, different DG technology will generate different amount of energy. The second 
reason is related to the location where a DG is connected to the distribution network. This 
factor will impact on the investment cost needed to provide connection. In a rural or remote 
location, the investment cost for DG connection is higher than the location which is near to 
the existing network. The location of DG connection will also impact on the number of 
affected components at a particular network configuration. The more the number of 
components needs to be upgraded, the higher the investment cost required. 
Therefore, in terms of DG incentives for DNOs, this research proposes a new approach to 
incentivise DNOs associated with DG connection, called energy-based DG incentive 
mechanism. In this mechanism, DNOs will be incentivised based on the utilization of the 
available DG energy on the network and its relation with the required investment. The higher 
the DG energy utilization, the higher the incentive for DNOs. 
Regarding the incentives for DNOs to implement DSR programme, different mechanisms 
have been applied in some countries, including Australia and USA. Some of the mechanisms 
aim to allow DNOs to recover their investment cost or forgone revenue related to DSR 
initiatives, as implemented in demand management incentive and rate of return mechanisms. 
Other mechanisms aim to allow DNOs to receive a percentage share or saving compensation 
as a result of DSR implementation on their distribution networks, as implemented in shared 
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shavings and avoided cost mechanisms. Currently, those DSR incentive mechanisms operate 
independently without any correlation between them.  
Therefore, in terms of DSR incentive for DNOs, this research proposes a new mechanism 
called energy-based DSR incentive mechanism. This mechanism aims to allow DNOs to 
recover their investment costs based on the utilization of available DSR energy on the 
network. The higher the DSR energy utilization, the higher the incentive for the DNOs. 
7.1.3 Key Findings of the Energy-based DG Incentive for DNOs 
This research proposes a new approach to incentivise DNOs associated with DG connection, 
called energy-based DG incentive mechanism. In this mechanism, DG incentive for DNOs is 
calculated based on the utilization of the available DG energy on the network and its relation 
with the required investment. The higher the DG energy utilization, the higher the incentive 
given to the DNOs.  
There are minimum and maximum thresholds for the energy-based DG incentive. The 
maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNOs if the available DG energy 
can be fully utilized. The minimum threshold of the incentive is given to the DNOs when the 
connected DG only delivers the minimum required energy to be conveyed. If the DNOs 
cannot meet this requirement, they will not be incentivised.  
There are seven types of DG technologies, including biomass, geothermal, CCGT CHP, 
offshore wind, hydro, onshore wind and solar PV which are examined in this research. The 
aim of this assessment is to find out the impact of DG technology on the value of the energy-
based DG incentive that will be given to the DNOs. The analysis shows that different DG 
technologies will generate different amount of energy output. By assuming the capacity of 
DG connected to the network is 4.5MVA and the estimated reinforcement cost of 
£183,600.00, the DG incentive rates for different DG technologies will vary, in the range 
between £1.53/MWh and £14.19/MWh.   
Since different DG technology will generate different energy output, the minimum 
requirement for energy to be conveyed will vary amongst different DG technologies, between 
13.52% and 39.63% of the available DG energy. These values will result in different 
minimum threshold of energy-based DG incentive for DNOs. However, if the DNOs cannot 
meet the minimum requirement for energy to be conveyed, they will not be incentivised. 
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Meanwhile, the maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive is given when the 
connected DG can deliver all their available energy, i.e. when the DG energy utilization is 
equal to 100%. Since the reinforcement cost to provide DG connection is assumed to be the 
same for all DG technologies, the maximum threshold of the incentive for all types of DG 
technology will be the same, equal to 20% of the required reinforcement cost. 
The location of DG connection on the network will also determine the value of energy-based 
DG incentive for the DNOs. Based on the analysis result of this research, the increase of the 
line’s length by 3000m will increase the incentive rate by £1.71/MWh.  
Another considered factor is related to the network configuration. The configuration of a 
particular network will determine the number of components that might be affected by the 
connection of a new DG to the network. The more the number of components needs to be 
upgraded, the higher the investment cost required. Based on the analysis results of the case 
studies in this thesis, the minimum and maximum threshold of energy-based DG incentive 
will adjust to the increase of the required reinforcement cost to provide DG connection. The 
higher the required reinforcement cost, the higher the incentive thresholds for the DNOs. 
Hence, comparing with current DG incentive mechanism, the proposed energy-based DG 
incentive mechanism can reflect the effectiveness of DNOs to deal with the required 
reinforcement cost to provide DG connection and the utilization of available DG energy on 
the network. 
7.1.4 Key Findings of the Energy-based DSR Incentive for DNOs 
In terms of DSR incentive mechanism, this research proposes a new mechanism called 
energy-based DSR incentive. This mechanism aims to incentivise DNOs in association with 
DSR implementation on their network.  
There are two factors which are considered in the implementation of energy-based DSR 
incentive mechanism. The first factor is related to the required investment cost to implement 
DSR programme on the distribution network. The maximum threshold of energy-based DSR 
incentive will adjust to the increase of the investment cost for DSR implementation. The 
higher the required investment cost, the higher the incentive thresholds for the DNOs. 
The second factor is related to the available DSR energy participation on the network. The 
energy-based DSR incentive is calculated based on the utilization of available DSR energy on 
the network. The higher the DSR energy utilization, the higher the incentive for the DNOs. 
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The maximum threshold of the incentive will be given to the DNOs if they can fully utilize 
the available energy from DSR participants on their network, as required.  
Therefore, the proposed energy-based DSR incentive mechanism can reflect the effectiveness 
of DNOs to deal with the required investment cost to implement DSR programme and the 
utilization of available DSR energy on the network. 
7.1.5 Key Findings of the Mixed Energy-based DG and DSR Incentives for DNOs 
The mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives mechanism aims to incentivise DNOs in 
association with their investment in providing DG connection and implementing DSR 
programmes. This mechanism considers the interaction between connecting DG and 
implementing DSR programme on the same distribution network.  
DSR mechanisms, including demand response and running on-site generation, aim to 
response to the single outage (N-1) contingency. In a case where the DG connection requires 
a particular network to be reinforced, the network reinforcement might impact the 
functionality of DSR on that particular network. Following network reinforcement, the single 
outage (N-1) contingency might not impact on the operation of the network, so that, the 
participation in DSR mechanisms is not required. This indicates that the DNOs do not 
necessarily need to invest in DSR programme on that particular network but they might be 
still required to implement DSR programme on other parts of the network. 
The mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentives mechanism is allowing DNOs to recover 
necessary investment related to the connection of DGs and the implementation of DSR. The 
incentives are calculated based on the utilization of the available DG and DSR energy on the 
network. The higher the utilization of the available DG and DSR energy, the higher the 
incentives for DNOs will be.   
Therefore, if the DNOs cannot fully utilize their investment in providing DG connection and 
implementing DSR programme, they will not be able to recover their investment cost. 
Through the mixed energy-based DG and DSR incentive, the DNOs are expected to be more 
effective in providing DG connection and implementing DSR programme on their networks. 
7.2 THESIS LIMITATIONS 
Parts of the objectives of the thesis are examining the impact of connecting a new DG to an 
existing distribution network, either to a generation-dominated area or to a demand-
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dominated area. The network configuration used in this thesis is an ideal network 
configuration which has some generation-only busbars and some demand-only busbars. This 
kind of network configuration is probably very rare in a real electricity system.   
Also, this thesis examines the impact of DG connection and DSR implementation on 
distribution network separately. Further consideration should be taken into account by 
considering that DG connection and DSR implementation could affect each other, if they are 
applied on the same distribution network.  
7.3 FUTURE WORK 
The proposed energy-based DG incentive mechanism can be developed further by 
considering the increase in the number of DGs connected to the network. One of the benefits 
of the presence of DGs on the distribution network is that it can maintain supply reliability in 
distribution level. However, when the amount of DGs increases significantly, it will require 
the DNOs to reinforce and develop the network in order to optimize the utilization of 
available DG energy on the network. As a consequence, DNOs need extra costs for 
developing, operating and maintaining the network in order to fulfil the requirement. 
On the one hand, a large number of DGs connected to the distribution network may cause 
DNOs to face financial and technical constraints, but on the other hand, this will give an 
opportunity to the transmission network operator (TNOs) to utilize the excess energy from 
the DG to unravel the transmission congestion. This requires good coordination between 
DNOs and TNOs, thus, the communication between the parties can be increased more 
intensively. Considering this, the energy-based DG incentive mechanism can be implemented 
to incentivise associated parties, either DNOs or TNOs, in association with the utilization of 
DG energy to release the congestion on transmission level and its relation with the required 
investment cost. 
Regarding the energy-based DSR incentive mechanism, further development can be carried 
out by considering the utilization of available DSR participation to reduce the power flow and 
to flatten the peak demand on the transmission level. Demand reduction mechanism can be 
used to prevent high power flow which can lead the network components to fail or damage. 
Another DSR mechanism, the demand shifting mechanism, can be used to flatten the peak 
demand. By flattening the peak demand, the investment for network upgrade can be deferred. 
Considering these factors, the energy-based DSR incentive mechanism can be implemented 
to incentivise associated parties, either DNOs or TNOs, in association with the utilization of 
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DSR participation and its relation with the avoided investment to upgrade the network 
components. 
Furthermore, the connection of a DG at a particular network, where the DSR programme is 
also applied, will impact on the reduction of the required investment cost. By considering the 
correlation between DG and DSR, the target of low carbon network can be achieved with 
lower investment cost. This can be considered to further develop the mixed energy-based DG 
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GSP 275.000 Slack 1.000   
Bus33-1 33.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus33-2 33.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus33-3 33.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus33-4 33.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-1 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-2 11.000 PQ 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-3 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-4 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-5 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-6 11.000 PQ 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-7 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-8 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus11-9 11.000 PV 1.000 0.0 
Bus04-1 0.400 PV 1.000 0.0 





















DG1 4.050 1.960 0.085941 34.076.300 0.143592 1.135.880 
DG2 5.850 2.830 0.152672 25.954.200 0.152672 1.068.700 
DG3 5.850 2.830 0.152672 25.954.200 0.152672 1.068.700 
DG4 4.050 1.960 0.085941 34.076.300 0.143592 1.135.880 



























MVL-1 15.433 0.031426 0.019180 0.000548 0.059029 0.020411 
MVL-2 15.433 0.031426 0.019180 0.000548 0.059029 0.020411 
MVL-3 15.433 0.031426 0.019180 0.000548 0.059029 0.020411 
MVL-4 15.433 0.031426 0.019180 0.000548 0.059029 0.020411 
MVL-5 15.433 0.031426 0.019180 0.000548 0.059029 0.020411 
MVL-6 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-7 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-8 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-9 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-10 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-11 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-12 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-13 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-14 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 
MVL-15 7.049 0.146120 0.144701 0.000137 0.401475 0.158746 














TR1 40.000 0.015000 0.312250 0.012500 0.268750 
TR2 40.000 0.015000 0.312250 0.012500 0.268750 
TR3 10.000 0.072300 1.308000 0.065100 1.177000 
TR4 10.000 0.072300 1.308000 0.065100 1.177000 
TR5 10.000 0.072300 1.308000 0.065100 1.177000 
TR6 7.500 0.414800 2.372000 0.373200 2.134800 






MD1 3.800 1.250 
MD2 3.800 1.250 
MD3 3.800 1.250 
MD4 3.330 1.090 
MD5 3.330 1.090 
LD1 1.200 0.900 
LD2 1.200 0.900 
LD3 1.200 0.900 






Appendix 2 – Full Flowchart for Energy-based DG Incentive Mechanism 
 
DG Connection 
Determining the Capacity & 
the Type of DG Technology 
Capacity (DGp,cap); 
Power Factor (DGp,pf);  
Capacity Factor (DGp,cf); 
Levelised Cost of Energy 
Generation (DGp,LCOEG);  
Operational Time (DGp,oprtime) 
Determining Available DG Energy  
DGp,EnergyMax 
=DGp,capxDGp,pfxDGp,cfxDGp,oprtime  
Determining DG Incentive Unit 
Cost   
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(1 − (1 + WACC))−nper
 
DGInc = 0 
Determining the Initial 
Network Parameters  
Thermal Rating (Si,k
lim) 
Initial Apparent Power 
Flow (Si,k) 
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 are the elements of JB4 and JB2 
Reinforcement Cost = 0 
1 
1 
Determining the Annual Energy-based DG 
Incentive 
DGInc = DGIR ∗  DGEU ∗ EnergyCvy,DG; 
DGIncMin = DGIR  ∗  DGEUMin ∗ Energyreq,DG; 
DGIncMax = DGIR ∗ 100% ∗ Energyrate,DG; 
Actual Energy Conveyed 
(DGp,EnergyCvy) 
Determining the 
Reinforcement Cost  
EnergyCvy,DG >  Energyreq,DG 
EnergyCvy,DG <  Energyreq,DG 
Reinforcement Cost > 0 







Appendix 3 – Full Flowchart for Energy-based DSR Incentive Mechanism 
DSR Implementation 
Determining the DSR 
Participation 
DSR Available Capacity  (DSRCapAv); 
Required Participation Time  (timereq) 
Determining DSR Available Energy   
DSREAv = DSRCapAv x timereq 





DSRCost>= 0  
? 









Determining DSR Actual Energy   
DSREAc = DSRCapAct x timeAct 
Determining DG Incentive Rate  
DSRIR =  
DSRUC ∗ (1 + 0.066 − 0.8) ∗ WACC
(1 − (1 + WACC))−nper
 
DSRInc = 0 
Determining the Annual Energy-based DSR Incentive 
DSR 
Inc
=  DSR 
IR
∗ DSREU ∗ DSREAc 
DSRIncMax = DGIR ∗ 100% ∗ DSREAv  
DSREU>=0
? 
Determining the DSR 
Investment Cost 
DSRCost= 0 







Appendix 4 - Email Correspondences 
Email 1. LTDS <LTDS@northernpowergrid.com>, 7 November  2014. Network Upgrade for 
DSR Implementation. Email to Mohammad Noor Hidayat <mnh22@bath.ac.uk> 
 
Date:  11/07/14 15:43:33 GMT  
From:  LTDS <LTDS@northernpowergrid.com>   
To:  mnh22@bath.ac.uk <mnh22@bath.ac.uk>  
Subject:  RE: Network Upgrade for DSR Implementation  
Parts:  1 
 











There is no charge for accessing the information and it provides quite a lot of background data. 
 





both websites will provide you projects and innovations that DNOs are looking at - these cover all 
aspects, however amongst these are projects on DSR. 
 
Your questions seem to be covering two points. Adoption of DSR and the upgrading the distribution 
network to integrate Smart Metering To answer the two questions specifically:- 
 
Upgrading the network to integrate Smart Metering 
 
There is no upgrade required to the network to integrate Smart Metering - therefore no cost to the 
DNO. Smart Meters will be replaced by the Meter Provider companies, which are not related to us in 
any way. 
 
On the topic of adoption of DSR 
 
-        Which parts of the network should be upgraded by the DNO? 
No parts of the network would be upgraded by a DNO to allow DSR - one of the major drivers for 
DSR is that it defers upgrading (i.e. reinforcement). The distribution network is designed to provide 
demand capacity, therefore by reducing capacity through DSR would mitigate the need to reinforce. 
 
-        Roughly, how much investment costs needed for upgrading the network? 
Based on above, you would not invest to allow DSR. You would invest in DSR to defer upgrading. 
The cost needed to defer upgrading is unique to each situation and would be based on the cost that the 
DSR would prevent. It is also dependent on the nature of the DSR, its reliability, availability and its 
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duration. All these elements would be factored into establishing a cost of DSR. 
 
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch 
 
Mick Walbank 
System Planning Manager 
 
Office: 0191 229 4204 
Internal: 729 4204 
Mobile: 07889 765 280 








From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk]  
Sent: 06 November 2014 12:45 
To: LTDS 





My name is Mohammad Noor Hidayat. I am a PhD student at Department of Electronic and Electrical 
Engineering, University of Bath. 
 
I am doing a research related to the implementation of  Demand Side Response in electricity 
distribution network. 
 
As we know, the participation from the distribution network opeartor 
(DNO) is very important in the implementation of DSR programme. One of the requirement is 
by  ugrading the distribution network in order to integrate into the smart meter network. However, I 
have not found adequate information about the following points: 
-        Which parts of the network should be upgraded by the DNO? 
-        Roughly, how much investment costs needed for upgrading the network? 
 
I really need your assistance to get those important information. 
How and where can I get permission to access those information? 
 
Thank you very much for your attention and consideration. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohammad Noor Hidayat 
PhD Student 
2E-1.22 








E mail Disclaimer 
You agree that you have read and understood this disclaimer and you agree to be bound by its terms. 
The information contained in this e-mail and any files transmitted with it (if any) are confidential and 
intended for the addressee only. If you have received this e-mail in error please notify the originator. 
This e-mail and any attachments have been scanned for certain viruses prior to sending but Northern 
Powergrid Holdings Company nor any of its associated companies from whom this e-mail originates 
shall be liable for any losses as a result of any viruses being passed on. 
No warranty of any kind is given in respect of any information contained in this e-mail and you 
should be aware that it might be incomplete, out of date or incorrect. It is therefore essential that you 
verify all such information with us before placing any reliance upon it.  
Northern Powergrid Holdings Company 
Lloyds Court  
78 Grey Street  
Newcastle upon Tyne  
NE1 6AF  





Email 2. LTDS <LTDS@northernpowergrid.com>, 10 November  2014. Network Upgrade for 
DSR Implementation. Email to Mohammad Noor Hidayat <mnh22@bath.ac.uk> 
 
Date:  11/10/14 12:48:22 GMT  
From:  LTDS <LTDS@northernpowergrid.com>   
To:  mnh22@bath.ac.uk <mnh22@bath.ac.uk>  

















Strange that the link didn’t work. The ENA is the trade association for the distribution companies in 
the UK. The following link may be of help about the Smarter Networks Portal. Mainly a contact name 




Unfortunately the schemes are all individual and we do not have a consolidated list. 
 
Answers to your questions are below 
 
-----Original Message----- 
From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk] 
Sent: 10 November 2014 08:29 
To: LTDS 
Subject: Re: Network Upgrade for DSR Implementation 
 
 
Dear Mick Walbank, 
 
First of all, I would like to thank you for your quick response. 
 
I have checked all the links you provided and I got valuable information from them, but the following 
one is not accessible: 
http://www.smarternetworks.org/ 
 
Furthermore, I would like to discuss another important factor, i.e. 
the costs for DSR Implementation. 
 
According to Peter Bradley, et al (2011), there are two types of DSR Costs, i.e. the participant costs 
and the system costs. The details are as follows: 
 
The participant costs include: enabling technology investment (smart meter),  comfort/inconvenience 
costs, reduce amenity/lost business, rescheduling costs (e.g. overtime pay) and on-site generator fuel 




The system costs include: metering/communication system upgrades, utility equipment or software 
costs, billing system upgrades, consumer education, programme/administration/management, 
marketing/recruitment, payments to participating customers and programme evaluation. 
 
Based on the above information, there are two points that come to my mind: 
 
1. Which one of those two becomes the DNO’s responsibility? 
(In my opinion, the DNO should bear the system costs but I have not got related 
evidences/references). 
Depending on your standpoint, you could define it either way. Two examples are given below. 
 
New Customer 
Under the current regulations, the DNO is responsible for general load growth and maintenance. The 
cost of this activity is levied on the customer through their electricity bill (on average about £40 per 
quarter is for the DNO use of system charge) Where we have to upgrade the network to connect a 
large customer, the total cost is picked up by the customer. The use of DSR would be instead of 
reinforcement of the network. Therefore any cost associated with DSR would be the responsibility of 
that particular customer – including any systems, communications etc. A general rule has been that a 
domestic customer should not see their bill go up due to us connecting a commercial operation, and as 
all our revenue is recovered from the customer, any ownership on our part would be passed through to 
the domestic customer. 
 
So in the above example – which is the connection of a new customer – we would expect all 
participant and system costs to be picked up by the customer. The alternative is for the customer to 
pay for reinforcement and a Cost Benefit Analysis would work that out. 
 
General load growth 
A second example would be general load growth and DSR used as an alternative to reinforcement. In 
this scenario, it is the general usage by customers that would cause the need to either reinforce or 
install DSR. We are obligated under our licence to provide the ‘most efficient and technically feasible 
solution’ which does include DSR. In this scenario we would expect that any customer involved in 
DSR would be compensated for inconvenience costs, lost business, fuel etc AND we would cover the 
cost of software, billing systems, education etc. We would look at going out to some form of 
tendering process for the services. 
 
A simplistic view would be that the customer would wrap up all their costs into a single price 
(common approach is an availability price and a utilisation price) and we would use that price as the 
cost of DSR. We would then look at this price and undertake cost benefit analysis against 
reinforcement (i.e. building a new substation). The essence of this is the same as above, the most 
efficient, technically feasible solution – which does not necessarily mean the cheapest, but must be 
long term viable and cost effective. 
 
2. How to value the costs that fall onto the DNO’s responsibility? 
(Perhaps there are some available documents that I can access) 
There are three places where you can garner information on costs, both will need some analysis to 
extract what you are after as the actual figures are dependent on the actual project. The best starting 




You can work out unit costs from the details as we give the total cost and the volume and from there 
you can work out a unit cost. 
 






This will give you a ‘ball park’ figure to connect say a single domestic property. You can take the cost 
of a new connection as a proxy for the cost of reinforcement (i.e. the cost of laying a new cable to add 
20kVA is much the same as laying a new cable to increase the capacity by 20kVA) any DSR scheme 
would have to be economically more efficient and technically feasible and more than just one year. A 
general guide is 10 to 15 years. This is a good starting point for Cost Benefit Analysis. 
 
In both cases, the starting point is the cost of reinforcement – and any DSR scheme would have to be 
economically more efficient than the reinforcement cost. 
 
National Grid already have contracts in place DSR services – under the reserve contracts that they 





This will give you prices that were paid for DSR on a large scale. This is a good starting point as this 
market has been around for at least 10 years and is well established. What it does do is set the price in 
that any scheme that you assess, it would need to be cheaper than this to work. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your attention and kind assistance. 
 
Sincerely yours, 




Quoting LTDS <LTDS@northernpowergrid.com<mailto:LTDS@northernpowergrid.com>>: 
[Hide Quoted Text] 
Dear Mohammad 
 
You may find some useful information on your request in our Long Term 




There is no charge for accessing the information and it provides quite 
a lot of background data. 
 





both websites will provide you projects and innovations that DNOs are 
looking at - these cover all aspects, however amongst these are 
projects on DSR. 
 
Your questions seem to be covering two points. Adoption of DSR and the 
upgrading the distribution network to integrate Smart Metering To 




Upgrading the network to integrate Smart Metering 
 
There is no upgrade required to the network to integrate Smart 
Metering - therefore no cost to the DNO. Smart Meters will be replaced 
by the Meter Provider companies, which are not related to us in any 
way. 
 
On the topic of adoption of DSR 
 
-     Which parts of the network should be upgraded by the DNO? 
No parts of the network would be upgraded by a DNO to allow DSR - one 
of the major drivers for DSR is that it defers upgrading (i.e. 
reinforcement). The distribution network is designed to provide demand 
capacity, therefore by reducing capacity through DSR would mitigate 
the need to reinforce. 
 
-     Roughly, how much investment costs needed for upgrading the network? 
Based on above, you would not invest to allow DSR. You would invest in 
DSR to defer upgrading. The cost needed to defer upgrading is unique 
to each situation and would be based on the cost that the DSR would 
prevent. It is also dependent on the nature of the DSR, its 
reliability, availability and its duration. All these elements would 
be factored into establishing a cost of DSR. 
 




System Planning Manager 
 
Office: 0191 229 4204 
Internal: 729 4204 
Mobile: 07889 765 280 








From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk<mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk> [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk] 
Sent: 06 November 2014 12:45 
To: LTDS 





My name is Mohammad Noor Hidayat. I am a PhD student at Department of 




I am doing a research related to the implementation of  Demand Side 
Response in electricity distribution network. 
 
As we know, the participation from the distribution network opeartor 
(DNO) is very important in the implementation of DSR programme. One of 
the requirement is by  ugrading the distribution network in order to 
integrate into the smart meter network. However, I have not found 
adequate information about the following points: 
-     Which parts of the network should be upgraded by the DNO? 
-     Roughly, how much investment costs needed for upgrading the network? 
 
I really need your assistance to get those important information. 
How and where can I get permission to access those information? 
 
Thank you very much for your attention and consideration. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohammad Noor Hidayat 
PhD Student 
2E-1.22 






E mail Disclaimer 
You agree that you have read and understood this disclaimer and you 
agree to be bound by its terms. 
The information contained in this e-mail and any files transmitted 
with it (if any) are confidential and intended for the addressee only. 
If you have received this e-mail in error please notify the 
originator. 
This e-mail and any attachments have been scanned for certain viruses 
prior to sending but Northern Powergrid Holdings Company nor any of 
its associated companies from whom this e-mail originates shall be 
liable for any losses as a result of any viruses being passed on. 
No warranty of any kind is given in respect of any information 
contained in this e-mail and you should be aware that it might be 
incomplete, out of date or incorrect. It is therefore essential that 
you verify all such information with us before placing any reliance 
upon it. 
Northern Powergrid Holdings Company 
Lloyds Court 
78 Grey Street 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
NE1 6AF 







Email 3. Anna Rossington <Anna.Rossington@ofgem.gov.uk>, 4 April 2013. DG Incentive 
Calculation. Email to Mohammad Noor Hidayat <mnh22@bath.ac.uk> 
 
Date:  04/04/13 17:49:40 GMT  
From:  Anna Rossington <Anna.Rossington@ofgem.gov.uk>   
To:  mnh22@bath.ac.uk <mnh22@bath.ac.uk>  
Subject:  RE: Asking about the calculation process of the DG Incentive Rate  
Parts:  1 
 




Apologies - it's a Microsoft Excel function: 
 
PMT function 






For a more complete description of the arguments in PMT, see the PV function. 
 
Rate     is the interest rate for the loan. 
 
Nper     is the total number of payments for the loan. 
 
Pv     is the present value, or the total amount that a series of future payments is worth now; also 
known as the principal. 
 
Fv     is the future value, or a cash balance you want to attain after the last payment is made. If fv is 
omitted, it is assumed to be 0 (zero), that is, the future value of a loan is 0. 
 





From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk]  
Sent: 04 April 2013 15:49 
To: Anna Rossington 
Subject: Re: Asking about the calculation process of the DG Incentive Rate 
 
 
Dear Anna Rossington, 
 
I understand all calculation processes you provided, except this particular one: 
 
The annual incentive rate = PMT (WACC, 15, total incentive) 
                                 = PMT (5.6%, 15, £9/kW) 




What does "PMT" mean? How the process should be done? 
 
Could you explain, please? 
I really did not get into it. 
 
Thank you very much for your attention and helpful assistance 
 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohammad Noor Hidayat 
 
 
Quoting Anna Rossington <Anna.Rossington@ofgem.gov.uk>: 
[Hide Quoted Text] 
Dear Mohammad, 
 
The DG incentive is made up of two elements, pass through (80% of the  
cost of relevant connection assets) and  the incentive (per kW). 
Together they are designed to give the company an additional 1% return  
on the cost of relevant assets used to connect DG. 
 
The calculation process was as follows: 
 
Pass through revenue = pass through rate x average cost of connection assets 
                                = 80% x £34/kW 
                                = £27/kW 
 
The desired return on the cost of assets used = WACC + 1% = 5.6% + 1%  
= 6.6% 
 
The combined revenue/kW (including pass through and incentive) to give  
the desired return 
                                                                = average cost of connection assets x (1 + desired return) 
                                                                = £34/kW x (1 + 6.6%) 
                                                                = £36/kW 
 
Therefore the total incentive required = combined revenue/kW - pass  
through revenue/kW 
                                                        = £36/kW - £27/kW 
                                                        = £9/kW 
 
The annual incentive rate = PMT (WACC, 15, total incentive) 
                                = PMT (5.6%, 15, £9/kW) 






From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk] 
Sent: 25 March 2013 10:50 
To: Anna Rossington 






Dear Anna Rossington, 
 
Regarding the Annual Incentive Rate of £0.90/kW/yr, I tried the  
calculation process as follows: 
 
Annual Incentive Rate 
= ((pre-tax WACC / 15) * pass through revenue) * incentive rate  
required/kW = ((5.6% / 15) * £27) *£9 = £0.9072 /kW/yr 
 
Is the calculation process correct? 
If the answer is YES, why the pre-tax WACC must be multiplied by the  
pass through revenue? 
 
If the calculation process is wrong, how to derive the value of the  
annual incentive rate? 
 
Or 
Could you give me the references/documents which are related to this matter? 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance and consideration. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohammad Noor Hidayat 
2E-1.22 
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering Faculty of  
Engineering and Design University of Bath Bath, BA2 7AY United Kingdom 
 
 
Quoting Anna Rossington <Anna.Rossington@ofgem.gov.uk>: 
Dear Mohammad, 
 
The average connection cost for DG forecast by the DNOs equated to  
approx £34/kW 
 
The incentive was calculated as follows: 
 
 
Average connection cost                                 £34         /kW 
pass through rate                                        80% 
pass through revenue /kW                        £27         /kW 
additional return                                        1% 
desired return                                        6.60%        (on pre-tax WACC of 5.6%) 
combined revenue /kW given desired return        £36 /kW 
Incentive rate required                                £9.00        /kW (£36 - £27) 
Annual Incentive Rate                                £0.90        /kW/yr (using pre-tax WACC over 15 years) 
Rounded up to                                        £1.00        /kW/yr 
 





















----- Original Message ----- 
From: mnh22@bath.ac.uk [mailto:mnh22@bath.ac.uk] 
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2013 04:06 PM 
To: Rachel Fletcher 




Dear Rachel Fletcher, 
 
My name is Mohammad Noor Hidayat. I am a PhD student at the  
University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom. I am doing a research with  
a topic related to DG Incentives for the Distribution Network  
Operators in the United Kingdom. 
 
According to the Electricity Distribution Price Control Review -  
Final Proposals - Incentives and Obligations, page 18, which was  
published on 7 September 2009, the value of DG incentive rate was set  
at £1/kW/year. I am curious how this value was derived. 
 
I found on page 19, point 3.6 and 3.11, consists of the following 
statements: 
 
3.6. The DG incentive is calculated to provide DNOs with an  
additional rate of return of 1 per cent above the current allowed  
cost of capital. As stated in Initial Proposals, using use of system  
connection assets only, the equivalent cost to that used in DPCR4 is  
£34/kW which resulted in an incentive rate of £1/kW/year in Initial  
Proposals. We recalculated the DG incentive (using the same basis as  
used for Initial Proposals) to reflect the WACC of 4.7 per cent  
(vanilla, equivalent to 5.6 per cent pre-tax) proposed in these Final  
Proposals. This resulted in a small reduction in the incentive rate,  
but due to the uncertainty surrounding the DG forecasts, we propose  
to retain the DG incentive rate at £1/kW/year (pre-tax). 
 
3.11. Similarly, we propose to calculate the DG incentive rate based  
on use of system connection assets only. The calculation still gives  
the DNOs an additional rate of return of 1 percentage point above the 
DPCR5 pre-tax WACC of 5.6 per cent and gives an incentive rate of  
£1/kW/year (pre-tax). We propose to use the same DG incentive rate  




Until now, I still cannot find the calculation process to get the  
incentive rate of £1/kW/year. Could you tell me how this value was  
derived and calculated? 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohammad Noor Hidayat 
2E-1.22 
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering Faculty of  
Engineering and Design University of Bath Bath, BA2 7AY United  
Kingdom 
 
This message may be confidential, privileged or otherwise protected  
from disclosure. It does not represent the views or opinions of Ofgem  
unless expressly stated otherwise. 
 
If you have received this message by mistake, please contact the  
sender and immediately delete the message from your system; you  
should not copy the message or disclose its contents to any other  
person or organisation. 
This message may be confidential, privileged or otherwise protected  
from disclosure. It does not represent the views or opinions of Ofgem  
unless expressly stated otherwise. 
 
If you have received this message by mistake, please contact the  
sender and immediately delete the message from your system; you should  
not copy the message or disclose its contents to any other person or  
organisation. 
This message may be confidential, privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. It does not 
represent the views or opinions of Ofgem unless expressly stated otherwise. 
 
If you have received this message by mistake, please contact the sender and immediately delete the 
message from your system; you should not copy the message or disclose its contents to any other 





Appendix 5 - Papers Published or in Process for Publication 
The following papers are reproduced in this appendix, in which, the first three papers have 
been published and the last one is waiting for publication. 
Published papers; 
1. Mohammad Noor Hidayat and Furong Li, 2011. Implementation of Renewable Energy 
Sources for Electricity Generation in Indonesia. 2011 IEEE PES General Meeting, IEEE 
Catalogue Number CFP11POW-USB, ISBN 978-1-4577-1001-8. 
2. Mohammad Noor Hidayat and Furong Li, 2013. Impact of Distributed Generation 
Technologies on Generation Curtailment. 2013 IEEE PES General Meeting, IEEE 
Catalogue Number CFP13POW-USB, ISBN 978-1-4799-1301-5. 
3. Mohammad Noor Hidayat and Furong Li, 2013. Investigating the Impact of Distributed 
Generation on Demand-dominated Areas. UKSim-AMSS 7th European Modelling 
Symposium 2013, 20-22 November 2013 Manchester, Manchester pp. 378-383. 
Papers waiting for publication; 
4. Mohammad Noor Hidayat and Furong Li, 2014. Energy-Based Distributed Generation 
Incentives for Distribution Network Operators. Accepted and scheduled for presentation 
at 2015 IEEE PES General Meeting. 
 
  
